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Abstract
Adaptations to Changes in Environmental Conditions and Policies
by
Steven James Miller
Economic incentives for users of natural resources depend on both environmental
conditions and policies in place to govern use of those resources. Similarly, polluting firms
are financially impacted by the regulatory context in which they operate and the manner
in which natural systems exposed to their pollution are affected. Shifts in environmental
conditions or policy thus may alter the economic incentives and behavior of resource
users and polluting firms. To the extent that such shifts impose higher costs, economic
theory suggests that economic agents will seek ways to mitigate their exposure to such
costs, either through preventative behavior or adaptation. As a result, the economic
effects of change will depend upon the responses of affected individuals or firms. Here,
I examine the effects of three types of change on the behavior of natural resource users
and polluting firms. The first chapter employs dynamic game theory to examine the
effect of a potential environmental regime shift on coalition formation in a shared fishery,
finding that the threat of such shifts can support enhanced cooperation as a means to
avoid the shift. The second chapter focuses attention on a policy shift in a multi-species
fishery, studying how resource users respond to the introduction of tradable permits
for bycatch species. That study uses a combination of theory and panel econometric
approaches to identify multi-margin responses to the regulatory change, and in so doing,
estimates the marginal costs of conservation for overfished species. In the final chapter, I
continue to examine regulatory change, but shift systems to examine how environmental
policy may stimulate innovation. In particular, I explore how tradable emissions permits
vi
can create incentives for unregulated firms to innovate, illustrating the consequences of
such spillovers for policy analysis using both theory and an empirical application to the
European Union Emissions Trading System.
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Chapter 1
Coalition formation in fisheries with
potential regime shift
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1.1 Introduction
Many natural systems can undergo sudden, dramatic changes in their dynamics in
response to a change in environmental conditions or human activity. When such a system
provides value through the provision of an ecosystem service such as shoreline protection
by mangroves or the harvest of fish, such a change in productivity, known as a regime
shift, can have substantial economic consequences. Large swings in the abundance and
growth of Pacific sardines led to the cessation of fishing in the early 1950s and a for-
mal moratorium in 1967 (Radovich, 1981). Similar dramatic shifts in productivity have
impacted cod fisheries in various parts of the Atlantic Ocean. Importantly, those shifts
may have been affected by the level of fishing to which the stocks were subjected. In
the Atlantic Cod fishery in the North and Baltic seas, Lindegren et al. (2010) find that
areas subject to trawl fishing bans were less likely to experience regime shift than areas
subjected to full commercial-scale fishing. The influence of fishing on regime shifts could
act directly through reduction in growth rates or indirectly by making a fish population
more susceptible to otherwise exogenous environmental drivers of regime shift (Collie
et al., 2004).
While a substantial body of research examines the economic consequences of uncer-
tainty in fisheries (e.g. Clark and Kirkwood 1986; Costello and Polasky 2008; Sethi et al.
2005) and a number of ecologists have studied the mechanisms behind regime shifts (e.g.
Folke et al. 2004), the economics literature examining how the potential for such regime
shifts affects optimal management of a fishery focuses only on harvest decisions.2 Early
work by Reed (1988) highlights two competing effects of such a threat. First, the threat
of collapse acts in a similar way to a higher discount rate, since expected future harvest
is smaller, suggesting higher optimal harvest rates. However, if the threat of collapse
2A related literature examines the effects of regime shift in other contexts, such as forestry, ozone
depletion, or greenhouse gas emissions. Examples include Cropper (1976); Nkuiya et al. (2014).
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increases as the stock is fished down, there may be a countervailing incentive to reduce
exposure to the threat by harvesting less. More recent work by Polasky et al. (2011)
and Ren and Polasky (2014) clarifies the role that different assumptions about the con-
sequences of the regime shift have on optimal harvest policies. In an applied setting,
Costello et al. (1998) examine the value of information pertaining to a potential shift in
a coho salmon fishery caused by El Nin˜o.
All of these studies examine how a single resource user should adjust management
choices when faced with the threat of a regime shift. However, there is also some evidence
suggesting that such threats may motivate cooperation among multiple resource users
in fisheries. The rock lobster fishery in New Zealand offers one compelling example.
That fishery has been managed under a property rights scheme since 1990, but despite
management efforts, catches showed signs of decline by 2006. In response to declining
catches, fishers worked with scientists to evaluate management alternatives and in 2007
each voluntarily surrendered a fraction of his or her individual quota in order to avoid
collapse of the stock and a shift to an extremely low productivity regime (Breen et al.,
2009). This example suggests that the threat of regime shift may alter not only individual
harvest choices, but also the calculus of cooperation.
This paper examines how the threat of a regime shift alters the incentives for cooper-
ation in a shared fishery. In particular, we study how the threat of a regime shift alters
both harvest and coalition membership decisions, and ask how those effects vary with (i)
whether the threat is exogenous (stock-independent) or endogenous (stock-dependent),
and (ii) the type of shift (complete collapse or drop in productivity). We address these
questions using a stochastic dynamic game of harvest in which fishers repeatedly choose
whether to join a fishing coalition and how much of the resource to extract. This frame-
work builds upon the standard fish wars model (Levhari and Mirman, 1980) used by Kwon
(2006) to study coalition formation in a deterministic setting. Our primary contribution
3
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is to unite that study of deterministic coalition formation with the sole owner litera-
ture on the threat of regime shift. Our work also complements studies by Fesselmeyer
and Santugini (2013) and Sakamoto (2014), which examine the impact of regime shifts
on harvest in a shared fishery but do not examine how such shifts affect (endogenous)
cooperation decisions.
Our analysis suggests that the threat of regime shift alters harvesters’ responses as
compared to the standard cases where either such a threat is absent or the decision to
join a coalition is ignored. We first examine the scenario where the abrupt occurrence
of the shift reduces the resource growth rate but does not cause extinction. Analytical
results indicate that when the probability of regime shift is exogenous and known, no
more than two players cooperate. The threat may induce a stable coalition with two
fishers that would not exist in the absence of the threat, but overall an exogenous threat
of regime shift supports only small coalitions. In addition, we find conditions under
which, prior to the shift, members of a stable coalition reduce their harvest whereas
each non-member increases his harvest. When we instead consider the case where the
probability of regime shift is endogenous (depends on harvest decisions), we find that
larger stable coalitions are sustainable prior to the shift. In particular, we find in this
context that the threat may induce full cooperation as an equilibrium outcome. We repeat
these analyses for a doomsday scenario in which the shift entails a doomsday event in
which the stock collapses. We find that a harvester may undertake cautious behavior
in response to the threat when the probability of regime shift is exogenous. In the case
where the likelihood of the shift is affected by harvest decisions, we show numerically
that the grand coalition can be stable. We of course do not interpret these findings as
implying that full cooperation will always arise in fisheries. However, our analysis does
suggest the threat of regime shift may play an important role in determining the level of
cooperation that occurs in shared resource use.
4
Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift Chapter 1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present our
dynamic model, including the system dynamics, player objectives, and game structure.
Section 3 presents the equilibrium and its properties for the post-shift era after a drop
in productivity. Section 4 does the same for the pre-shift era when the threat of a shift
is exogenous, and the fifth section presents numerical results for the pre-shift era with
endogenous threat. We then consider the doomsday scenario in which the shift causes a
lump-sum bad payoff for all players. The final section concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Overview
We model the exploitation of a common-pool renewable resource by a fixed and finite
number of identical users in a discrete-time, infinite horizon dynamic game. Harvest
of the resource provides immediate benefits and also affects the future availability of
the resource, thereby affecting future benefits. Each user may make harvest decisions
independently or may choose to join a coalition and jointly agree upon harvest choices
with other coalition members. Coalition membership is re-evaluated at the start of each
period.
Members of the coalition choose harvest so as to maximize their aggregate discounted
sum of benefits, while each non-member considers only his or her own benefits. The ben-
efits earned by the coalition are shared equally among members due to the identical
nature of players. Individuals join the coalition only if their share of the coalition ben-
efits exceeds the payoff that they could earn by leaving the coalition and harvesting
independently.
Our assumption of identical harvesters simplifies much of the analysis that follows,
5
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but it requires that we specify how harvesters form expectations about future payoffs.
To compute future returns a harvester needs to know whether he will be in the coalition
in the future. However, identical harvesters will have the same membership preferences
and it remains unclear which harvesters will get to join. To resolve this issue, we adopt
the Random Assignment Rule,3 in which current coalition members and non-members
have the same expected future payoff.
The focus of the model is on how the threat of regime shift alters the decision of
whether or not to join the coalition and the resulting effects on equilibrium harvest rates.
The regime shift works as follows: the system starts in a preferable state with high
resource growth and during any period may permanently switch with some probability
to a less productive, low growth state. We examine the case where the probability of
that shift is exogenously given and the case where the probability depends on the current
level of the stock. In the latter case, because the stock is a function of users’ harvest
decisions, the threat of regime shift is endogenous. More precisely, an increase of total
harvest reduces the resource stock, which in turn increases the probability of regime shift.
With this overview of the game in place, we next formalize the model mathematically.
1.2.2 Dynamic game structure
A set of N identical resource users exploit a shared resource in a discrete-time dynamic
game. In each period t, the environment is in regime θt ∈ {H,L} (where H denotes
“High” and L “Low”), the stock is of size St ∈ [0, 1], and the following sequence of events
takes place:
1. In the absence of harvest, the stock grows naturally according to a growth function
3See Nkuiya (2012) and Nkuiya et al. (2014) for examples and a survey on this technique. There are,
of course, many other ways to resolve coalition membership, but we focus on the Random Assignment
Rule for consistency with the literature and tractability.
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g(St, θt). For comparison with the Fish Wars literature we restrict our attention to
Gompertz growth:
g(St, θt) = S
1−bθt
t , (1.1)
where bθt is a regime-specific growth parameter. We assume 1 > bH > bL ≥ 0 so
that g(St, H) ≥ g(St, L) ∀St ∈ [0, 1], i.e. the “High” regime is characterized by
greater growth.
2. Users form and announce preferences for joining or free-riding on a coalition based
on a comparison of the discounted net benefits that accrue to members and free-
riders. These preferences determine the stable coalition size nt such that no member
would prefer to leave and no free-rider would prefer to join. A coalition is then
formed, with the set of members denoted Kt and nt = |Kt|.
3. The coalition and non-members simultaneously choose and apply harvest. Coali-
tion member i harvests hit, while non-member j harvests hjt. Harvest has two
consequences. First, it subtracts from the post-growth stock g(St, θt) to produce
the next period stock St+1:
St+1 = g(St, θt)−
∑
i∈Kt
hit −
∑
j 6∈Kt
hjt (1.2)
Second, harvest provides current benefits pi(hjt) for each non-member and∑
i∈Kt pi(hit) for the coalition. For consistency with the Fish Wars literature, we
use pi(h) = ln(h).
4. The environmental state updates from θt to θt+1 according to a Markov process
with transition probabilities P (θt+1|θt). These transition probabilities P (θt+1|θt)
7
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are such that the probability of shift from H to L is given by ρ(St), and the shift
from H to L, if it occurs, is permanent. Formally:
P (θt+1 = L|θt = H) = ρ(St), P (θt+1 = H|θt = H) = 1− ρ(St), (1.3)
P (θt+1 = L|θt = L) = 1, P (θt+1 = H|θt = L) = 0.
In the case of exogenous threat, ρ(St) = ρ¯ and does not depend on St, while in the
case of endogenous threat, ρ(St) weakly decreases in St.
Steps 2 and 3 constitute a two-stage game that occurs every period: a first-stage
membership game and a second-stage harvest game. Because the Random Assignment
Rule affects both coalition formation and calculation of the future component of benefits
in step 2, we briefly clarify the role of the Random Assignment Rule before turning to a
discussion of those two stage games.
1.2.3 Expected payoffs under random assignment
Under the Random Assignment Rule, once a coalition size nt has been determined by
the membership game in period t, since players are identical they are randomly assigned
to the coalition until the coalition is of that size. Since this assignment rule implies that
all players share the same expected future payoff, regardless of their current membership
status, we should define the expected future payoff. Let V Ci (St, θt, nt) be the value of
being a member of a coalition of size nt with stock St and regime θt, and let V
F
j (St, θt, nt)
be defined analogously for an individual free-riding on that coalition. Denoting the
equilibrium coalition size by n∗(St, θt), in period t− 1 all players face the same expected
8
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future payoff in period t:
W (St, θt) =
n∗(St, θt)
N
V Ci (St, θt, n
∗(St, θt)) +
N − n∗(St, θt)
N
V Fj (St, θt, n
∗(St, θt)). (1.4)
We next write down the problems faced by harvesters, beginning with the second-
stage harvest game and working backwards.
1.2.4 Second-stage harvest game
Assume that in period t the first-stage coalition formation game has taken place.
In the second-stage harvest game, the coalition and each non-member take the stock,
environmental state, coalition size, and harvest decisions of others as given and choose
harvest levels to maximize the discounted sum of current and expected future benefits.
Recall that coalition members seek to maximize their joint benefits from harvest, while
each free-rider considers only his own benefits. Note that there are no returns to scale
for coalition members; the benefits of cooperation stem solely from making joint harvest
choices that partially internalize of the externalities of harvest.
Formally, we write the harvest problems facing the coalition and individual free-riders
as follows:
V C(St, θt, nt) = max{hit:i∈Kt}
∑
i∈Kt
ln(hit) + ntδ
∑
θt+1
P (θt+1|θt)W (St+1, θt+1), (1.5)
V Fj (St, θt, nt) = max
hjt
ln(hjt) + δ
∑
θt+1
P (θt+1|θt)W (St+1, θt+1), (1.6)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor.
Since players are identical, coalition members share payoffs equally, and each coalition
9
Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift Chapter 1
member in a coalition of size nt receives
1
nt
of the coalition payoff:
V Ci (St, θt, nt) = max{hit},i∈Kt
1
nt
∑
i∈Kt
ln(hit) + δ
∑
θt+1
P (θt+1|θt)W (St+1, θt+1). (1.7)
We restrict attention to harvest policies that depend only on the current state of
the system (resource stock and current regime), i.e. Markov strategies. Alternatively,
one may also consider history-dependent strategies. We adopt Markov strategies as, in
addition to yielding time-consistent and tractable solutions, they are sufficient to isolate
the role that the threat of regime shift plays in influencing cooperation. As the restriction
to Markov strategies and dynamic game structure suggest, the equilibrium concept we
will ultimately apply is Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
1.2.5 Membership stage game
In the first-stage membership game, harvesters non-cooperatively decide whether or
not to join a coalition based on the potential gains to cooperation. We rely on the
stability conditions of d’Aspremont et al. (1983), which state that a coalition of size nt
is stable if it satisfies:
V Ci (St, θt, nt) ≥ V Fj (St, θt, nt − 1), (1.8)
V Fj (St, θt, nt) ≥ V Ci (St, θt, nt + 1). (1.9)
The internal stability condition (1.8) states that no coalition member can become
better off by leaving the coalition. Likewise, the external stability condition (1.9) states
that no free-rider would gain from joining the coalition. These two stability conditions
10
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can be summarized using the stability function (see, for example, Nkuiya et al. 2014)
φ(St, θt, nt) = V
C
i (St, θt, nt)− V Fj (St, θt, nt − 1). (1.10)
The largest coalition size n∗t satisfying φ(St, θt, nt) ≥ 0 is stable. To see this, note
that if n∗t satisfies φ(St, θt, nt) ≥ 0, it is clearly internally stable. Since n∗t is the largest
coalition satisfying φ(St, θt, nt) ≥ 0, then we must have that φ(St, θt, n∗t + 1) < 0. By
the definition of φ(St, θt, nt), this in turn implies that V
F
j (St, θt, n
∗
t ) > V
C
i (St, θt, n
∗
t + 1),
and so the coalition of size n∗t is also externally stable. Therefore, in this paper we define
the equilibrium coalition size as the largest coalition size satisfying the internal stability
condition (1.8). Finally, note that, in general, n∗t may be a function of both St and θt,
so we write it more generally as n∗(St, θt).
Together, (1.2), (1.3), (1.4), (1.6), (1.7), (1.8), and (1.9) define the dynamic game
and its equilibrium. We turn next to finding and analyzing that equilibrium, beginning
with decisions after the regime shift has taken place (θt = L) and working backwards.
1.3 Post-shift equilibrium
We begin our analysis after a regime shift has taken place, i.e. for times t for which
θt = L. We do so for three reasons: first, players making decisions prior to the regime
shift must anticipate the payoffs they would receive in the future if regime shift does
occur. Second, comparing the post-shift outcome with the benchmark of cooperation in
the absence of threat allows us to understand the effects of the shift itself. Third, the
solution of the post-regime shift case will allow us to completely derive the equilibrium
of the game.
We solve the post-shift problem as follows. First, we make a conjecture about the
11
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functional form of W (St, L). Second, under that conjecture, we solve the harvest prob-
lems faced by coalition members and free-riders to derive expressions for both equilibrium
harvest policies and the players’ payoffs. Third, we use the players’ payoffs to evaluate
the stability conditions and show that the equilibrium coalition size n∗L is independent of
the stock size St. Fourth, we use the definition of W (St, L) under the random assignment
rule, the second-stage value functions, and the stock-independence of n∗L to show that
W (St, L) takes the conjectured form. Finally, we use the solution to derive an expression
for n∗L and use that result to show that the equilibrium coalition size cannot be larger
than two after the regime shift has taken place.
1.3.1 Second-stage harvest game
Based on the logarithmic form of the instantaneous benefit function, we conjecture
that W (St, L) takes the following form
W (St, L) =ALln(St) + γL, (1.11)
where AL and γL are constants that depend on model parameters but do not depend on
St.
Under this conjecture, we may write the second-stage harvest problems faced by the
coalition and non-members as follows:
V C(St, L, nt) = max{hit:i∈Kt}
∑
i∈Kt
ln(hit) + ntδ [ALln(St+1) + γL] , (1.12)
V Fj (St, L, nt) = max
hjt
ln(hjt) + δ [ALln(St+1) + γL] , (1.13)
12
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subject to (1.2). First-order conditions for members and free-riders, respectively, give
1
nt
1
h∗it
=
δAL
g(St, L)− nth∗it − (N − nt)h∗jt
,
1
h∗jt
=
δAL
g(St, L)− nth∗it − (N − nt)h∗jt
.
Note that h∗jt = nth
∗
it, i.e. each non-member harvests as much as the entire coalition.
Using this fact we solve for h∗it and h
∗
jt:
h∗it =
1
nt
g(St, L)
δAL +N − nt + 1 , (1.14)
h∗jt =
g(St, L)
δAL +N − nt + 1 . (1.15)
We may plug these harvests into (1.12) and (1.13) and substitute for g(St, L) using
(1.1) to get expressions for V Ci (St, L, nt) and V
F
j (St, L, nt). Algebra yields
V Ci (St, L, nt) =(1 + δAL)(1− bL)ln(St) + δALln (δAL) + δγL (1.16)
− (1 + δAL)ln(δAL +N − nt + 1)− ln(nt)
V Fj (St, L, nt) =V
C
i (St, L, nt) + ln(nt). (1.17)
Since W (St, L) is defined in (1.4) as a function of the equilibrium coalition size
n∗(St, L), in order to verify the conjectured form for W (St, L) we must determine the
equilibrium coalition size. Thus, we carry through our conjecture to consideration of the
first-stage membership game.
13
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1.3.2 First-stage membership game
To determine the outcome of the first-stage membership game, we use the stability
concept defined in section 2.5. Substituting (1.16) and (1.17) into (1.10) we get that
φ(St, θt, nt) ≥ 0 holds only when
ln(nt) ≤ (1 + δAL) ln
(
1 +
1
δAL +N − nt + 1
)
. (1.18)
Immediately we see that the largest coalition size satisfying (1.18) is independent of
St. As a result, from here on we write n
∗
L(St, L) simply as n
∗
L.
Plugging (1.16) and (1.17) into the definition of W (St, L) as given in (1.4) and rear-
ranging gives
W (St, L) =(1 + δAL)(1− bL)ln(St)
+ δALln (δAL) + δγL − (1 + δAL)ln(δAL +N − n∗L + 1)−
n∗L
N
ln(n∗L)
This equation is of the form we conjectured for W (St, L), and so we have verified the
conjecture. Equating coefficients yields
AL =
1− bL
1− δ(1− bL) (1.19)
γL =
−(1 + δAL)ln(δAL +N − n∗L + 1) + δALln(δAL)− n
∗
L
N
ln(n∗L)
1− δ . (1.20)
With the equilibrium defined, we summarize the properties of the coalition size in the
following result:
Result 1 In the post regime shift phase (θt = L), the equilibrium coalition size (i) cannot
be larger than 2, and (ii) is non-increasing in the post-shift resource productivity bL.
14
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Proof: See the appendix.
The first part of Result 1 strengthens the result obtained in the deterministic frame-
work by Kwon (2006), where membership decisions are made once and for all at the
start of the initial period (an open loop membership game). In this paper, membership
decisions are revised at the start of each period. We find that the coalition size stays
constant in the post-shift era not by assumption, but as an equilibrium outcome. Still, as
in Kwon, the intuition underlying this result is that the gains to free-riding dominate the
gains to cooperation for any coalition with more than two members. Free-riding offers
harvesters immediate private returns from increased harvest, while the only benefit of
cooperation in this model is a larger future stock size, which benefits all players.
The second part of Result 1 allows us to compare the level of cooperation in the
post-shift era to that which would arise in the high productivity regime if there were
no threat of regime shift. Since the post-shift era itself involves no threat, the solution
for the no-threat case can be obtained from that for the post-shift era with bL replaced
by bH . Part (ii) of Result 1 indicates that, since bH > bL, the coalition in a zero-threat
setting is no larger and possibly smaller than that in the post-shift era.
We next move back to the pre-shift era and examine the consequences of the threat of
regime shift on harvest and cooperation decisions. The presence of any such threat will
clearly alter harvester incentives, since a player seeking to maximize discounted returns
must contend with the possibility that future returns will be reduced through a shift to
a lower productivity regime. Importantly, the way in which the threat alters incentives
depends upon the type of threat, since an endogenous threat means harvest choices
change not only the future resource stock but also the probability of regime shift. As a
result, we must analyze the two types of threat separately; we begin with the case of an
exogenous threat.
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1.4 Pre-regime shift, exogenous threat
Consider the pre-shift era when θt = H and the probability of a shift to the lower
productivity regime is exogenous, i.e. ρ(St) = ρ¯ for all 0 < St ≤ 1.
1.4.1 Second-stage harvest game
We use the same methodology as for the post-shift case. First, we conjecture that
the first-stage value function is again log-linear in the resource stock. That is:
W (St, H) =AH ln(St) + γH , (1.21)
where AH and γH are again constants that depend on model parameters but not on St.
Under this conjecture, the second-stage harvest problems faced by coalition members and
free-riders can then be written as
V C(St, H, nt) = max{hit:i∈Kt}
∑
i∈Kt
ln(hit)
+ ntδ (ρ¯ [ALln(St+1) + γL] + (1− ρ¯) [AH ln(St+1) + γH ]) , (1.22)
V Fj (St, H, nt) = max
hjt
ln(hjt) + δ (ρ¯ [ALln(St+1) + γL] + δ(1− ρ¯) [AH ln(St+1) + γH ]) .
(1.23)
The first-order conditions for the maximization of the right-hand side of (1.22) and (1.23)
can be respectively written as
1
h∗it
=nt
δA¯
g(St, H)− nth∗it − (N − nt)h∗jt
,
1
h∗jt
=
δA¯
g(St, H)− nth∗it − (N − nt)h∗jt
,
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where A¯ = ρ¯AL + (1− ρ¯)AH . These conditions state that a member chooses the harvest
rate that equates his marginal benefit with all signatories’ aggregated expected inter-
temporal marginal cost whereas a non-member chooses his harvest such that his marginal
benefit and his expected inter-temporal marginal cost are identical.
We combine these first-order conditions with the resource dynamics, giving the fol-
lowing expressions for equilibrium harvest strategies:
h∗it =nt
g(St, H)
δA¯+N − nt + 1 , (1.24)
h∗jt =
g(St, H)
δA¯+N − nt + 1 . (1.25)
Note that these harvest policies imply that, as with the post-shift era, each non-member
harvests as much as the entire coalition (i.e, h∗jt = nth
∗
it).
Plugging these equilibrium policies into the harvest problems and simplifying, we get
the following expressions for the second-stage value functions:
V Ci (St, H, nt) =
(
1 + δA¯
)
(1− bH)ln (St) (1.26)
+ δ(1− ρ¯) [AH ln (δA¯)+ γH]+ δρ¯ [ALln (δA¯)+ γL]
− (1 + δA¯) ln (δA¯+N − nt + 1)− ln(nt),
V Fj (St, H, nt) =V
C
i (St, H, nt) + ln(nt). (1.27)
Since the definition of W (St, H) as given in (1.4) depends upon these values and the
equilibrium coalition size n∗(St, H), in order to complete the verification of our conjecture
for the form of W (St, H), it may be helpful to determine the equilibrium coalition size.
To do so, we turn to the first-stage membership game.
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1.4.2 First-stage membership game
To determine the outcome of the membership game, we evaluate the stability condi-
tions (1.8) and (1.9). Substituting (1.26) and (1.27) into (1.10), we find that the condition
φ(St, θt, nt) ≥ 0 holds only when
ln(nt) ≤(1 + δA¯)ln
(
1 +
1
δA¯+N − nt + 1
)
. (1.28)
Recall that n∗(St, H) is the largest coalition size satisfying this condition. As with
the post-shift case, the stability condition clearly does not depend on St, and so n
∗
H =
n∗(St, H) is independent of the stock size St. Hereafter we simply write the equilibrium
coalition size as n∗H .
Using the stock-independence of n∗H , we may plug the expressions for V
C
i (St, H, nt)
and V Fj (St, H, nt) as given by (1.26) and (1.27) into the definition of W (St, H) as given
in (1.4) and simplify to give
W (St, H) =
(
1 + δA¯
)
(1− bH)ln(St)
− (1 + δA¯)ln(δA¯+N − n∗H + 1) + δ
[
A¯ln(δA¯) + ρ¯γL + (1− ρ¯)γH
]
− n
∗
H
N
ln(n∗H).
This equation is of the conjectured form for W (St, H), thus completing our verifica-
tion. Equating the coefficients for both ln(St) and the constant term and solving gives
expressions for AH and γH :
AH =
1− δ(1− ρ¯)(1− bL)
1− δ(1− ρ¯)(1− bH)
1− bH
1− δ(1− bL) , (1.29)
γH =
δA¯ln(δA¯) + δρ¯γL − (1 + δA¯)ln(δA¯+N − n∗H + 1)− n
∗
H
N
ln(n∗H)
1− δ(1− ρ¯) . (1.30)
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With the equilibrium defined, we provide a summary of its properties in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 Assume the probability of regime shift is exogenous and known. Before a
regime shift takes place, coalitions of size greater than 2 are not stable. That is, n∗H ≤ 2.
Proof: See the appendix.
In short, the maximum stable coalition size across all fisheries is unaffected by ex-
ogenous regime shift. While the threat of a shift increases the expected future costs of
current harvest (via reduced growth) the benefits of free-riding on the coalition remain
strong.
That said, higher future costs of current harvest should intuitively induce more cau-
tious harvesting behavior when fishers equate marginal benefits and marginal costs in
their harvesting decisions. Those changed harvesting decisions may have more subtle ef-
fects on coalition membership in a particular fishery, even if the maximum coalition size
across all fisheries is unaffected. This effect is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Assume that the probability of regime shift is exogenous and known. Be-
fore the occurrence of the shift, the equilibrium coalition size is weakly increasing in the
probability of regime shift. That is, n∗H(ρ¯2) ≥ n∗H(ρ¯1) for ρ¯2 ≥ ρ¯1 ≥ 0.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 2 says that as the threat level is increased, the incentive to join the
coalition cannot diminish. An important consequence of this result is that it allows us
to compare the case where there is zero probability of a regime shift to a case where
there is a nonzero probability. In particular, Proposition 2 says that the equilibrium
coalition under a nonzero probability of regime shift will always be at least as large as
the equilibrium coalition in the absence of such a threat.
19
Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift Chapter 1
While our primary focus is to examine the incentive to join the coalition, we also look
at the impact of the threat of regime shift on harvest decisions. We report two main
results, concerning changes to individual and total harvest, respectively.
Proposition 3 Assume that the probability of regime shift is exogenous and the set of
parameters satisfies
ρ¯ < ρ¯R and (1 + δA˜H) ln(1 +
1
δA˜H +N − 1
) < ln(2) ≤ (1 + δA¯) ln(1 + 1
δA¯+N − 1),
(1.31)
where
ρ¯R =
(1− δ(1− bL))(1− δ(1− bH))
δ
[
(bH − bL) + (1− bH)
(
δ(1− bL)− 1−δ(1−bL)1−δ(1−bH)
)] and A˜H = A¯|ρ¯=0. (1.32)
While the threat of regime shift increases a non-member’s harvest rate, it diminishes each
member’s harvest rate.
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 3 provides conditions under which individual signatories facing the threat
of regime shift reduce their harvest whereas non-members increase their harvest.4 These
results are driven by the effects of the threat on the inter-temporal marginal costs of
harvest (marginal benefits are unaffected). As long as condition (1.31) holds, the threat
of regime shift increases each coalition member’s expected inter-temporal marginal cost,
but that same threat causes each non-member’s expected inter-temporal marginal cost
to decrease. The latter effect occurs because, when condition (1.31) holds, the threat of
a shift causes the coalition to grow in size. Members of that larger coalition reduce their
harvest, which in turn lowers the marginal cost of harvest for non-members.
4Using the set of parameters N = 4, bH = 0.1, bL = 0.01, and δ = 0.89, we verify numerically that
conditions in (1.31) and these results hold for plausible values of ρ¯.
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While Proposition 3 indicates that the threat of regime shift has heterogeneous effects
on harvester behavior, we can still definitively sign the effect of such a threat on total
harvest. In particular, despite the fact that non-signatories may increase harvest in
response to the threat of regime shift, we find that total harvest declines:
Result 2 An increase in the exogenous threat of regime shift causes a decrease in total
harvest at a given stock level.
Proof: See the appendix.
1.5 Pre-regime shift, endogenous threat
Thus far, we have focused on exogenous threats: those for which harvester behavior
does not influence the probability of a shift occurring. That assumption may be appropri-
ate for some types of threats, such as permanent climatic shifts (e.g. driven by warming
or acidification) or unforeseen disasters (e.g. oil spills), but is likely inappropriate for
harvest-driven threats. For example, the collapse of some fish stocks (e.g. Atlantic cod)
is believed to be at least partly due to overfishing.
In order to analyze such cases, we examine the scenario where the probability of regime
shift is endogenous (i.e., ρ(St) decreases in St). The methods used in the post-shift and
exogenous threat pre-shift cases are based on proofs by conjecture. The dependency of
ρ(St) on St introduces new terms in the second-stage value functions that depend on St
in ways that it becomes impossible to conjecture the expected payoff given in (1.4) and
thus analytical solutions are not sustainable in this section. As such, we use numerical
simulations to illustrate our results.
To solve the pre-regime shift game numerically, we use a version of value function
iteration. We approximate the second-stage value functions for both coalition members
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and free-riders with piecewise linear functions that are anchored at a finite number of
discrete stock sizes (see, for example, Judd 1998).5 Because the first-stage value function
W is a weighted combination of those second-stage value functions, our first-stage value
function is also a piecewise linear approximation.
We begin with initial guesses for the value of the first-stage value function at the
discrete lattice points. We then iteratively update guesses for the second-stage value
functions, harvest policies, equilibrium coalition size, and first-stage value function until
a convergence criterion is satisfied. The steps are as follows:
1. Initialize guesses for the functions W (St, H), V
C
i (St, H, nt), and V
F
j (St, H, nt) to
the values they take on in the no-shift case.
2. Given the current guess for W (St, H), for each discrete stock size and possible
coalition size, compute the equilibrium harvest policies according to (1.6) and (1.7).
3. Using the current guess for W (St, H) and the harvest policies computed in step 2,
update the guesses for V Ci (St, H, nt) and V
F
j (St, H, nt) for all possible combinations
of discrete stock and coalition sizes using (1.6) and (1.7).
4. Using V Ci (St, H, nt) and V
F
j (St, H, nt) as computed in step 3, calculate the equilib-
rium coalition size for each stock size n∗(St, H) using stability function (1.10).
5. Given the current guesses for V Ci (St, H, nt) and V
F
j (St, H, nt) as computed in step
3 and the equilibrium coalition size guesses as computed in step 4, compute an
updated guess for W (St, H) according to (1.4).
6. Denote the guess for W (St, H) as computed in step 4 as Wcur(St, H), and the previ-
ous guess by Wprev(St, H). If max
St
|Wcur(St, H)−Wprev(St, H)| ≤ 0.01, accept the
5For a large number of grid points, the difference between piecewise linear and other approximation
techniques (e.g. splines) should be negligible
22
Coalition formation in fisheries with potential regime shift Chapter 1
current guesses for W (St, H), V
C
i (St, H, nt), V
F
j (St, H, nt), h
∗
it(St, H), h
∗
jt(St, H),
and n∗(St, H) as the solution. Otherwise, return to step 2.
We apply this algorithm using the piecewise probability function
ρ(St) =

0.9 if St < 0.5
0 if St >= 0.5.
(1.33)
With this probability function, the probability is near zero at high levels of St and
near one for small values of St. The probability of a shift changes suddenly at St = 0.5.
Using this approach, we are able to verify one of the main propositions of this paper:
Proposition 4 Prior to the shift, if the threat of regime shift from H to L is endogenous,
i.e. ρ(St) is a non-constant function of St, (i) coalitions of size larger than two can be
sustained, and (ii) the grand coalition is sustainable as an equilibrium outcome.
Proof: Since the proposition claims only existence of larger stable coalitions, we
may prove the proposition numerically. We use the numerical approach outlined above,
discretizing the state space at intervals of 0.01. We set parameters as follows: δ =
0.95, bH = 0.4, bL = 0.01. Our simulations suggest that for N = 8, the grand coalition
(of size 8) is stable for an initial stock size S0 = 0.17.
We next examine the sensitivity of this result with respect to parameters, beginning
with the size of the shift (bH−bL). We fix bH at 0.4 and vary bL from 0.4 to 0, computing
the equilibrium outcome for each bL. The equilibrium level of cooperation varies from
full non-cooperation to full cooperation, as indicated in Figure 1.1. In addition, our
simulations suggest that the effect of increasing the size of the shift on the equilibrium
coalition size is non-monotonic. The equilibrium coalition size first increases with the size
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of the shift, but as the size of the shift grows increasingly large, the level of cooperation
may actually decline.6
The non-monotonic relationship between the magnitude of the shift and equilibrium
coalition size stems from two opposing forces. First, as the size of the shift increases,
so too does the incentive for players to avoid it by keeping the stock at a level where
the probability of the shift is low. This incentive tends to favor larger coalitions, since
coalition members harvest less and increased membership can thus help avoid the shift.
However, as the size of the shift continues to grow, the gains to free-riding also increase.
To see why, note that for a large enough shift, coalitions of several sizes all reduce harvest
just enough to keep the stock at the critical threshold at which the probability of the shift
drops (St = 0.5). Only the smallest such coalition can be internally stable: a member of
a larger coalition can gain by becoming a free-rider and increasing his or her harvest with
no future consequences, since the remaining members of the smaller coalition will reduce
harvest and leave the same residual stock. The interaction of these two forces gives rise
to the non-monotonic relationship in Figure 1.1.
Further intuition can be gained by examining the evolution of the stock and coalition
size through time. Figure 1.2 depicts the time paths of both for several starting stock
levels. As is evident from the plots, cooperation arises for low initial stock levels, and
serves to help bring the stock level above the point at which the probability of regime
shift increases. Once the stock has reached those higher levels, the players no longer need
cooperate to maintain the stock at high enough levels to avoid increased exposure to the
6The non-monotonic response of coalition size to an increase in the size of the shift stands in contrast
to results found in the context of pollution control by Nkuiya et al. (2014). In that study, an increase in
the size of the shift never results in a smaller coalition. The difference in the results likely stems from
the combination of different payoff functions and probability functions. Here, the increase in probability
is steeper near St = 0.5 as compared with the quadratic increase used in Nkuiya et al. (2014). When
combined with a sufficiently large shift, the steeper rise in probability used here induces a larger response
(reduction in harvest) by the coalition, such that only partial cooperation is needed to avoid the large
increase in the probability of a shift.
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threat of the shift.
Next, we explore how our results depend upon the number of players. Fixing bL at
0 and keeping all other parameters the same, we vary N from 3 to 25. Our simulations
suggest that the grand coalition or a coalition near the grand coalition size is sustain-
able even for larger numbers of harvesters. These results clearly show the potential for
endogenous regime shift to alter equilibrium level of cooperation.
1.6 Doomsday scenario
Suppose that instead of altering the dynamics of the stock in the way outlined above,
the regime shift results in a doomsday scenario (stock collapse) in which all users receive
a negative,7 stock-independent payoff D. We examine the sensitivity of our results with
respect to various values of parameter D.
Formally, for this scenario we assume
V Ci (St, L, nt) = V
F
j (St, L, nt) = W (St, L) = D. (1.34)
We next investigate how a threat of this type of event affects harvests and incentives
to join the coalition.
1.6.1 Exogenous threat
By defining AL = 0 and γL = D for the post-shift era, the analysis above can
be adapted to derive the equilibrium outcome when there is an exogenous threat of a
doomsday event. The main result from Proposition 1 continues to hold: stable coalitions
can have at most two members when the threat of regime shift is exogenous.
7Because utility is logarithmic in harvest and harvest is less than one, payoffs even in the absence of
a shift are negative, so D must be large and negative to constitute a true doomsday event.
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As with the productivity shift case, we again examine how an increase in the proba-
bility of the shift affects the incentives to join the coalition.
Proposition 5 When the exogenous probability of a doomsday event is increased, the
equilibrium coalition size cannot increase (i.e., n∗DDH (ρ¯1) ≥ n∗DDH (ρ¯2) for all ρ¯2 > ρ¯1 ≥ 0).
Proof: See the appendix.
Proposition 5 suggests that results of Proposition 2 obtained under the threat of
regime shift do not hold under the threat of a doomsday event. Moreover, a clear im-
plication of the result of Proposition 5 is that incentives to join the coalition cannot be
increased by the threat of a doomsday event (n∗DDH (ρ¯) ≤ n∗(0)). Combining the results
of Propositions 2 and 5, we obtain that the stable coalition size under the doomsday
event is lower than the stable coalition size under the no-shift setting, which in turn is
lower than the stable coalition size under the threat of regime shift.
The intuition for this ordering stems from the consequences of defection under each
scenario. A harvester who chooses to free-ride on a coalition of a given size gains in current
period returns regardless of the type of threat (or lack thereof) facing the fishery. The
key difference between the scenarios is the inter-temporal cost of defection. If no threat
is present, the costs of defection are those resulting from increased aggregate harvest and
a lower future stock. If there is a threat of regime shift, that lower future stock may
result in much higher costs if the shift takes place, thereby increasing the expected cost
of defection. In contrast, if the threat concerns a doomsday event, the reduced future
stock will have no consequences if the event does occur, thereby reducing the expected
cost of defection. As a result, n∗DDH (ρ¯) ≤ n∗H(0) ≤ n∗H(ρ¯).
In addition to these findings pertaining to coalition size, we can also state two results
about equilibrium harvest.
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Proposition 6 Assume that the probability of the shift is exogenous and the set of pa-
rameters satisfies
ρ¯ < ρ¯DD and (1 + δA¯) ln(1 +
1
δA¯+N − 1) < ln(2) ≤ (1 + δA˜H) ln(1 +
1
δA˜H +N − 1
),
(1.35)
where
ρ¯DD =
(
1
δ(1− bH) − 1
)2
. (1.36)
(i) The threat of a doomsday event induces fully noncooperative behavior whereas in
the no-shift case, stable coalitions are of size two. (ii) Each non-member harvests less
under the threat of a doomsday event than in the no-shift case.
Proof: See the appendix.
The driving force behind the results of Proposition 6 is that an exogenous threat of a
doomsday event reduces incentives to cooperate. If those incentives are reduced enough
(i.e. condition (1.35) is satisfied), the coalition dissolves. As a result, fishers who would
have been in the coalition in the absence of the threat increase their harvest, which causes
a reduction in harvest by non-members.
These results shed some light on a class of economic papers dealing with the threat of
the doomsday event in which the post event value function is either stock independent or
normalized to zero. In the pollution control setting, for example, Clarke and Reed (1994),
Tsur and Zemel (1998), de Zeeuw and Zemel (2012), and Nkuiya and Costello (2014) all
find that it is always optimal to act aggressively under the threat of a doomsday event as
long as the threat is exogenous. In a fisheries setting, Polasky et al. (2011) show that a
single harvester will never harvest less under the threat of a doomsday event. In all those
papers, there is only one player (the optimal control approach). In this paper, however,
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we allow for partial cooperation in which each harvester can join or leave a coalition as
long as it is beneficial to do so. Proposition 6 suggests that this additional flexibility gives
rise to behavior not previously identified in the literature: in certain circumstances, an
exogenous threat of a doomsday event can cause non-members to reduce their harvest.
We conclude our analysis of a doomsday event with exogenous probability by moving
from individual harvest decisions to aggregate harvest levels. We find that the threat of
a doomsday event can never reduce total harvest:
Result 3 When the probability of regime shift is exogenous and the shift has not yet
occurred, total harvest in the doomsday scenario is at least as large as harvest in the
absence of such a threat.
Proof: See the appendix.
Together, Results 2 and 3 imply an ordering on total harvest between the regime shift,
doomsday, and no-shift scenarios when the threat of any type of event is exogenous. In
particular, total harvest under an exogenous threat of regime shift is smallest, followed
by the no-shift scenario, and finally, total harvest under the threat of a doomsday event is
largest. In the context of real-world threats, this suggests that the threat of catastrophic
events, such as severe oil spills, may cause decreased cooperation and increased total
harvest, while an exogenous threat of regime shift, such as lower productivity due to
changing environmental conditions (see, for example, Reid et al. (1998)), may enhance
cooperation and reduce total harvest.
1.6.2 Endogenous threat
This section focuses on the scenario where the probability of occurrence of the dooms-
day event is endogenous. To examine this scenario, we adapt the algorithm presented
above to the doomsday case and use the probability function given in (1.33). Using the
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same set of parameter values as for the regime shift case presented in Section 1.5, we
solve for the equilibrium coalition size and harvest decisions.
Our simulations suggest that threat of a doomsday event has effects on cooperation
that are qualitatively similar to the threat of regime shift. The stable coalition size
at a given stock level varies non-monotonically with the severity of the doomsday event.
Further, the stable coalition size depends upon the stock level. These results are captured
in Figure 1.3, which depicts the stable coalition size as a function of the size of the
doomsday event at two example stock levels. Over the range −150 < D < −100, the
stable coalition size at S0 = 0.33 first increases, then decreases, while no coalitions form
at S0 = 0.17. Finally, the grand coalition is stable for D = −100 and S0 = 0.40 (not
shown in Figure 1.3). The intuition for these patterns parallels that for the regime shift
case: a more negative D increases the cost of the shift for harvesters, just as a smaller
bL does in the regime shift case.
8
Our finding that coalitions can be larger when the threat of regime shift is endogenous
is consistent with patterns observed in some real-world fisheries. As one example, the
formation of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to cooperatively
manage international fisheries has often occurred after stocks have been depleted to
low levels and the risk of regime shift or collapse is high. Such delayed formation is
often simply attributed to reduction in the benefits of free-riding. Our model provides
additional insight on this point, suggesting that one potential reason cooperation may
arise at low stock levels is the increased threat of regime shift (recall that when the threat
is absent or exogenous, the largest stable coalition contained only two members).
8Due to the dependency of coalition size on key parameters bL and D that are not common between
the productivity shift and doomsday scenarios, we avoid comparison between the two endogenous threat
scenarios. In the exogenous threat case, we were able to compare outcomes for coalition size only because
D did not play a role in determining the equilibrium coalition size in the doomsday scenario.
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1.7 Summary and Conclusion
This paper has examined harvesters’ responses to the threat of an abrupt shift in
the biological growth for a renewable resource. In contrast to the existing literature, we
focus on the implications of such a threat for both cooperation and harvest in a partial
coalition framework. We have studied four different types of threat and compared them
to the baseline scenario where the shift is absent. In the case where the probability of
regime shift is exogenous, we have found that the threat of regime shift tends to slightly
increase incentives to join the coalition, while the threat of a doomsday event has the
opposite effect. In addition, stable coalitions are of size equal to or less than two under
both the exogenous threat and no-threat cases. However, when the probability of regime
shift depends on harvest decisions, larger coalitions may be stable, and in some cases
full cooperation is an equilibrium outcome. Further, we find that the size of the stable
coalition is non-monotonically related to the size of the shift. The equilibrium coalition
size first increases as the shift becomes more severe, but above a threshold, the potential
gains from cooperation are reduced, resulting in smaller coalitions.
These impacts of the threat of regime shift on coalition size give rise to novel harvest
responses. Prior analyses of regime shift have focused on behavior of sole owners, fully
cooperative harvesters, or a set of fully non-cooperative harvesters. In such cases, all
players respond to a threat identically (trivially so in the case of sole ownership). This
paper has focused on the scenario where each harvester may join a coalition as long
as it is beneficial do so. In so doing, we have identified conditions under which some
resource users increase harvest while others reduce harvest in response to the threat.
In particular, we find that an exogenous threat of regime shift may cause non-members
to increase harvest while members reduce harvest. These heterogeneous responses are
driven by the effect of regime shift on coalition size. The threat of regime shift provides
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a direct incentive for all players to reduce harvest, but if the coalition grows in size, the
resulting reduction in harvest by members also provides a counteracting incentive for
non-members to increase harvest. We identify conditions in which that indirect effect is
larger than the direct effect.
In light of increasing concerns about regime shift due to climatic shifts, oil spills,
nutrification, and overfishing, the results developed here may help inform expectations
about cooperation and harvest in shared fisheries facing such threats. The basic setup
presented here invites a number of extensions that may enhance the model’s applica-
bility. In some cases the size of the shift or the relationship between actions and the
probability of the shift may not be fully known. In such a case harvest incentives and
the gains from cooperation might be altered, and thus the equilibrium coalition size is
likely to change. In addition, while we focus on homogenous harvesters so as to isolate
the impacts of regime shift on cooperation, heterogeneity may play an important role
in determining coalition membership. Resource users could have differing payoffs from
harvest. Alternatively, the type of fundamental change to system dynamics considered
here might have heterogeneous effects on harvesters. How exactly these features would
affect the results is an avenue for further research.
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Figure 1.1: Maximum stable coalition size at S0 = 0.33 and S0 = 0.17 under endoge-
nous probability of regime shift as a function of the size of the shift (bH − bL).
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Figure 1.2: Top panel: Equilibrium path of stock as a function of time for starting
stock levels S0 = 0.33 and S0 = 0.17. Bottom panel: Equilibrium path of coalition
size as a function of time for starting stock levels S0 = 0.33 and S0 = 0.17.
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Figure 1.3: Maximum stable coalition size at S = 0.33 and S = 0.17 under endogenous
probability of a doomsday event as a function of the doomsday payoff. (D).
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2.1 Introduction
The absence of an exclusive property right to any asset prevents the execution of
contracts and transactions that could in principle lead to efficient use. This lack of
exclusion, or open access, is a key feature of many marine fish stocks. It results partly
from physical features of the resource that make monitoring and enforcement difficult,
such as the fact that fish stocks are hidden beneath the sea and their sometimes mobile
nature. Exclusion can also fail because legal institutions do not recognize a right of
exclusive access by any particular party (Cheung, 1970, pp. 50, 67). Absent property
rights to the resource, contracting and market exchange will not occur and the necessary
conditions for efficient resource use will not in general be satisfied. The result can be
a degradation of potentially valuable resources, an unfortunate outcome that has been
documented for commercially important fish species around the world (Worm et al.,
2009).
This point is now widely understood, and this understanding has led to management
policies based on creating partial property rights to the flow a resource can provide. In
fisheries, the cap and trade system known as the individual transferable quota (ITQ) has
emerged as a leading example of this approach. With ITQ management, a biologically
determined limit on total harvest is divided into discrete units that are then allocated
to individual fishers as rights to catch specific quantities of fish. The creation of these
property rights has enabled contracting, transactions, and the emergence of formal mar-
kets for access rights to fish stocks (Newell et al., 2005), or more precisely, to the flows
from them. This has led to demonstrated efficiency gains (Newell et al., 2005; Grafton
et al., 2000; Arnason, 2012). Stocks managed in this way also tend to be in better shape
biologically than stocks managed differently (Costello et al., 2008).
Early ITQ programs were located predominantly in New Zealand, Iceland, and Aus-
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tralia, while more recent programs are spread across the globe. In 2010 the U.S. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) began actively promoting ‘catch share’
management for the nation’s fisheries (NOAA 2010); catch share refers to a category of
policies based on creating property rights that includes ITQs. In the U.S. state-level
management reforms are moving in the same direction. The U.S. trend toward ITQ
management can be explained by its efficiency advantages. Creating harvest rights to
‘target’ stocks, the commercially valuable fish that harvesters intend to catch, provides
individual incentives that promote efficient fishing practices and rational organization
of fishing fleets. Pre-existing management was largely prescriptive and rule based, pro-
viding neither incentives nor latitude for finding least cost outcomes. While success
in managing target stocks is an important achievement, a separate problem remains.
Commercial fishing often results in the unintended catch of over-fished species, causing
collateral damage to marine ecosystems. Controlling this phenomenon, termed ‘bycatch’,
is increasingly important in management decisions and is the dominant concern in many
fisheries. Regulators typically have tried to fix this problem with the same rule-based,
prescriptive strategies traditionally applied to target stocks, such as spatial and temporal
closures and restrictions on fishing gear. This regulatory approach provides only limited
incentives for individual fishers to find least cost ways to limit bycatch.
In theory, the problem of managing bycatch can also be addressed by creating property
rights (Boyce, 1996). However, this approach is seldom taken in practice and evidence
comparing this property rights-based approach to more common rule-based strategies is
scarce. , Our central contribution is to help fill this gap. We exploit a recent policy
shift in the US West Coast groundfish fishery to provide evidence on how fishing prac-
tices changed, and how bycatch outcomes were affected, when a rule-based strategy was
replaced by a property rights regime. Most of the catch in this fishery is harvested by
non-selective trawl gear. Trawling involves towing a bag-shaped net through the water,
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which catches most fish in its path; in the fishery examined, over 40 different species are
commonly landed by such gear. Bycatch of rockfish and other species groups by trawl
gear has been a problem in this fishery for over a decade. Incidental harvests impose
the greatest ecological harm when the bycatch stocks are long-lived, slow growing, have
low fecundity, and have been reduced to precariously low levels. We use the term ’weak’
stock to describe such populations. Prior to 2011, federal regulators sought to protect
weak stocks with several prescriptive policies. First, extensive areas were entirely closed
to trawl fishing. The boundaries of these closures changed from year to year, differed for
different types of trawl nets, and the prescriptions often shifted during a season to keep
projected catch aligned with targets as new information arrived. Second, catch limits
and gear restrictions were imposed on commercially valuable species in order to avoid
weak stock species found in the same habitats. Third, upper limits were placed on weak
stock harvests for the entire fishery, and the entire fishery (including all target stocks)
could be closed if the cap for a single weak stock species was violated or projected to be
so. Because these caps were fishery-wide, individual fishers had no strong incentive to
minimize bycatch. Prior to 2011 the management of target stocks was also rule-based.
Regulators fixed the number of commercial fishing permits and each permit holder faced
upper limits on catches of each target species for specific periods during the year.
In 2011 this fishery transitioned to a rights-based management scheme known as
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs). The main difference between IFQs and ITQs is that
transferability of the former is somewhat restricted. Nevertheless, IFQs are individual
rights to harvest specific quantities, and each permit holder was allocated a portfolio of
such rights for both target and weak stock species. Creating IFQs for non-target weak
stocks is unusual. Each fisher is required to hold sufficient rights to cover any weak
stock catches made and rights are deducted from the fisher’s account as catches occur.
These rights are limited in supply and hence valuable. Consequently, each fisher faces
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an individual penalty for weak stock catches, which creates an incentive to discard them.
Recognizing this, regulators require mandatory on-board monitoring, count all discards
against quota allocations, and impose severe penalties for violations. Shortly after the
IFQs were created, transactions in quota for weak stock and target species emerged and
a market began to function.
Harvesters must surrender a valuable unit of quota, or incur the cost of acquiring a
unit of quota from someone else, for each unit of weak stock catch landed. Harvesters
therefore have a profit motive to find minimum cost strategies for avoiding bycatch. Two
obvious strategies are available: avoid fishing in areas where weak stock catches are
common (Toft et al., 2011), and switch to more selective gear, such as from trawl nets to
traps and hook and line assemblies that can target species more precisely. More subtle
adjustments are also possible, however, such as altering the deployment of trawl gear in
order to either gain more precise information on the location of weak stock concentrations
or to exploit the differential migration patterns of weak stock species (Grafton et al.,
2005). Further, fishers can organize themselves into groups to take collective actions to
avoid bycatch (Holland, 2010). Our empirical analysis demonstrates that the industry
took each of these steps after weak stock IFQs were introduced and that weak stock
catches declined dramatically. Some commercial fishers shifted from trawling to the
use of highly selective fixed gear, while those who kept trawling made both spatial and
nuanced behavioral adjustments. The end result was a suite of adaptations on several
margins, an outcome that would be difficult to achieve with prescriptive regulation, but
that occurred naturally when property rights for bycatch were created.
The primary evidence we present is from individual logbook entries for every trawl
tow on the U.S. West Coast during the period 2005-2012. Our most detailed analysis
concerns spatial avoidance, i.e., shifts in fishing effort across spatial areas or ‘patches’
to avoid concentrations of weak stock species. We demonstrate that substantial spatial
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avoidance did in fact take place and use the cost of these spatial shifts to shed light on
the shadow price, or implicit penalty, that fishers assigned to weak stock catches.
Under rule-based management, regulators created ‘marine protected areas’ (MPAs),
zones where fishing was prohibited or fishing methods were severely restricted, in order
to protect marine environments. These pre-IFQ spatial closures remained in place under
IFQ management, but the behavior of harvesters toward them changed in interesting
ways. Prior to IFQs, fishers would be compliant if they fished along the borders of MPAs,
a practice that can be attractive because some target stocks tend to be abundant near
these no-fishing zones. The introduction of IFQs for weak stocks changed this calculus,
since weak stocks are also abundant near MPAs. We find evidence that fishers voluntarily
moved effort away from MPA boundaries creating what we term ‘fuzzy MPAs’, regions
of partial closure around the regulatory no-fishing zones.
We also document behavioral shifts in trawl fishing methods. When weak stock IFQs
were introduced, trawl fishers shifted toward fishing at night, a time when some weak
stock species migrate up from the sea floor and thus become less vulnerable to trawl
gear, while key target stocks remain near the bottom. Trawlers also shifted toward
making shorter tows following IFQ introduction. This practice yields higher frequency
information on weak stock catches and enables one to change locations when a weak
stock concentration is encountered. We also document a shift away from trawling and
toward the use of highly selective fixed gear following IFQ adoption. Finally, we provide
summary information on the collective bycatch avoidance actions of groups of fishers who
organized following the implementation of bycatch IFQs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides back-
ground for the fishery examined. It includes an extensive description of the management
regime in place prior to 2011 and the IFQ system adopted subsequently, and a discussion
of the timing of the shift. This information provides essential context for our empiri-
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cal hypotheses on changes in the fishery following the management change. Section 3
presents the model that underlies our empirical approach. Section 4 explains the data
used in estimation, Section 5 presents empirical results on spatial avoidance and Section
6 presents evidence of adjustment on other margins. The paper concludes in Section 7
with a discussion of implications and suggestions for further work.
2.2 The Fishery
Groundfish off the west coast of California, Oregon, and Washington are targeted by
commercial vessels primarily employing trawl gear and to a lesser extent by fishers using
baited hook and line assemblies and pots and traps, collectively known as ’fixed’ (non-
towed) gear. ’Groundfish’ is a catch-all term for the variety of species living on or near the
sea floor, including flatfish such as Dover sole, roundfish such as sablefish, rockfish such
as yellow tail and other species such as sharks and skates. Over 40 individual species and
species groups are harvested, but most fishing effort is directed toward a small subset of
commercially valuable ‘target species’: whiting (also known as hake), Dover and petrale
sole, thornyheads, arrowtooth flounder, and sablefish (also known as black cod). These
target species are generally fast growing and their populations can withstand substantial
fishing pressure. Several species of rockfish and other ’weak stocks’ caught incidentally
along with the targets are not as robust.
While commercial exploitation of this fishery pre-dates World War II, effort by U.S.
fleets did not become intense until the 1970s. At that time the U.S. implemented a num-
ber of federal subsidies, loan guarantees, and special tax provisions intended to increase
domestic fishing effort. These measures were partly in response to heavy exploitation by
foreign vessels. Following passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976 and establish-
ment of 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) a few years later, U.S. vessels began
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to supplant their foreign counterparts. The U.S. Pacific whiting catch increased from
a few million pounds in 1980 to 200 million pounds by the early 1990s; domestic West
Coast catches of groundfish roughly doubled between the mid-1970s and early 1980s.
Groundfish landings peaked in 1981 and 1982, prompting adoption in 1982 of a federal
Fishery Management Plan (FMP) intended to control harvesting and a set of regulations
that remained in place (with revisions) until 2011. Despite FMP provisions, groundfish
stocks entered a period of decline that continued for two decades. In the 1980s the
regulatory body in charge, the Pacific Fishery Management Council (PFMC), adopted
several effort controls intended to stop or reverse the decline. These included ‘trip limits’
(explained below), shortened fishing seasons, bycatch limits and gear restrictions. In 1994
the PFMC limited entry by new permit holders for most of the fishery. Despite these
protections, the downward trend in stocks, catches, and fishing incomes continued. In
2000, the federal government declared the fishery an economic disaster. In 2003 federal
managers, seeking to reduce capacity, instituted a policy of buying back active fishing
permits.
Concurrent with declines in target species catches and profits, bycatch emerged as
another central management concern. Specific populations were identified as over-fished
species (OFS) and new restrictions were adopted to rebuild them. (OFS is the legal term
for specific weak stocks that received regulatory protection.) Policies adopted in 1996
required PFMC to identify ‘essential fish habitat’ (EFH), areas holding OFS concentra-
tions, and to restrict fishing times and gear used in these zones. In 2002-03 an extensive
system of rockfish conservation areas (RCAs) was created along the Washington, Oregon
and California coasts. RCAs containing high densities of overfished species are off limits
to trawl gear. Figure 1 provides a map illustrating these spatial restrictions for a section
of the California and Oregon coast.
The regulatory system that emerged was complex, multi-faceted and adaptive. The
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trip limits imposed on vessels are illustrative. They generally constrained catches by a
single vessel during a given block of time and varied by location (for different latitude
bands), by species (for over 20 target and weak stock species or species groups), by type
of trawl gear used, and by month of year. Trip limits have been adopted in several U.S.
fisheries as a way to mitigate the ‘race to fish’ that occurs in fisheries managed by simply
closing a fishery once a fishery-wide target catch is met.
While arguably an improvement on season closures, trip limits clearly constrain effort
decisions by vessel owners in complex ways. Trip limits for some species capped a vessel’s
catch on a ‘per trip’ basis. For example, as of 2008 large and small footrope trawlers
could harvest no more than 20,000 pounds of whiting per trip before the primary whiting
season opened, and 10,000 pounds per trip at other times. For most species, trip limits
constrained a vessel’s cumulative catch over a 1 or 2-month period. For example, the 2008
regulations for sablefish allowed limited entry vessels using ‘large or small footrope trawl
gear’ to harvest up to 14,000 pounds per 2-month period during the months of January-
April and November-December, and 19,000 pounds per 2-month period during the months
of May-October. The multi-species nature of the fishery and imperfect selectivity of trawl
gear added complexity. For example, large and small footrope trawl vessels faced specific
2-month limits on each of several major species they targeted (Dover sole, thornyheads,
arrowtooth flounder and various flatfish) as well as prohibitions or tight limits on catching
various rockfish. However, vessels using ‘selective flatfish trawl gear’, which is somewhat
different, were subject to different limits. Fishers using non-trawl equipment, e.g., hook
and line gear or traps, faced an entirely different suite of restrictions. Because a single
tow of a trawl net can scoop up numerous species, this policy encouraged both biological
and economic waste. If a vessel hit a trip limit for one species, subsequent catches of
this species during the time window in question might be discarded at sea; discarded
fish seldom survive. Further, if the binding trip limit pertained to an abundant species,
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fishers may have found it more profitable to cease fishing for the rest of the regulatory
period rather than discard a large portion of their catch.
Other measures for managing weak stock species were equally complex. The rockfish
conservation areas, which were mentioned earlier and which remain in effect under IFQ
management, are illustrative. RCAs are defined by latitude bands and lines approximat-
ing depth contours. The specific depth range closed to fishing varies during the year, with
boundaries typically fixed for 2-month periods (January-February, March-April, and so
on). Generally, areas between 100-150 fathoms are closed. However, in some areas and
seasons the shallower boundary extends to the shore and the deeper boundary extends
out to 250 fathoms. Some closures are complete, while others are off-limits only for
specific trawl gear. For example, in 2002 the areas shoreward of RCAs were closed to
trawlers using large footrope gear, which can fish on rockier bottoms and is therefore
likely to inflict more damage, but open to lighter trawl gear. In 2005 those restrictions
were tightened such that only fishers using selective flatfish gear can fish shoreward of
RCAs north of 40°10’ (approximately 200 miles north of San Francisco). Further closures
arrived in June 2006, when several Essential Fish Habitat (EFH) areas up and down the
coast were closed to fishers employing certain types of gear, with many closures affecting
the use of trawl nets.
Spatial and quantity restrictions were regularly updated in an attempt to keep catches
of individual species below regulatory caps. For instance, in 2006 the RCA boundaries
and several trip limits were adjusted mid-year due to early indications that the catch of
darkblotched rockfish would exceed limits. In extreme cases, the result was early closure
of large portions of the fishery. In September 2002 the entire groundfish trawl fishery
(for all species) was closed north of 40°10’ for the remainder of the year; in July of the
same year fishing south of that boundary was restricted to a small number of target
species. These emergency closures were enacted to protect weak stocks of darkblotched
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and bocaccio rockfish, respectively.
Using prescriptive input controls to simultaneously satisfy catch limits for several
species, all of which are harvested with imperfectly selective gear, proved to be an
unattainable goal. Target stock landings and weak stock populations failed to rebound.
In 2011 the fishery transitioned to a multi-species IFQ scheme that included quota for
weak stock species. This timing is easy to understand in light of events in the fishery
and the direction of U.S. fishery management policy. As noted earlier, the fishery was
declared an ‘economic disaster’ in 2000. OFS stocks were increasingly problematic in
the years following and the entire fishery was shut down prematurely in 2002 due to
excessive OFS catches. The reauthorized Magnuson-Stevens Act, adopted by the U.S.
Congress in 2007, stressed the use of IFQs and other ‘limited access privilege’ policies
for managing U.S. fisheries. In 2010, the NMFS adopted an official position promoting
the use of catch shares (individual quantitative catch rights) for managing the nation’s
fisheries. Adding support, the number of U.S. fisheries using IFQs increased steadily
after 1998 and evidence of gains in efficiency accumulated steadily.
Under IFQ management each permit holder in the West Coast groundfish fishery was
allocated a share of the annual total allowable catch (TAC) for each target and weak
stock species, based on the permit’s history of catches. Each year these quota shares
are converted to quantitative annual catch limits, termed quota pounds, by multiplying
a vessel owner’s quota share for a particular species by the fishery-wide TAC for the
corresponding stock. The result is that each permit holder owns a portfolio of quantitative
catch rights for various species. A vessel’s catches are then monitored and quantities
caught are deducted from the vessel’s account. If an account is in deficit for any species,
the owner must acquire additional quota pounds by leasing them from another vessel,
or else borrow against next year’s allocation and cease fishing for the remainder of the
current season. Both options impose a potentially substantial cost on the vessel owner.
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Within a few months of IFQ implementation, an online auction site emerged to facilitate
quota pound transactions. This enabled fishers to augment quota holdings when they
faced a shortfall in much the same way they would replenish depleted inventories of fuel
and ice. The flexibility of marketable, quantitative catch rights allowed one harvester
who faced a shortfall of quota for species A but not for species B, to find a trading
partner who is in the opposite situation. The possibility of such trades is particularly
advantageous for a multi-species, imperfectly selective fishery.
Catch limits for overfished species traditionally were set at low levels in order to
rebuild stocks, and they remain low under IFQ management. Historically, trawlers often
discarded OFS catches at sea and the incentive to do so was heightened under the new
IFQ system. Recognizing this, the IFQ policy instituted a mandatory on-board observer
program with 100% coverage for trawl vessels. The low TACs and discard prohibitions
for bycatch species resulted in high quota prices and correspondingly strong incentives
to avoid OFS catches.
A few items of summary information indicate that the shift to IFQs significantly
changed the way the industry treated bycatch. First, average quota prices, shown in
Table 2.1, reflect the importance of overfished stocks in both management decisions and
fishery profits. Quota prices for sablefish, a highly desired target species, average about
$1 per pound, while quota for high volume target species such as Dover sole are near
zero. All 7 over-fished stocks commanded significant quota prices, with yelloweye rockfish
topping the list at over $30 per pound in 2011. Second, high OFS prices resulted from
small quota allocations. The yelloweye rockfish case is an extreme example: the average
annual allocation for an individual trawl vessel was 16 pounds, the median allocation
was 7 pounds and one-sixth of the fleet had a zero allocation. OFS trawl landings, which
had averaged an estimated 825,000 lbs. per year during 2005-2010, fell to an average
of 356,400 lbs. in 2011-2012 under IFQ management (Table 2.2). This reduction in
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OFS trawl landings and the clear reduction in trawl effort following IFQ implementation
are partly due to shifts away from trawl fishing and toward more selective fixed gear.
However, the composition of the trawl landings also changed following IFQs; the ratio of
OFS landings to total landings dropped by over one-third.
Our main focus in the remainder of the paper is to investigate a possible link between
these two summary observations, the significant OFS quota prices and significant OFS
catch reductions that followed the introduction of IFQs. Specifically, we seek to answer a
straightforward question: In what ways did fishers respond to the introduction of signif-
icant, individual penalties for OFS catches? We begin by examining spatial avoidance,
an obvious margin of adjustment, and develop a model that leads to an explicit empir-
ical specification. This model also allows for adjustments in fishing methods, which we
examine somewhat informally in a subsequent section. An Appendix provides details.
2.3 Modeling Spatial Adaptations to IFQS
A tow of a trawl net generally catches a different mix of species in different locations
because fish stocks are not uniformly distributed. The profit from a tow will therefore
vary from location to location depending on the densities of stocks present, as well as
economic variables such as prices and costs, and on the management regime. The pre-
IFQ regime constrained harvesters’ actions in various ways, but created little individual
accountability for OFS catches; hence, it provided no incentive to avoid locations with
high OFS densities. IFQ management changed the profit calculus both by requiring
fishers to surrender a unit of valuable quota for each unit of catch and by relaxing several
pre-existing constraints. Accordingly, it introduced incentives to adjust fishing locations.
We model spatial choices by a ‘representative fisher’ who maximizes expected profit.
Profit differentials across locations are subject to arbitrage. If the expected profit at one
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location is abnormally high, more effort will be applied, removing biomass and lowering
stock abundance and reducing profit per unit effort. This process equilibrates the dis-
tribution of effort. We invoke the equilibrium condition that a unit of effort allocated
at any location generates the same expected profit and use this condition to get an em-
pirical specification for the spatial distribution of fishing effort. Profit at each location
also depends on the prices of catch and on cost terms such as distance from port, fuel
price and wage rates. Profit also depends on the fishing methods used and on regulatory
constraints.
Fishers deploy effort at discrete fishing locations called ‘patches’. A fisher who deploys
a unit of effort in period t at patch j earns revenue by selling catches ht at prices pt,
and incurs the variable costs V Cjt. The fishery is multi-species and gear is not perfectly
selective, which implies that ht and pt are S dimensional vectors where S is the number of
target species harvested. Further, catch is unknown when the fishing location is chosen,
so ht is a vector of random variables. If an IFQ program is in place, the fisher also faces
a vector of per-pound quota prices ct. With these definitions the expected profit from a
unit of effort on patch j in period t is
E [pijt] = (pt − ct)E [hjt]− V Cjt (2.1)
We assume fishers know relevant prices and cost terms and choose locations to maximize
expected profit Catches of different species are linked to their stock densities and to
fishing effort according to a simplified Schaefer model of harvesting. This model suits
our purpose because it captures the decline in profit per unit effort on a given patch
as effort is increased. It also gives an exact mathematical representation of equilibrium
effort in each patch as a function of prices, costs, initial stock densities, and the regulatory
regime, which is useful for estimation. The Schaefer model specifies that a unit of effort
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will catch a fixed fraction of each stock that is vulnerable to trawl gear in the location
where fishing takes place. For tractability we assume a single catchability coefficient, q,
applies to all species.
Our empirical specification for the spatial effort distribution follows from the arbitrage
argument—that profit differentials across patches are eliminated in equilibrium. Let the
S dimensional vector X0jt indicate the biological stocks in patch j at the beginning of
period t. Fishers can select among a finite set of mutually exclusive actions, or fishing
methods, that affect the fractions of these stocks that are vulnerable to trawl gear. The
set of possible choices is denoted A = a1, a2, ..., aK and each element of A could represent
a combination of the choice of depth, speed, duration, or time of day of a trawl tow.
When action k is taken at location j, the fractions of stocks that are vulnerable to trawl
gear are given by the S dimensional vector f(akj).
If no effort has been applied, the vector of trawl-vulnerable stocks on patch j in
period t using fishing method k is f(akjt) ◦X0jt, where the operator ’◦’ indicates element-
wise multiplication. Let q be the Schaefer catchability coefficient, i.e., the mortality rate
inflicted by a marginal unit of effort. If Tjt units of effort have been deployed in patch j
in period t, the Schaefer technology implies that the trawl vulnerable stock remaining is
f(akj) ◦Xjt(Tjt) = f(akjt) ◦X0jte−qTjt (2.2)
where Xjt(Tjt) is the biological stock remaining after Tjt units of fishing effort. Applying
dT units of additional effort will generate catches
h(Tjt, dT ) = qf(akjt) ◦Xjt(Tjt). (2.3)
Substituting (2.2) into (2.3), and the result into (2.1), the expected profit from a marginal
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unit (dT ) of effort applied in patch j at time t, when Tjt units have already been applied,
is
E [pijkt] = (pt − ct) · E
[
qf(akjt) ◦X0jt
]
e−qTjt − V Cjkt. (2.4)
The representative fisher applying a marginal unit of effort on patch j in period t is
assumed to use the fishing method that maximizes expected profit, denoted a∗jt, so the
vector of expectations on the right hand side of (2.4) is E
[
qf(a∗jt) ◦X0jt
]
. The model
implies that a∗j depends on the arguments of (2.4): prices, quota costs if IFQs are in
effect, expected initial biological stocks, costs and aggregate effort applied on the patch.
When examining the spatial distribution of effort we do not try to identify the separable
effect of fishing method, but seek only to estimate the reduced form effect of price, cost,
and stock abundance. The vector of expectations E
[
qf(a∗jt) ◦X0jt
]
is expected catch per
unit effort when no effort has been applied. In what follows we represent this vector with
a proxy, E
[
CPUE0jt′
]
, the vector of observed catch per unit effort in patch j in a prior
period, t′, of the same management regime. We require the proxy to be from a period
of the same management regime because the fishers are likely to expect that past catch
experience will be a poor predictor of current fishing success if the regime has changed in
the meantime. We assume that the most important determinant of effort that we cannot
observe, i.e., information available to the fisher but not to us, is expected catch per unit
effort in a given patch. Consequently, we append a multiplicative error term, ejt , to
E
[
CPUE0jt′
]
, where jt is normally distributed.
If fishers are free to apply effort on any patch, the expected profit from applying an
additional unit of effort, dT , should in equilibrium be equal across all patches that receive
positive fishing effort. Denoting this equilibrium expected profit by p¯it, the right-hand
side of (2.4) should equal p¯it in equilibrium. Imposing this condition and keeping in mind
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the error term just introduced, equation (2.4) can be solved for Tjt, equilibrium fishing
effort on patch j in period t:
Tjt =
1
q
ln
(
(pt − ct) · E
[
CPUE0jt
]
V Cjt + p¯it
)
+
1
q
jt. (2.5)
The intuition for this empirical specification is straightforward: effort in patch j and
period t depends positively on fish prices, negatively on quota prices if IFQs are present,
positively on the start of season expected catch per unit effort for various species (proxied
by a vector of prior year catches per unit effort), negatively on cost per unit effort,
and negatively on the equilibrium profit from deploying effort on other patches. Tjt is
necessarily left censored at zero in the data and the additive error term is assumed to be
normally distributed. This implies that the likelihood for each observation takes a form
similar to that for a Tobit. Details are provided in the Appendix.
The basic empirical approach is to estimate a variant of equation (2.5) via quasi
maximum likelihood. We observe effort Tjt and ex-vessel prices pt and compute variable
costs V Cjt using information on input costs. We assume that equilibrium marginal profits
are driven to zero in our initial specification, but later allow for positive profits levels
that can vary by fishing port. The main objects of estimation are imputed quota prices,
ct, which are estimated from observed fishing behavior when IFQs are in place. Prior to
IFQs, these terms are restricted to take zero values. We must also account other fishery
regulations. The RCA and EFH trawl closures constrained fishing location choices, but
they were in place and essentially constant both before and after IFQ adoption. Their
effects will therefore be captured by expected catch per unit effort in various patches,
which is proxied by past catch experience. Trip limits presumably affected spatial choices
in the pre-IFQ regime (and were designed to shift effort further offshore), but were
dropped for most species when IFQs were introduced. Trip limits must therefore be
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incorporated explicitly in estimation in order isolate the effect of IFQs. For modeling
purposes, any catch in excess of a vessel’s trip limit can be regarded as commanding a
zero price. To incorporate the trip limit effect in estimation we construct a patch-level
proxy for the probability that a trip limit will bind for at least one species on a given
fishing trip and then multiply expected catch per unit effort in (2.5) by this proxy.
2.4 Data
Empirical analysis is based on data for effort and catch at individual fishing locations,
as well as prices for inputs and outputs. The core dataset consists of trawl logbook
entries from 2005-2012, supplied by fishers to state agencies and compiled by the Pacific
Fisheries Information Network (PacFIN). Logbook entries report detailed information
about individual trawl net tows. Each entry provides geographic information (port of
departure, latitude and longitude of both the set and the retrieval of the net), temporal
data (date and time of departure from and return to port, date and time of set and
retrieval of the net), gear characteristics (vessel length, net type), and catch composition
(captain’s estimates of weight, and landed weight, by species). The time period was
chosen to provide maximal coverage of the post-IFQ period, as well as a large number of
pre-IFQ data points for a period in which broad-scale spatial management, particularly
closures and gear restrictions, was relatively stable. Our analysis of spatial avoidance is
necessarily limited to trawl vessels because fishers employing other gear types are not
required to provide logbooks to management agencies.
The raw logbook entries were scrutinized for anomalies and missing data. Tows miss-
ing any location information (location of set or retrieval, or depth), temporal information
(date or time a net was set or retrieved), or weight information (landed pounds) were
dropped. Also removed were tows reported to have taken place on land (according to
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a mask created from the NOAA Medium Resolution Shoreline), tows that started and
ended at the same location, and records reporting a tow speed above 7 knots, since real-
istic tow speeds are roughly 3 knots. The sample was restricted to tows using one of the
main forms of bottom trawl gear, excluding midwater trawls and Scottish seine hauls.
The excluded gear types comprised 9% of the records available and have a different catch
profile than the majority of the trawl fleet. Tows deemed to be participating in the Cali-
fornia halibut or sea cucumber fisheries were also dropped since both fisheries have very
different characteristics than the main groundfish trawl fishery. Finally, attention was
restricted to tows between Point Conception, California and Cape Alava, Washington,
an area extending roughly from Santa Barbara, California to a latitude just south of the
US-Canada border. Farther north the RCAs have effectively closed the fishery; farther
south the bulk of fishing activity focuses on California halibut and sea cucumber. Table
2 shows summary statistics for the logbook data used in estimation.
Converting logbook entries to observations requires defining patches and time periods
and assigning logbook and other data to these units. Patches are based on a 0.2 degree
rectangular grid, which results in cells 10 miles wide (east-west) by 15 miles high (north-
south). Each cell is then subdivided into areas shallower than and deeper than 115
fathoms (if relevant) to account for different fishing opportunities shoreward and seaward
of the RCAs. As a result, our full patch specification is a triple (latitude, longitude,
shoreward area). Any patches that had no tows during the sample period are dropped.
Temporally, each year is subdivided into two-month seasons corresponding to regulatory
periods: January-February, March-April, May-June, July-August, September-October,
and November-December.
Harvesters’ expectations of catch per unit effort on different patches are central to the
analysis of spatial avoidance. These expectations are proxied by observed or predicted
catch per unit effort, by species, for all tows on a given patch in the same two-month
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period in the prior two years. As explained earlier, this approach is only appropriate if
management is constant across the current and lagged periods. If management changed
in that window, fishers will likely anticipate any changes to their own fishing methods
that might alter expected catch per unit effort, and our proxy for expected CPUE should
adjust accordingly. The adjustment used in estimation is outlined in the Appendix. For
all CPUE calculations, a unit of fishing effort is defined to be a tow-hour. Alternative
effort measures, such as number of tows or tow distance, are either less precise or less
useful.
Economic data were taken from several sources. Annual ex-vessel prices for landed
fish, by species and port, are available from PacFIN. Expected revenue per unit effort for
a patch and period was computed by multiplying current year prices (which are assumed
known when the fishing location is chosen) by expected catch per unit effort based on
prior year harvests. Fuel prices are from periodic surveys of West Coast ports. Labor cost
is measured by annual observations on county-level wages for the Natural Resources and
Mining sector, as reported by the Quarterly Census of Employment & Wages (US Bureau
of Labor Statistics). Quota lease prices were obtained from Jefferson State Trading
Company, an online auction service for trading quota pounds in the fishery. While our
empirical strategy estimates implicit quota prices, the prices listed on this auction site
are useful for making comparisons.
Cost per unit effort was computed from data on fuel prices and wage rates, distance
from port to the fishing area, and information from a 2008 cost survey for this fishery
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2012). The cost survey gives infor-
mation on crew size (labor per vessel), fuel consumption rates, and cost items such as ice,
maintenance, and repairs that vary with the amount of effort. With this information it is
possible to compute the labor and fuel costs for a specific trip. Other variable cost items
were assumed to bear the same proportionate relationship to labor and fuel expenses as
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in the 2008 survey. Because the unit of observation is fishing effort at an individual cell at
a point in time, a single cost per unit effort must be assigned to each cell for each period.
This required designating a single distance from port for each patch; this was deemed to
be the distance to the nearest port with at least 100 tows. Dividing the resulting cost
per trip by the average number of tow-hours per trip for all trips to that cell yielded our
measure of cost per tow-hour.
2.5 Results on Fishing Locations
The evidence indicates that harvesters altered fishing locations in ways that reduced
OFS catches following the shift to IFQs. A clear pattern in these changes is the emergence
of ’fuzzy MPAs’.
2.5.1 Evidence on Spatial Shifts
Estimates of the spatial adjustment model, represented by eq. (2.5), are presented
in Table 3. The parameters estimated are the implicit quota prices, ct (our main focus),
the parameter q, and a parameter for the trip limit proxy. We also report average quota
lease prices from the Jefferson State Trading Co. These data are not used in estimation
because they are taken from an incomplete, possibly non-random set of transactions, but
they are useful for making comparisons to estimates. We also report ex-vessel prices for
target species and OFS species for the purpose of discussing results. Interpreting the
regression coefficients, ct, as implicit quota prices follows from the logic of the estimating
equation: a large estimated quota price for species s indicates that, holding constant total
revenue, variable cost, and quota costs for other species, fishers avoided patches with
dense concentrations of species s under IFQ management. Such avoidance is sensible
only if IFQ quota for species s has a high price.
55
Protecting Marine Ecosystems: Prescriptive Regulation versus Market Incentives Chapter 2
In this light, the general pattern of estimated quota prices in Table 3 agrees with
intuition. First, among target stocks, the most valuable species tend to have the highest
estimated quota prices. The three target stocks with ex vessel prices over $1/lb., Petrale
sole, Sablefish north and Sablefish south, also have the highest estimated quota prices and
most of these estimates are significant. Several of the next most valuable target species
(ex-vessel prices between $.50 and $1.00/lb.), such as chilipepper rockfish, lingcod, and
yellowtail rockfish, also have large and significant quota price estimates. Second, among
OFS stocks, all estimated quota prices are positive and some are significant. The highest
are for bocaccio and yelloweye rockfish, two species that have been the focus of attention
in OFS management.
Patterns of spatial avoidance under IFQs can be gleaned by comparing estimated
quota prices to ex-vessel prices. If the estimated quota price for a species exceeds its
ex-vessel price, then fishers systematically moved away from patches where this species
is abundant under IFQs management. This is true for all OFS species except Widow,
which was nearly rebuilt by the time IFQs were put into place, making it a less con-
straining species. In three cases, bocaccio, canary rockfish and yelloweye rockfish, the
difference between estimated quota price and ex-vessel price is large, indicating strong
spatial avoidance.
There may also be evidence of OFS avoidance in some of the target stock coefficients.
The estimated quota price for chilipepper rockfish is far above the average quota lease
price (IFQ price) from the auction market, suggesting that the model may under-estimate
avoidance of this species. This gap, and similar gaps for other target species, may indicate
that fishers base expectations of OFS abundance on factors other than catch per unit
effort in a prior period. Certain target species are known to co-occur with OFS species
and fishers may use this knowledge when attempting to avoid OFS catches. Chilipepper
rockfish, a prominent target, is an apt example: areas abundant in chilipepper also tend
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to have high concentrations of widow and canary rockfish, both OFS species. Petrale
sole, another prominent target, may be another example. The estimated petrale quota
price is much higher than the quota price observed on the auction market, which may be
a consequence of the fact that several OFS, particularly bocaccio, tend to occur in areas
with higher petrale concentrations.
2.5.2 Evidence on Fuzzy MPAs
We hypothesized that the shift to IFQs caused a decline in effort near the RCA and
EFH protected areas, effectively expanding the areas of strict regulatory closure with
regions of voluntary, partial closure. The regulatory trawl closures were placed in areas
where OFS concentrations are high, and it is likely that OFS concentrations are also high
just outside these areas. Pre-IFQ regulations did not restrict fishing near RCA and EFH
zones, however; if anything, fishing along borders of these zones was attractive because
the target stocks inside were unfished. Fishers could therefore be compliant by fishing
along closed area boundaries, even though this presumably enhanced the risks of OFS
catches. When IFQs were placed on OFS catches, these incentives were reversed. Fishers
arguably had reason to avoid OFS concentrations near closed areas, even though fishing
in these areas is perfectly legal.
To examine this hypothesis, the estimated model was used to predict the change
in effort on each patch following IFQ implementation that can be attributed to bycatch
avoidance. The bycatch avoidance effect is isolated by computing predicted effort on each
patch with the estimated quota prices, then predicting again with quota prices for OFS
species set to zero. The difference between these predictions is the change in effort that
our model attributes to bycatch avoidance. For patches with predicted effort reductions,
the predicted reduction was plotted against the distance to the nearest protected area’s
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centroid. The resulting plot is shown in Figure 2 and the pattern is evident; the greatest
effort reductions occurred near the borders of MPAs. Adopting IFQs for overfished
species expanded the existing MPA network, but the protection added to the new areas
was partial and the degree diminished with distance. In other words, IFQs for overfished
species created ’fuzzy marine protected areas’.
2.6 Results on Other Adaptations
Following the shift to IFQs, harvesters altered trawl fishing methods in ways that
reduced the vulnerability of OFS populations. Fishers also shifted away from trawling
and toward more selective gear and pursued collective actions that had the effect of
reducing OFS catches. This section presents detailed evidence on these adaptations.
2.6.1 Adaptations in Trawl Methods
Trawl fishers can affect the mix of species caught on a given patch by changing fishing
methods in ways that alter the vulnerability of biological populations to trawl nets. The
shift to IFQ management changed the payoff to a given mix of species, implying that it
changed the payoff from applying different fishing methods on a given patch. The same
logic implies that the choice of method depends on the densities of biological stocks, on
prices and on costs. We examine the effect of IFQs on fishing methods by specifying
reduced form models that capture this reasoning. Two changes in trawl fishing methods
are examined, the time of day when fishing takes place and the duration of individual
tows of trawl nets.
Time of day is potentially relevant because the physical, biological, and ecological
dynamics of the ocean present harvesters with fishing opportunities that change through
time. While both target and OFS stocks live near the ocean bottom, widow rockfish
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and other OFS species migrate off the sea floor at night, while target stocks such as
Dover sole and other flatfish do not (Hannah et al 2005; Holland and Jannot 2013).
Nighttime fishing for flatfish targets may therefore be an effective strategy for avoiding
OFS catches. A simple test on the pre- and post-IFQ distribution of trawl fishing starting
times indicates that there was a shift in the time of day when sets occurred following
IFQ implementation. Figure 3 plots the temporal distribution of set times for the two
periods. Visually, the proportion of trawl sets made between the hours of 7:00 pm and
4:00 am increased after IFQ implementation. A two-sample Kuiper test of differences
in the empirical distributions of fishing effort within the 24-hour daily cycle before and
after the switch to IFQs to indicates that the difference is significant (Kuiper V: 0.024,
p= 1.93E-6).
To investigate whether this shift can be attributed to bycatch avoidance we model
the fraction of tows in patch j and period t that occur at night as follows
%Nightjt = αj + βIFQIFQt +
∑
s
βs∆CPUEjst +
∑
s
βs∗IFQ∆CPUEjstIFQt + jt
(2.6)
The specification allows for patch fixed effects and a patch-invariant effect for IFQs. It
allows the decision to fish at night in patch j to be influenced by the difference in catch per
unit effort (∆CPUE) between day and night in patch j. The variable ∆CPUE is coded
so that a positive value indicates lower abundance at night. The interaction between
∆CPUE and the IFQ dummy captures the effect of interest. A positive coefficient for
species s would indicate that IFQs encouraged nighttime fishing on patches where species
s is less abundant at night than during the day. Because the response variable is bounded
above and below, a two-sided Tobit estimation strategy was used.
The model was estimated for trawl tows that targeted Dover sole and Petrale sole, the
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two most important flatfish species in the fishery. Neither of these species migrates up
from the seafloor at night, while some other target species do. Results are presented in
Table 4, with standard errors clustered by patch. The positive and significant coefficient
estimate for the interaction between IFQs and yelloweye rockfish is consistent with the
use of night fishing as a bycatch reduction strategy.
Next, we examine whether the duration of trawl tows changed when IFQs were im-
plemented. While a trawl net is being towed, the composition of species collected is
unknown. When bycatch IFQs were introduced, information on the composition of catch
became more valuable because a single unfortunate tow could exhaust a vessel’s annual
quota allocation for some OFS species. Making shorter tows provides higher frequency
information on species abundances in the area fished, and better enables a fisher to move
away from OFS concentrations. Shorter tows could also be part of an active strategy of
learning about the locations of stock concentrations, and hence the areas to frequent or
avoid in future fishing trips. Figure 4 plots the distribution of tow durations for trawls
shoreward of the RCAs where OFS species are most common. The mean duration of tows
clearly decreased following IFQ adoption. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-
Whitney tests reject the null hypothesis of identical distributions against the one-sided
alternative of shorter tows under IFQs (Kolmogorov-Smirnov D+: 0.235, p-value<2.2E-
16; Mann-Whitney W=7.4E7, p-value<2.2E-16).
To test whether this shift reflected OFS avoidance, we estimate a reduced form model
of tow duration. Tow duration on a patch is hypothesized to depend on the variance in
total OFS catch per unit effort, and the strength of the dependence is allowed be different
in pre- versus post-IFQ periods. If shortening tows is a strategy for gaining information
on weak stock concentrations, tows in all periods should be shorter on patches where
OFS concentrations are more uncertain and this effect should be stronger under IFQs
because of the heightened individual avoidance incentive. The specification also allows
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for individual fisher fixed effects to account for differences in vessel attributes or the
habits of individual fishers; patch and time period fixed effects; depth and depth squared
to account for the time required for nets to reach the seafloor; the number of tows the
individual has made in the same patch in the same season in the same or prior year,
to proxy individual knowledge; and an interaction between the latter term and an IFQ
dummy. The model estimated is
Towdurationijt =γi + αj + φt + βDDijt + βD2D
2
ijt + βExpNijt + βExpIFQNijtIFQt
+ βOFSV ar
OFS
ijt + βOFSIFQV ar
OFS
ijt IFQt + ijt. (2.7)
The coefficients of primary interest are βOFS and βOFSIFQ. The former term indicates
whether or not tow durations were shorter in areas of OFS uncertainty prior to bycatch
IFQs and the latter coefficient shows what happened when IFQs for OFS were imple-
mented.
The estimates are shown in Table 5. The key result supports the hypothesis of IFQ-
induced avoidance behavior: tow durations were reduced in areas of high OFS uncertainty
after IFQs were implemented and the effect is weakly significant. This pattern was not
evident prior to IFQs. Other variables in the model have anticipated effects. Increased
depth increases tow duration at a decreasing rate; fishers with extensive experience on a
given patch tend to extend tow duration under IFQs.
Following IFQ implementation, the OFS portion of trawl catches declined substan-
tially, lending support to the claim that changes in fishing methods were motivated by
OFS avoidance. The discarding problem makes a thorough analysis of catch composition
infeasible, but simple comparisons can be made using data from the NOAA observer
program, a source that includes estimates of discards for a sample of trawl trips. Table
6 reports trawl catches of OFS and non-OFS species in pre- and post-IFQ periods. The
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ratio of OFS species in the total trawl catch fell by almost three-fourths in the first year
of IFQ management; trawl catches of two critical OFS species, cowcod and yelloweye
rockfish, essentially vanished.
2.6.2 Changes in Fishing Gear
It is well known that ’fixed (non-towed) gear’ such as baited hook and line assemblies
and baited fish traps and pots can select target stocks and avoid bycatch more precisely
than trawl nets. We hypothesize that introducing quota for OFS catches tilted the profit
calculus toward fixed gear fishing and away from trawling, and specify a reduced form
model to examine this hypothesis. Fixed gear fishers are not required to keep log books,
so empirical analysis must be based on catch statistics rather than effort. The empirical
specification must account for two other possibly confounding factors, a regulatory shift
that allowed for more fish to be landed using fixed gear and a price spike in certain target
species that are best caught with fixed gear.
The outcome variable examined is the fraction of the target catch that is landed by
trawl vessels versus fixed gear, by region and by month for the period 2007-2012. If
IFQs drove gear switching in order to avoid OFS catches, then switching should be most
prominent in months and regions where OFS catch is prominent. This effect is captured
by including the fraction of OFS catch in total catch for trawl fishing interacted with an
IFQ dummy. A negative coefficient on the interaction term would be consistent with gear
switching to avoid OFS catches following IFQ adoption. The specification also includes
time fixed effects, which should capture target species price effects; region dummies; and
an IFQ dummy interacted with region dummies, to represent the post-IFQ relaxation of
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constraints on switching gear. The specification is
Trawlsharejt = αj + α
IFQ
j IFQt + φt + βOFSFrac
OFS
jt + βOFSIFQFrac
OFS
jt IFQt + jt
(2.8)
The coefficient of interest is βOFSIFQ. Because the range of the dependent variable is
bounded above and below, a two-sided Tobit estimation procedure is used.
Results are reported in Table 7. The interaction effect is negative and highly signif-
icant, indicating that fishers shifted from away trawl nets toward fixed gear partly to
avoid bycatch.
2.6.3 Contracting and Collective Actions
IFQ management of bycatch created property rights to catches of OFS species and
required fishers to hold rights sufficient to cover OFS catches. This gave rise to indi-
vidual risks that had not existed previously, but also enabled contractual approaches for
managing these risks.
Even with careful fishing, trawling is imperfectly selective. The risk of making an acci-
dental haul of OFS species created a latent demand among fishers for insurance contracts
that would spread this risk. During the first year of IFQ operation at least three groups
of West Coast groundfish fishers responded to this by forming ‘risk pools’, contractual
arrangements that are essentially mutual insurance organizations. Each risk pool holds
the OFS quota of the members who join. The individual OFS quota contributions serve
as an insurance premium, and in return the pool insures pool members against accidental
hauls of OFS species. To be covered by the pool, an individual must fish according to
clean fishing protocols that the pool develops. One prominent pool with members based
in Fort Bragg and Morro Bay, California develops a ‘fishing plan’ each year that delin-
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eates areas of high, medium and low risk for OFS catches. The members then agree to
acceptable fishing practices for each risk category and these practices must be followed
in order to be covered by the pool. The 2012 fishing plan for this pool covered 15 million
acres of fishing grounds. It delineated zones of differential risk of OFS catches, specified
fishing practices based on scientific information, members’ experience and fishing history,
and allowed for in-season updates as new information is acquired.
Creating property rights also enabled a contractual solution to an oft-stated concern
with IFQs, that fishing activity may exit from traditional fishing communities. Adopting
IFQs often results in consolidation of effort due to over-capitalization under previous
management. It also gives incentives for more profitable fishing practices to replace less
profitable practices, which may cause vessels to move to different ports. Both changes are
sources of concern for small coastal communities that identify with commercial fishing
and rely on fishing activity as an attraction for tourists. One such community, Morro Bay,
California, pursued a contractual solution to this potential problem. The City of Morro
Bay, in collaboration with The Nature Conservancy and a local fishermen’s organization,
formed a new entity, the Morro Bay Community Quota Fund (the Fund). The purpose
of the Fund is to acquire and own quota for target and OFS stocks, and then lease this
quota to commercial fishers with lease restrictions on fishing activity that address the
concerns just described. The Fund’s bylaws require that leases be structured to enhance
fishing activities in the local community and to achieve various environmental goals.
2.7 Discussion and Conclusions
Adaptations to bycatch IFQs in the West Coast groundfish fishery indicate that creat-
ing property rights to the flow from a resource can achieve important ecosystem protection
goals effectively. Viewing conservation targets as constraints on joint production func-
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tions, satisfying such constraints at least cost is a highly complex, information-demanding
management problem. Its solution may involve a mix of spatial avoidance, subtle changes
in harvesting methods and switches to different technologies. In the pre-IFQ regime, man-
agers sought to satisfy conservation constraints by imposing trip limits, gear restrictions,
and spatial closures. The commercial fishers bound by these constraints clearly needed
to comply in order to continue fishing, but their actions were not motivated by the goal
of reducing OFS catches at minimum cost. Switching to IFQ management provided this
incentive and led to behavioral changes in where, when, and how fishers fished, actions
that were overlooked by the pre-IFQ management strategy. Evidently, even detailed
regulations in an extensively studied, comparatively information-rich fishery can miss
important margins of adjustment. If these margins had been recognized by regulators,
achieving them by command and control would have encountered severe monitoring and
enforcement problems and, no doubt, political opposition from fishers. Imposing IFQs
on OFS catches provided incentives for harvesters to make these adaptations voluntarily
because they enhanced profits in the new regime, making it unnecessary to force them
upon an unwilling fishing industry.
The nuanced behavioral responses to IFQs in the West Coast groundfish fishery may
have important implications for other fisheries. The behavioral adjustments that followed
the creation of property rights for bycatch species in the fishery studied here were both
nuanced and highly effective, suggesting that the persistent bycatch problem in fisheries
still managed under command and control regulation may be largely a matter of incentives
rather than a purely technological phenomenon. While trawling is typically considered
to be a non-selective method of fishing, fishers are clearly able to make some adjustments
to their mix of catch to better match their portfolio of quota holdings. That fishers can
make such adjustments in a fishery with so many species (and associated prices) suggests
that market approaches to bycatch management may work well in other fisheries.
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Evidence that fishers took diverse actions to avoid catches of overfished species does
not, of course, imply that IFQs can solve all marine conservation problems. Spatially
prescriptive policies, possibly layered onto bycatch IFQs, may remain appropriate if there
are reasons beyond limiting bycatch to reduce fishing in specific areas. Such reasons
may include protection of spawning grounds that export larvae to surrounding areas
or preservation of sensitive seafloor structures. Pairing market-based approaches with
spatial policies may well improve on the outcome that either approach alone could realize.
Alternatively, making the property rights themselves spatially explicit could, at least in
principle, provide sufficient incentives to achieve a particular spatial pattern of fishing at
least cost.
Finally, because some fisher responses are likely to be driven by the risk of bycatch
rather than expected costs of bycatch, further research into the influence of bycatch
risk on fisher behavior is warranted. The introduction of IFQs not only changed the
risk to which fishers were exposed, but also created a basis for contracts to manage
risk. The formation of risk pools and their development of protocols for fishing practices
that minimize bycatch suggest that these changes in risk are likely to be an important
determinant of behavior. Direct study of individual responses to risk may shed light on
the gains to cooperation and the determinants of risk pool membership. Further, because
risk pools can reduce their overall exposure by sharing information, participating fishers
may be able to more efficiently utilize their target stock quotas. These and other potential
effects of bycatch risk on fisher behavior merit closer study.
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Table 2.1: Mean Quota Lease Prices.
Species Mean Lease Price ($/lb)
Target (non-OFS) stocks 2011 2012
Dover sole 0.02 N/A
Petrale sole 0.40 0.46
Sablefish - North 1.19 1.15
Sablefish – South 0.80 1.01
Shortspine thornyheads – North 0.05 0.04
Overfished stocks
Bocaccio rockfish 0.33 0.27
Canary rockfish 1.60 2.07
Cowcod 0.54 1.44
Darkblotched rockfish 0.33 0.39
Pacific Ocean perch 0.26 0.29
Widow rockfish 0.27 0.60
Yelloweye rockfish 33.54 19.29
Table 2.2: Logbook Summary Statistics. Excludes records not used in estimation.
OFS catch reported from observer data to address discarding. Number of observa-
tions reported are the number of patch x 2 month block observations with valid catch
expectations; no observations exist for 2005-2006 since those years are used for com-
puting expectations starting in 2007. Tow duration reported for tows for which the
depth is less than 115 fathoms.
Year # obs Unique
Vessels
Trips Tows Total
Landings
(lb)
OFS
Catch
(lb)
Avg
Tow
Length
(hr)
%Night
Tows
for
Flatfish
2005 - 114 1,889 12,489 33,430,245 511,251 2.58 34.7
2006 - 112 1,876 13,275 34,287,686 663,591 2.66 34.2
2007 1,393 119 2,048 13,715 42,130,877 910,508 2.70 37.3
2008 1,399 116 2,143 15,137 50,629,774 786,388 2.47 41.4
2009 1,390 114 2,460 17,272 54,364,747 1,076,957 2.47 41.1
2010 1,439 103 1,838 13,147 46,408,945 1,012,141 2.40 40.9
2011 1,435 71 1,059 8,639 36,491,772 349,080 2.10 43.0
2012 1,317 65 991 8,331 36,268,704 363,564 2.27 41.7
SUM 8,373 - 14,418 102,005 334,012,750 5,673,479 - -
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Table 2.3: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Equation (2.5). Lease prices
(2011-2012 average) and ex-vessel prices are provided for reference only and are not
estimated.
Est. SE Est. SE IFQ
Auc-
tion
price
Ex-
vessel
price
Quota
prices:
target
species
Arrowtooth flounder 0.09 (0.02)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** - 0.10
Chilipepper rockfish 0.62 (0.00)*** 0.62 (0.00)*** 0.04 0.64
Dover sole -0.07 (0.04). 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.02 0.41
English sole -0.03 (0.16) 0.26 (0.10)* - 0.32
Lingcod 0.73 (0.02)*** 0.75 (0.04)*** 0.05 0.74
Longspine thornyhead 0.23 (0.07)** 0.29 (0.04)*** 0.04 0.42
Minor slope rockfish 0.61 (0.12)*** 0.56 (0.12)*** - -
Other flatfish 0.18 (0.06)** 0.26 (0.03)*** - -
Pacific cod 0.34 (0.14)* 0.54 (0.09)*** 0.03 0.53
Petrale sole 1.24 (0.03)*** 1.29 (0.02)*** 0.41 1.40
Sablefish (North) 1.63 (0.06)*** 1.66 (0.00)*** 1.17 2.52
Sablefish (South) 2.67 (0.18)*** 1.60 (0.50)** 0.84 2.52
Splitnose rockfish 0.73 (0.01)*** 0.74 (0.01)*** - 0.34
Shortspine thornyhead 0.08 (0.21) 0.39 (0.12)** 0.05 0.65
Starry flounder 0.32 (0.08)*** 0.47 (0.02)*** - 0.59
Yellowtail rockfish 0.47 (0.04)*** 0.50 (0.09)*** 0.01 0.51
Quota
prices:
by-
catch
species
Bocaccio rockfish 1.70 (0.36)*** 1.59 (0.37)*** 0.32 0.62
Canary rockfish 0.73 (2.01) 1.51 (0.98) 1.91 0.54
Darkblotched rockfish 0.68 (0.11)*** 0.91 (0.10)*** 0.35 0.47
Pacific Ocean perch 0.82 (0.02)*** 0.69 (0.01)*** 0.29 0.49
Widow rockfish 0.44 (0.03)*** 0.43 (0.01)*** 0.40 0.46
Yelloweye rockfish 18.68 (190.99) 42.85 (26.08) 21.83 0.31
Other
model
param.
1/q 59.76 (3.44)*** 47.26 (1.33)***
α 0.14 (0.01)*** 0.05 (0.01)***
σ 1.14 (0.04)*** 1.32 (0.09)***
Port Fixed Effects No Yes
# observations 8,373 8,373
Significance codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1
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Table 2.4: Two-sided Tobit estimates predicting the fraction of tows in a patch and 2
month block that begin at night (6pm-6am). Patch fixed effects omitted for brevity.
Standard errors clustered by patch.
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) 4.84E-01 (1.60E-01)**
IFQ -1.53E-02 (2.26E-02)
∆CPUE(Dover Sole) -3.58E-05 (3.71E-05)
∆CPUE(Dover Sole)*IFQ 1.13E-04 (9.04E-05)
∆CPUE(Petrale Sole) -5.18E-05 (7.07E-05)
∆CPUE(Petrale Sole)*IFQ -3.96E-04 (2.25E-04).
∆CPUE(Arrowtooth Fl.) 1.13E-04 (8.32E-05)
∆CPUE(Arrowtooth Fl.)*IFQ 9.47E-05 (1.34E-04)
∆CPUE(English Sole) -4.14E-05 (2.40E-04)
∆CPUE(English Sole)*IFQ 2.15E-03 (1.05E-03)*
∆CPUE(Bocaccio) 2.47E-02 (1.51E-02)
∆CPUE(Bocaccio)*IFQ 2.99E-03 (5.25E-03)
∆CPUE(Canary R.) -7.18E-03 (7.85E-03)
∆CPUE(Canary R.)*IFQ -7.34E-03 (1.27E-02)
∆CPUE(Darkblotched R.) -3.67E-04 (6.01E-04)
∆CPUE(Darkblotched R.)*IFQ 1.01E-03 (9.75E-04)
∆CPUE(Pac. Ocn. Perch) 4.00E-04 (6.11E-04)
∆CPUE(Pac. Ocn. Perch)*IFQ -1.91E-03 (1.86E-03)
∆CPUE(Widow R.) -5.51E-03 (6.17E-03)
∆CPUE(Widow R.)*IFQ 5.60E-03 (7.28E-03)
∆CPUE(Yelloweye R.) -1.47E-01 (1.25E-01)
∆CPUE(Yelloweye R.)*IFQ 2.71E+00 (1.36E+00)*
Significance codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1
Table 2.5: Estimates of model of tow duration. Patch, fisher, and period effects
omitted for brevity. Standard errors clustered by patch.
Estimate Std. Error
Depth 2.39E-02 (6.22E-03)***
DepthSq -2.06E-04 (5.20E-05)***
Var(OFSCatch) -3.76E-07 (3.01E-07)
Var(OFSCatch):IFQ -1.48E-06 (4.08E-07)***
# PriorTows -1.68E-03 (6.76E-04)*
# PriorTows:IFQ 6.41E-03 (1.66E-03)***
Significance codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1
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Table 2.6: Trawl selectivity before and after IFQs: Estimated catch of over-fished
species relative to landings of other species. Values reported are annual averages over
the relevant period: 2005-2010 for Pre-IFQ, and 2011-2012 for IFQ. Total OFS catch
figures exclude widow rockfish and petrale sole because their OFS status changed
during the period shown. Pre-IFQ OFS trawl statistics for 2005-2010 are estimates
from observer data summarized in Bellman et al. (2008). Non-OFS trawl statistics
are landings data from the PacFIN database at: http://pacfin.psmfc.org/.
Total trawl catch (metric tons) IFQ Pre-IFQ
Bocaccio 7.08 15.93
Canary Rockfish 3.86 15.85
Cowcod (South of 40°10’ N. lat.) 0.06 1.12
Darkblotched Rockfish 85.15 217.10
Pacific Ocean Perch 41.24 109.97
Yelloweye Rockfish 0.04 0.35
TOTAL OFS catch 137.23 360.32
TOTAL Non-OFS groundfish landings 13,383 20,055
OFS/Non-OFS catch (%) 1.025 1.797
Table 2.7: Estimation results for model of trawl share of catch by month and region.
Period and region effects omitted for brevity.
Estimate Std. Error
IFQ 0.073 (0.112)
Fraction OFS 2.670 (1.399).
Region*IFQ
Pt. Conception.*IFQ 0.163 (0.057)**
Eureka*IFQ 0.137 (0.015)***
Monterey*IFQ -0.020 (0.016)
Vancouver*IFQ 0.092 (0.007)***
Frac(OFS) * IFQ -6.260 (1.528)***
Significance codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, . 0.1
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Figure 2.1: Spatial closures near the California-Oregon border. Solid gray areas repre-
sent EFH closures. Dashed lines indicate representative RCA boundaries approximat-
ing 75 and 200 fathoms. Seaward RCA boundaries represent the maximal extent of
the RCAs during the year, and innermost boundaries represent the minimal closures.
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Figure 2.2: Reduction in predicted effort (2010-2011) attributed to OFS avoidance as
a function of distance from RCAs. Points represent patch x 2-month period observa-
tional units. Areas with higher reductions in predicted effort are generally closer to
the RCA boundaries.
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Figure 2.3: Empirical distribution of intra-day timing of fishing effort (net set time)
before (dashed) and after (solid) the change to IFQs. Vertical dotted lines indicate
6am and 6pm, the distinctions used for day and night in the reduced form estimation
of the effect of bycatch IFQs on night fishing.
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Figure 2.4: Distribution of tow duration before IFQs (dashed) and during IFQs (solid)
among tows with average depth < 115 fathoms. Vertical lines indicate mean tow
duration for the relevant period.
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3.1 Introduction
Many discussions of climate policy emphasize the prospects for technological change to
keep mitigation and adaptation costs at manageable levels. This has led to increased focus
on the ability of different climate policies to spur innovation in reducing production and
increasing capture of greenhouse gases (Milliman and Prince, 1989; Fischer et al., 2003;
Requate and Unold, 2003; Fischer and Newell, 2008). The rationale for this emphasis is
straightforward: since environmental policy often increases the costs of polluting, firms
will seek ways to avoid those costs, including development of new technologies that reduce
pollution. The idea that changes in relative prices should influence innovation traces
back to Hicks (1932), with Acemoglu (2002) formalizing that intuition and generalizing
to include the importance of relative factor abundance as well. The application of those
ideas to environmental policy intensified with a set of provocative claims by Porter and
van der Linde (1995). Those authors posited not only that environmental regulation
would induce innovation, but also that innovation could lead to enhanced competitiveness
for firms (or countries) subject to environmental regulation.
Empirical studies seeking to test these claims by quantifying the innovation induced
by environmental policy have thus far produced mixed results. Early studies found sug-
gestive evidence for a link between policy stringency and innovation (Lanjouw and Mody,
1996), but a follow-up study provided no evidence that link was causal (Jaffe and Palmer,
1997). Subsequent work again reversed the conclusions, finding that policy stringency
may increase pollution-relevant innovation but has a negligible effect on overall patent
rates (Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). More recent studies have echoed the importance
of outcome variable choice: Johnstone et al. (2010) find that renewable energy policies
have heterogeneous effects on innovation across different types of renewable technologies
(e.g. wind vs solar).
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Most recently, the scale and scope of the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
(EU ETS) has generated great interest in whether the policy is aiding in the transition
to a lower-carbon economy. Analyses thus far have suggested that, while regulated firms
have increased their low-carbon patenting activities substantially, the program accounts
for only a small fraction of the increase in low-carbon patenting in the EU (Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre, 2014). Other factors, such as fuel costs and country-specific renewable
energy policies, may be driving the bulk of low-carbon patenting (Hoffmann, 2007). The
EU ETS may be influencing other types of innovation, such as (disembodied) process
innovation like fuel switching (Delarue et al., 2008), but the current best estimates of the
effect of the EU ETS on product innovation indicate only a small effect.
In this paper, I revisit the question of how much innovation is induced by environ-
mental regulation, with a focus on the extent to which regulation might also induce
innovation by unregulated firms. While some attention has been paid to this issue, the
focus of prior work has been on upstream spillovers: does regulation induce innovation
by unregulated suppliers of technology to regulated firms (Fischer et al., 2003; Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre, 2014)? For example, a technology supplier might develop a new scrubber
for a regulated polluter. In contrast, the focus here is on downstream spillovers: does
regulation induce unregulated firms to develop new technologies that help reduce the use
of regulated firm output? Such downstream spillovers may entail fundamentally different
technologies than their upstream counterparts.
There are several potential reasons that downstream firms might innovate in response
to regulation. I focus on two channels for such indirect effects: knowledge spillovers that
augment the knowledge stock available to all firms, and pass-through of regulatory costs
into the price of outputs used by unregulated firms as inputs (e.g. electricity).12 Both
1In the treatment effects literature, such indirect effects are often referred to as interference (Cox,
1958).
2I return to other potential spillover channels in the discussion.
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knowledge stocks and energy prices have been shown to impact patenting output of firms
(e.g. Popp (2002)), so any impact of a policy on those intermediate quantities should
ultimately affect innovation. The aforementioned induced innovation studies offer evi-
dence that regulation can spur innovation by regulated firms, thereby augmenting the
knowledge stock available to unregulated firms. A separate line of evidence suggests that
regulated firms indeed pass through the costs of EU ETS emissions permits into both
wholesale electricity prices (e.g. Sijm et al. (2006, 2008); Fabra and Reguant (2013))
and retail electricity pries (Sijm et al., 2008; Convery et al., 2008). While the empirical
component of this paper is focused on that policy setting, cost pass-through has also been
raised as an issue in the context of a number of other environmental policies, including
but not limited to NOx reductions in the United States (Burtraw et al., 2001), standards
for management of livestock waste (Vukina, 2003), and air pollution regulation under
the Clean Air Act (Gianessi et al., 1979). Similarly, fully regulated utilities may have a
cost-pass through allowance for new investments needed to comply with stricter environ-
mental regulation, such as water quality standards (Cowan, 1993). Taken together, these
strands of the literature suggest that many environmental regulations are likely to induce
innovation by downstream unregulated firms, but that topic has not yet been directly
addressed.
If such a response occurs, then estimators that attempt to identify the direct effect
of regulation on innovation by regulated firms are missing part of the total effects of the
policy. That potential bias affects the most commonly used treatment effect estimators
(e.g. difference-in-difference, matching, and propensity score approaches), all of which
identify only the differential effects of policy on innovation by regulated firms. Such
spillovers have consequences for identification and bias in many settings, including studies
of social effects (Manski, 1993) and medical treatments (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). In
those other contexts, a few authors have also suggested estimation strategies that can
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account for certain types of indirect effects (Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Aronow and
Samii, 2012). However, the issue remains largely ignored in studies of innovation induced
by environmental regulation.
In what follows, I analyze the potential for regulation to indirectly induce innova-
tion by downstream unregulated firms using a mix of theory and empirical approaches.
On the theoretical side, I first employ Rubin’s (1974) potential outcomes framework
to demonstrate the potential for bias in standard estimators that ignore downstream
responses to regulation. Then, I use a two-period model that captures both spillover
channels outlined above to illustrate why downstream firms might respond to a change
in regulation by innovating more. Regulated firms innovate in response to regulation,
thereby increasing knowledge stocks, and the pass-through of regulatory costs into the
price of regulated firm outputs emerges as an equilibrium outcome. The magnitude of
these indirect effects of any one policy on innovation will, of course, depend upon the
strength of the hypothesized channels. For example, when regulated firms are able to
pass through costs because of a lack of unregulated competition, the effects are likely to
be larger. In contrast, sectors whose competitiveness may be threatened by regulation
due to the presence of competition from an unregulated sector (e.g. foreign firms) are less
likely to pass through costs, providing fewer incentives for innovation by consumers of
that sector’s output. Similarly, the strength of intellectual property rights in the jurisdic-
tion of a particular environmental policy will impact the degree of knowledge spillovers,
which will influence the way in which higher patent output by regulated firms affects the
productivity of R&D for unregulated firms.
After establishing the potential for such indirect effects of regulation, I quantify the
importance of those effects for the EU ETS by estimating dynamic count models with a
panel dataset of firm-level low-carbon patenting. The EU ETS provides a useful test of
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the relative importance of indirect effects for two primary reasons.3 First, as previously
mentioned, regulated power producers are indeed passing along permit costs into the price
of electricity.4 The first empirical approach I take pairs existing estimates of pass-through
with my own estimates of the elasticity of patenting with respect to electricity prices.
Second, the potential for cost pass-through all the way to retail electricity prices varies
geographically due to differences in generation mix, market concentration, and retail
price regulation, giving rise to variation in exposure to indirect innovation incentives.5
With that variation in mind, my second empirical approach makes use of the contrast
between mostly market-based retail pricing in several EU countries with the still high
degree of retail price regulation in France. If carbon cost pass-through does indeed
induce innovation among unregulated firms, there should be a stronger response in other
countries as compared to France.
In the context of the European carbon market, my estimates suggest that the total
effect of environmental regulation on innovation is 71% larger than the direct effect on
regulated firms alone. As such, consideration of indirect effects may be important for
accurate estimation of effects of environmental policy on innovation. While the total
effect of that policy on low-carbon innovation remains modest in absolute terms, the
primary purpose of that empirical exercise and this paper as a whole is to illustrate
relative effect sizes. As I show theoretically, the indirect effects of policy on innovation
by unregulated firms are likely to scale with the size of direct effects on regulated firms.
As such, if the total policy effect can be substantially larger than the direct effect, in
3I highlight features of the ETS that I think make indirect effects both relevant and estimable. There
are plenty of other benefits to studying the ETS, including its size, quality of available data, and the
existence of a carefully constructed estimate of the direct innovation effect from Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre
(2014) that can act as a reference point.
4A consistent but indirect source of evidence of pass-through is a positive link between CO2 prices
and stock performance of large, ETS-regulated electric utilities (Veith et al., 2009; Oberndorfer, 2009;
Bushnell et al., 2013).
5While wholesale markets are increasingly connected across markets, retail prices remain localized.
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settings where the direct effect of a policy is larger, the bias of studies that consider only
direct effects may be economically significant.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section more formally
presents the standard approaches taken in estimating induced innovation, highlighting
the prevalence of the assumption that unregulated firms do not innovate in response to
regulation, and the consequences when that assumption is violated. The third section
uses simple models to illustrate two common channels through which regulation is likely
to have indirect effects on innovation by unregulated firms: knowledge spillovers and
cost pass-through. The fourth section presents the empirical application to the EU
ETS, including development of an alternative estimation approach using dynamic count
models that account for both indirect channels, as well as a description of the data
used for estimation. Section five presents the results of estimation, and the final section
concludes.
3.2 Estimation of policy effects and potential bias
To illustrate why innovation by unregulated firms in the EU or elsewhere might pose
a problem for assessment of policy effects, it is useful to review the objectives of and
assumptions underlying most studies of induced innovation. Many empirical studies of
environmental policy effects, including those on innovation, seek to quantify the effect of
regulation on a particular outcome of interest. From a policy perspective, the relevant
outcome of interest is typically an aggregate quantity, such as total low-carbon patenting
across all firms. To get at that total policy effect (TPE), most studies first estimate firm-
level average responses, such as the average treatment effect (ATE) or average treatment
effect on the treated (ATT), then sum those effects across regulated firms. There are
two potential problems with this approach when unregulated firms respond to policy,
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which may result in biased estimates of the TPE. The first is that unregulated firms do
not form a suitable counterfactual for regulated firm behavior in the absence of a policy.
The second is that the responses by unregulated firms go uncounted. This section briefly
illustrates these issues in the treatment effects framework introduced by Rubin (1974).
To fix ideas, suppose that the outcome of interest is aggregate innovation in a par-
ticular technological field and the total policy effect of interest is the change in such
innovation (as measured by patents) caused by new environmental regulation. The TPE
can theoretically be calculated by comparing the total patenting under the actual pol-
icy regime with total patenting in the absence of the policy. The key challenge in such
studies is construction of a credible counterfactual: how many patents would have been
generated if the policy had not been implemented?
To answer that question, the treatment effects literature makes use of the idea of
potential outcomes. Suppose that firm i’s regulatory status is Ti ∈ {0, 1}, with Ti = 1 if
firm i is subject to environmental regulation and Ti = 0 if not. Let R ∈ {0, 1} be a binary
indicator of whether or not any firms are regulated, i.e. R = 1(
∑
i Ti > 0).
6 Finally, let
patenting by firm i with regulatory status T within overall policy regime R be denoted
yiTR. For example, i’s patent output if regulated under a policy is yi11, while that same
firm would output yi00 patents if it not regulated and no other firms were regulated.
This notation permits a concise expression of the total policy effect, defined here as
the change in total patenting caused by the introduction of regulation. Note that the
introduction of regulation changes R from 0 to 1 for all firms, while it changes Ti from 0
6This could be extended to allow Ti, R, or both to be continuous variables measuring the intensity of
treatment/regulation. More generally, R could even be an N-dimensional vector capturing the treatment
status for all firms. For practical purposes, and looking ahead to the empirical application to the EU
ETS, the largest firms in covered sectors are regulated, such that a binary indicator for R should be a
useful approximation. I use a binary treatment T at the firm-level for comparison with existing studies.
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to 1 only for firms directly subject to regulation. As a result, we may write the TPE as
TPE =
∑
i
yiT1 − yi00, (3.1)
where the sum is over all firms that might be affected in some way by the policy, not
just firms directly subject to regulation.7 For each firm, the TPE compares patenting
given a firm’s actual treatment status and the presence of regulation (yiT1) with what
that firm’s patenting output would have been in if it were not regulated and no other
firm were regulated (yi00). For firms actually regulated, this difference corresponds to
yi11 − yi00, while for unregulated firms it corresponds to yi01 − yi00.
The principal practical challenge in estimating the TPE is that we only observe one
outcome for each firm at a given point in time. When regulation is in place, we observe
yi11 for regulated firms, but we do not observe yi01 or yi00, both of which enter into
(3.3). Similarly, for unregulated firms, we do not observe yj00. Since we cannot estimate
such unobserved outcomes for a single individual, a natural approach is to replace firm-
level potential outcomes with their population averages, frequently after conditioning on
covariates, e.g. to replace yiTR with E[yiTR|xi]. Here, the expectation is be taken over
unobserved components of the potential outcome. Making these replacements yields:
TPE =
∑
i
E[yiT1 − yi00|xi] (3.2)
where, to save on notation, I simply re-define TPE to refer to this new expression.
The total policy effect can be usefully decomposed into direct and indirect effects on
7This sum should include all entities that could potentially respond to the policy in some way. This
may include individuals, or universities, and may include firms outside of the jurisdiction of the policy
in question. For practical purposes, in the empirical application to the EU ETS I consider the universe
of responding entities to be those falling within a particular country, regardless of regulatory status.
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both regulated and unregulated firms. In particular, we may rewrite (3.2) as:
TPE =
∑
i:Ti=1
E[yi11 − yi01|xi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct Effect on
Regulated Firms
γRDirect
+
∑
i:Ti=1
E[yi01 − yi00|xi]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect on
Regulated Firms
γRIndirect
+
∑
j:Tj=0
E[yj01 − yj00|xj]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect on
Unregulated Firms
γUIndirect
. (3.3)
The total policy effect thus consists of three components, corresponding to the three
sums above. The first (γRDirect) is the direct effect of regulation on regulated firms: what
are the consequences of regulating a firm given that some regulation of other firms is
in place (i.e. holding R fixed at 1)? The second term (γRIndirect) is the indirect effect of
regulation on regulated firms, capturing ways in which decisions made by other regulated
firms might impact firm i even if firm i were not regulated. The final term (γUIndirect) cap-
tures a similar indirect effect on firms that are actually unregulated. This decomposition
of the TPE into direct and indirect effects is similar to that in Hudgens and Halloran
(2008); I further decompose the indirect effects into those on regulated firms and those
on unregulated firms. Doing so emphasizes the two potential pitfalls of focusing only on
direct effects: part of the response by regulated firms goes uncounted, and any response
by unregulated firms is ignored.
From (3.3) we can begin to see how standard estimators relate to the total policy
effect. Most studies of induced innovation seek to quantify the Average Treatment Effect
(ATE) or Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT ) (e.g. Lanjouw and Mody
(1996); Jaffe and Palmer (1997); Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003)). The ATE conditioned
on xi is defined as:
ATE(xi) = E[yi11 − yi01|xi], (3.4)
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while the ATT conditioned on xi is
ATT (xi) = E[yi11 − yi01|xi, Ti = 1]. (3.5)
The summand in the first sum in (3.3) corresponds to the ATE, which is also equal
to the ATT if the treatment effect is constant across the population.89 As such, esti-
mators that seek to estimate the ATE or ATT are useful in estimating the direct effect
γRDirect of a policy on the outcomes of regulated firms. To make progress, it is common
to assume that potential outcomes are conditionally mean-independent of a firm’s reg-
ulatory status given some vector of covariates x. In particular, this implies that if i is
regulated, j is unregulated, and xi = xj, then E[yi01|xi] = E[yj01|xj]. In other words,
after conditioning on covariates, the expected outcome a firm would have if it were not
regulated but some regulation were in place is the same for all firms, regardless of their
actual regulatory status. That assumption allows unbiased estimation of ATE(xi), and
by summing over regulated firms, unbiased estimation of γRDirect. Regression and match-
ing estimators, including difference-in-difference and propensity score approaches, take
this general approach to estimating the ATE.
Since estimators of the ATE and ATT quantify the direct effects of policy, a key
question is whether those same estimators provide unbiased estimates of the total policy
effect. Mathematically, we wish to know when TPE = γRDirect. From (3.3) a sufficient
condition for TPE = γRDirect is for there to be no indirect effects of any kind. That
condition corresponds to the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), under
which the regulatory status of other firms has no effect on firm i’s patent output. Thus,
8In the decomposition of the TPE, I have, in fact, assumed homogenous treatment effects by omitting
conditioning on Ti.
9Standard ATE and ATT definitions often are written under SUTVA and thus do not include the R
subscript on potential outcomes, and would simply be written as E[yi1 − yi0|xi]. Practically speaking,
though, most ATE estimators are implemented to estimate (3.4) since they use outcomes for unregulated
firms in the presence of regulation to estimate E[yi0|xi].
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if SUTVA holds, average treatment effect estimators provide an unbiased estimate of the
total policy effect (when scaled by the number of regulated firms). If SUTVA does not
hold, an estimator of the direct effect may still provide an unbiased estimate of the total
policy effect, but only in the extreme case where the indirect effects on regulated and
unregulated firms exactly cancel. A secondary issue arising from the presence of indirect
effects is that the total effect of the policy on regulated firms, TPER = γRDirect +γ
R
Indirect,
cannot be derived from the ATE or ATT alone. Estimators of the ATE or ATT only
capture the differential (direct) effect of a policy on regulated vs unregulated firms, which
may not be the same as the total effect on regulated firms.
By this logic, prior studies of regulation-induced innovation that estimate only direct
effects on regulated firms will provide biased estimates of the total policy effect unless
the indirect policy effects are zero. Those studies may still provide unbiased estimates
of the direct effects they set out to quantify, but they offer an incomplete picture of the
total innovation effects of environmental policy. Further, as I will illustrate theoretically,
in many environmental policy settings, SUTVA is indeed likely to fail: both cost pass-
through and knowledge spillovers give rise to indirect effects of regulation on innovation
by regulated firms, unregulated firms, or both.
The direction of bias in standard estimators depends upon the sign of the indirect
effects. If both of those indirect effect terms are positive, estimators corresponding to
the direct effect alone will underestimate the total policy effect. In the empirical setting
of the EU ETS, the estimated net indirect effect is in fact positive, implying that prior
studies under-estimate the patenting effects of that policy. To provide motivation for why
that might be the case, I next develop a simple theoretical framework that incorporates
cost pass-through and spillovers into a model of induced innovation.
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3.3 Theoretical framework
To understand why environmental regulation might induce innovation in downstream,
unregulated sectors, I present a stylized model of regulation, innovation, knowledge
spillovers, and cost pass-through. Consider a two-sector economy in which one of the
sectors is subject to environmental regulation, and that sector produces a good used
by the unregulated sector. The NR regulated firms use a number of primary inputs to
produce a single output good XR, and in the process, generate a harmful pollutant e.
The regulated sector is subject to an emissions permit scheme with permit price τ , which
regulated firms take as given.10 The NU unregulated firms use the regulated sector’s
output as an input to production of a final good XU. A simple example of this is a regu-
lated sector producing electricity and an unregulated sector using electricity to produce
textiles.
In this two-period model, firms have two decisions to make. In the second period, a
firm must choose how much of its output to produce, with firms competing in Cournot
fashion. In the first period, each firm may invest in R&D to alter its production technol-
ogy for the second period. In particular, regulated firms may invest in R&D that lowers
emissions, while unregulated firms may invest in R&D that reduces the use of XR. R&D
is costly, and to maintain focus, considered to be deterministic.
The primary purpose of the model is to demonstrate how the presence of τ alters R&D
by unregulated firms through the indirect channels of knowledge spillovers and cost pass-
through. For a related treatment of R&D without such indirect channels, focusing on the
effects of τ on R&D by regulated firms only, see Baker and Shittu (2006). For a general
theoretical treatment of cost pass-through (tax incidence) without discussion of R&D,
10Even if regulated firms have market power in their output market, imagine that the permit scheme
covers other firms that are economically and technologically disconnected from the two sectors considered
here such that each firm considers the permit price to be exogenous.
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see Weyl and Fabinger (2013). Knowledge spillovers have been studied extensively in
the broader R&D literature; see, for example, Leahy and Neary (1997). The model here
combines elements of all of these approaches to highlight the role that indirect effects
may play in R&D responses to environmental policy.
I begin by considering firms’ second-period output decisions, taking first period knowl-
edge investment decisions (and thus second period knowledge stocks) as given. The
analysis then turns to the first period R&D decisions, effectively working backwards.
3.3.1 Output decisions
Let profits for representative regulated and unregulated firms be written as piR and
piU , with
piR =PR
(
XR
)
xRi − cR(xRi , w)− τe(xRi , kRi ), (3.6)
piU =PU
(
XU
)
xUj − cU(xUj , w)− wRDR(xUj , kUj , w). (3.7)
Here, P S(XS), S ∈ {R,U} is the inverse demand facing a firm in sector S, xSi is the
output quantity chosen by that firm (with sector-wide total output XS =
∑
i x
S
i ), and
production costs for firms in sector S are cS(xSi , w). Factor prices are denoted by w,
with the endogenously determined price of the regulated firm’s output separated out
as wR. Emissions e(xRi , k
R
i ) depend upon both output and the firm’s knowledge k
R
i .
Unregulated firms do not emit, but use production technology with conditional factor
demand for XR denoted by DR(xUi , k
U
i , w), which depends on the unregulated firm’s
output xUi and knowledge k
U
i and factor prices w, which include w
R. I make standard
assumptions that demand is non-negative and downward sloping (PU
′
< 0, PU(XU) ≥
0) and costs are increasing and convex in output (cSx > 0, c
S
xx > 0). Emissions are
increasing in output (ex > 0) and decreasing and convex in knowledge (ek < 0, ekk > 0),
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and marginal emissions are decreasing in knowledge (exk < 0). Finally, the production
technology for unregulated firms is such that conditional factor demand for the regulated
firm output is increasing in output (DRx > 0) and decreasing and convex in knowledge
(DRk < 0, D
R
kk > 0), and marginal demand for regulated firm output is decreasing in
knowledge (DRxk < 0).
Both regulated and unregulated firms choose output to maximize profits, taking
prices, knowledge, and actions of other firms as given. Equilibrium output choices (as-
sumed interior) are defined by the first order conditions for maximization of (3.6) and
(3.7). Specifically:
PR
′
(XR)xR∗i + P
R(XR) =cRx (x
R∗
i , w) + τex(x
R∗
i , k
R
i ), (3.8)
PU
′
(XU)xU∗j + P
U(XU) =cUx (x
U∗
j , w) + w
RDRx (x
U∗
j , k
U
j , w). (3.9)
Let the equilibrium output of an unregulated firm implicitly defined by those first
order conditions be denoted xU∗j . Focusing on symmetric equilibrium, total demand for
XR facing regulated firms is then NUDR(xU
∗
j , k
U
j , w), and the inverse demand function
PR(·) is defined such that PR(NUDR(xU∗j , kUj , w)) = wR. Similarly, first order conditions
for regulated firms yield implicitly defined output choices xR∗i .
As in Weyl and Fabinger (2013), the first order conditions defining equilibrium output
by regulated firms can be implicitly differentiated to yield the rate at which regulated
firms pass-through the costs of regulation (τ) into the price of their output (wR). In
particular, it can be shown (see Appendix) that
∂wR
∂τ
= PR
′
NR
ex
NRPR′′xR∗i + (NR + 1)PR′ − cRxx − τexx
, (3.10)
where all derivatives are evaluated at equilibrium output levels. The fraction corresponds
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to the change in a firm’s equilibrium output in response to a marginal increase in the
tax, which, when multiplied by PR
′
(XR∗)NR, yields the resulting change in the price
wR. That change in output is determined by the relative size of the two effects a tax
increase has on the marginal profit of output. First, holding output constant, a higher
tax directly alters marginal profits in proportion to marginal emissions, as captured in
the numerator. Second, a tax increase will cause all firms to alter their output decisions,
which will affect both prices and the firm’s own marginal costs, as represented by the
denominator. The ratio of the direct tax effect and the output effect determines how
much output will change in response to a tax increase.
The pass through effect described in (3.10) will, in general, depend on both market
characteristics and technology, as is often discussed in the literature on tax incidence.
Note in particular that market power is not required for cost pass-through to occur. As
the market becomes competitive, i.e. N → ∞ and consequently xR∗i → 0, the pass-
through rate from (3.10) converges to a constant ex, which depends upon regulated firm
production technologies (often in the literature unit choices and technology with constant
emissions per unit output imply ex = 1). If there were a third, unregulated production
sector competing with regulated firms, then prospects for pass-through begin to erode.
In such a case, PR
′
could be seen as a residual demand facing the regulated sector, and
the larger that competing sector is, the flatter that residual demand would be (PR
′ → 0),
driving pass-through to zero. As such, the regulated sector as a whole must possess power
in its output market, but firms within that sector need not possess market power for cost
pass-through to occur.
Provided that the equilibrium is stable in the sense of Seade (1980),11 ∂w
R
∂τ
> 0 and the
effect of a tax increase on the price of regulated firm output is positive (see Appendix).
Thus, for a given level of knowledge kRi , regulated firms facing a cost increase via τ
11Essentially, reaction functions must be downward sloping.
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will choose output such that wR increases, and unregulated firms will thus face a higher
relative price for XR. It is intuitive that this higher price may affect R&D decisions for
unregulated firms in earlier periods; I turn to this next.
3.3.2 Innovation decisions
In the first period, firms choose R&D investment with a goal of maximizing the sum
of profits across the two periods. I ignore discounting given the short time horizon of the
model; adding it offers little additional insight. R&D by a firm in sector S is denoted
rS, with each unit of R&D having unit cost. Such investment generates new knowledge
according to knowledge production function fS(rSi , R
S, R−S, ki), where RS captures total
investment by other firms in i’s sector, R−S is total investment by firms in the other
sector, and ki is the firm’s current knowledge stock. Knowledge production is assumed
to be increasing and concave in both own R&D (fSr > 0, f
S
rr < 0) and own knowledge
(fSk > 0, f
S
kk < 0). In general, f
S(·) may either increase or decrease in both RS and R−S.
An increasing relationship reflects positive R&D spillovers (fSR > 0), while a decreasing
one may reflect technological saturation (fSR < 0). The theory below does not depend on
the sign of fSR , but when making predictions regarding the direction of expected effects for
the empirical application, I assume fSR > 0 since the low-carbon technologies of interest
are not yet mature enough that saturation should be an issue. New knowledge generated
via these functions increments the knowledge stock additively:
kSi =k
S
i0 + f
S(rS, RS, R−S, kSi0), (3.11)
where kSi0 is firm i’s initial knowledge stock.
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With this notation, the first-period problems facing firms can be written as follows:
max
rRi
{−rRi + piR∗(kRi , w, τ,KR, KU)} (3.12)
max
rUj
{−rUj + piU∗(kUi , w, τ,KU , KR)} . (3.13)
Here, piS∗ represents the equilibrium payoffs a firm in sector S will earn in the second
period. Those future payoffs will depend upon both future prices (including the emissions
price) and future knowledge stocks of all firms (KR, KU), which are affected by current
period investments in R&D via (3.11). When choosing R&D, each firm takes the R&D
decisions of all other firms as given. Further, consistent with the price-taking behavior
described earlier, unregulated firms assume that their R&D will have no effect on future
input prices. However, unregulated firms do recognize that their R&D decisions may
affect future output choices by other unregulated firms, due both to knowledge spillovers
and the strategic nature of second period output decisions.
First order conditions corresponding to the problems above again implicitly define
equilibrium firm choices rR∗i and r
U∗
j . I focus solely on first period R&D choices by
unregulated firms, since the purpose of the theoretical framework is to highlight channels
for induced innovation outside the regulated sector. Still, due to the parallel structure of
(3.12) and (3.13), the analysis for regulated firms is analogous. Adapting the methods
in Leahy and Neary (1997) (see Appendix), in a symmetric equilibrium the first order
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condition defining rU∗j can be written:
−wRDRk fUr
 1︸︷︷︸
R&D cost effect
+ (NU − 1)P ′xU∗j
piUjjj
(
piUjlj
piUjjj
− f
U
RU
fUr
)
(
piUjjj − piUjlj
)(
piUjjj + (N
U − 1)piUjlj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R&D strategic effect
 = 1,
(3.14)
where the notation piUjlj is used to denote a second order partial derivative of firm j’s profits
with respect to output decisions by unregulated firms j and l. This condition equates
the marginal benefit of R&D, which consists of a (direct) cost effect and a strategic effect
via impacts to other firms’ output decisions, with the (constant) marginal cost of R&D.
Note that the sign of the strategic effect on optimal R&D depends on the strength of
knowledge spillovers, captured here by fURU . Once f
U
RU grows larger than a threshold level,
the strategic effect changes sign. The intuition is straightforward: if spillovers are small,
R&D enables j to increase output, causing a strategic reduction in output by other firms,
and providing additional marginal benefits of R&D to firm j. As spillovers get larger,
however, R&D by j also reduces costs for other firms, causing them to increase output
and reduce the marginal benefits to firm j. Above a spillover threshold, the net impact
of those effects is negative.
This condition provides useful insight into the determinants of R&D by unregulated
firms in equilibrium. First, and of greatest interest, the price of regulated firm output
will clearly impact R&D decisions. Thus, any factor affecting the price of that good will,
in turn, impact R&D by unregulated firms. In particular, pass through of τ into wR and
R&D by regulated firms RR (which affects regulated firm output XR) will both impact
wR, and ultimately R&D by unregulated firms. Second, through fURU and f
U
r , R&D by
one unregulated firm is likely to depend upon R&D choices by other unregulated firms
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RU . Thus, determinants of RU and RR, including the knowledge stocks of other firms
KU and KR, will also affect the equilibrium value of rU∗j . Finally, the marginal benefits
of R&D scale with DRk , which corresponds to the (negative of the) marginal rate of
technical substitution (MRTS) between XR and k in an unregulated firm’s production of
its output XU . If knowledge is a poor substitute for XR, then DRk is small in magnitude,
and regardless of the magnitude of cost pass-through, the marginal benefits of R&D will
be small, and we should expect to see little R&D in that unregulated sector. The MRTS
will be small in magnitude if past investment in R&D is high (so that k is large) since
DRk < 0 and D
R
kk > 0. Similarly, the MRTS will be small if little or no X
R is required
in the production of XU in the first place. That is, for a given level of pass-through
(and hence a fixed wR), we should expect to see the most innovation in a sector that is
intensive in its use of XR and immature with respect to technological advances to reduce
use of XR.
Determining the sign of the effect of τ on rU∗j becomes quickly intractable: τ impacts
the price wR, R&D by regulated firms and other unregulated firms, and output choices
of all unregulated firms, all of which affect rU∗j via (3.14). Some additional insight can
be gained if the unregulated sector is a monopoly (NU = 1), in which case the strategic
effect of R&D disappears (NU − 1 = 0).12 In that case, differentiation of (3.14) with
respect to τ yields
∂rU∗j
∂τ
=
∂wR
∂τ
∂rU∗j
∂wR
=
∂wR
∂τ
fUr
wR
(
−DRk − wRDRkx
∂xU∗j
∂wR
− wRDRkwR
)
DRk f
U
rr +D
R
kk(f
U
r )
2
. (3.15)
Casual inspection of this expression suggests that the change in R&D by unregulated
firms due to regulation will depend upon the pass-through of the permit price ∂w
R
∂τ
. Any
market characteristics or policies (e.g. price regulation) that limit cost pass-through
12The strategic term also vanishes in perfect competition, since xU∗j → 0.
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should therefore reduce the level of indirectly induced innovation.
The sign of the effect in (3.15) hinges upon the numerator of the final fraction, which
captures the way in which a change in wR impacts the marginal benefit of knowledge
at a given knowledge level. The first effect (−DRk ) simply reflects that as XR becomes
more expensive, technology that helps reduce use of XR is more valuable. However, the
unregulated firm has two other ways to reduce its use of XR: it can reduce its own
output or substitute away from XR toward other inputs. The second (−wRDRkx
∂xU∗j
∂wR
) and
third (−wRDRkwR) terms capture those possibilities. Both of those effects counteract the
first term, since they limit the marginal benefit of knowledge. Which force dominates
depends on the production technology that gives rise to DR in the first place. As in
Acemoglu (2002), if other factors are a poor substitute for XR, the price increase will
tend to increase innovation leading to reduced use of XR. In contrast, if other factors are
good substitutes, the firm may substitute away from XR enough so that R&D related to
use of XR actually declines.
Pulling this all together, we may write equilibrium R&D by an unregulated firm as a
function of variables that firm treats as exogenous (wR is endogenous, but unregulated
firms are price takers):
rU∗j = r
U∗(wR, w, τ, kUi0, K
U
0 , K
R
0 ). (3.16)
These dependencies will be important in translating the theoretical framework to an
empirical specification for the application to the EU ETS. As noted above, it is difficult
to definitively sign the effect of changes in determinants of R&D on equilibrium levels of
innovation without further restrictions on the primitive functions defining production of
both output and knowledge.
I conclude this section by summarizing the expectations about what will impact in-
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novation by unregulated firms based on the discussion above. The first two hypotheses
follow directly from assumptions about the properties of the knowledge production func-
tion fU(·):
H1 Innovation by unregulated firms increases in own knowledge.
H2 Innovation by unregulated firms increases in total knowledge for newer technologies.
While these knowledge effects do not directly pertain to unregulated firms’ response to
regulation, they apply in general and thus will mediate some of the indirect effects of
regulation on unregulated firms.
The remaining hypotheses address unregulated firm patenting responses to regulation
more directly. First, while the sign of
∂rU∗j
∂τ
cannot be determined in general, relatively
inelastic short-run demand for electricity suggests that for many production technologies,
substitution possibilities are limited. Therefore, we should expect to see more innovation
due to cost pass-through:
H3 Innovation by unregulated firms increases with higher costs of inputs produced by
regulated firms.
Further, the discussion of condition (3.14) includes additional hypotheses about market
characteristics and technology. Specifically:
H4 Innovation by unregulated firms is higher in sectors that are intensive in their use
of regulated firm output and are technologically immature.
H5 Innovation by unregulated firms is higher in markets facing higher cost pass-through
from regulated firms (larger ∂w
R
∂τ
).
To test these hypotheses, I turn to an empirical application involving low-carbon inno-
vation and the emissions trading program in the EU.
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3.4 Empirical Application: EU ETS
The European Union launched its permit market for greenhouse gas emissions in
2005 covering a subset of CO2 emitting installations across several industries; currently
over 11,000 installations in 31 countries are regulated under the scheme.13 As the largest
emissions permit market in the world, the EU ETS is under intense scrutiny for its ability
to meet a variety of objectives. One important metric on which the EU ETS is being
evaluated is its ability to stimulate low-carbon innovation, both in patentable product
form and process innovations. As discussed earlier, studies to date have found little
evidence of a strong impact of the EU ETS on product innovation. In this empirical
application, I revisit those findings in light of the potential for indirect effects as outlined
in the preceding theoretical framework.
While cost pass-through is possible for any output produced by regulated firms, I
focus only on electricity, given its prevalence as an input used by unregulated firms and
existing documentation of cost pass-through. From an empirical perspective, electricity
markets offer two sources of variation that will prove useful in identification of cost
pass-through as a driver of indirectly induced innovation. First, prices within a country
vary across time for a variety of reasons, setting up panel estimation of the relationship
between electricity prices and low-carbon patenting. Those estimates of the elasticity
of low carbon patenting with respect to electricity can be paired with estimates of cost
pass-through to give a picture of how low-carbon patenting by electricity users responded
to the introduction of the ETS. I rely on existing estimates of cost pass-through for this
first approach, focusing empirical efforts only on the relationship between electricity
prices and low-carbon patenting.
The relationship between the emissions permit price and electricity price is also likely
13For detailed background on the ETS, the reader is referred to any of the prior studies referenced
earlier.
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to vary geographically. Power producers face different emissions costs due to the use of
different technologies, and geographic variation in price regulation and market charac-
teristics will influence those firms’ ability to pass through emission costs into the price of
electricity. Although the EU as a whole has made strides toward market-based pricing
for electricity, there is still substantial variation in scope for carbon price pass-through
all the way to end users. Such variation in cost pass-through should, in turn, influence
the strength of the hypothesized indirect effects of regulation on innovation.
Based on that observation, the second estimation approach I take in the paper is
a difference-in-difference style estimation comparing the change in low-carbon patenting
that occurred with the introduction of the ETS across markets with different pass-through
potential. In particular, retail electricity markets in France are somewhat unique in
that the prospects for pass-through are extremely limited as compared to the rest of
the EU. On the generation side, France’s large nuclear capacity means that the bulk
of domestic electricity generation generates few carbon emissions (though the marginal
technology may still be carbon-intensive). In terms of price regulation, many French
firms have the option (and most take it) to buy electricity under a regulated tariff scheme.
Because regulated tariffs are set on a cost-recovery basis and not on the marginal costs
of production as in a market system, the large nuclear capacity means that the retail
price faced by many firms will contain a relatively small carbon component. In other
countries in the EU, the more liberalized retail markets and smaller nuclear capacity will
mean the retail market price will contain more carbon costs.14 As such, downstream,
unregulated firms in countries other than France should exhibit a stronger low-carbon
14This intuition is reflected in early model-based estimates of pass-through rates by Sijm et al. (2006),
which suggest carbon costs of 20 e/ton should increase electricity prices in Germany by 13-19 e/MWH
but only by 1-5 e/MWH in France. In practice, the carbon price has been below that absolute level,
but the modeling exercise hints at substantively different pass-through rates in the two countries. In a
later study, Sijm et al. (2008) and co-authors explicitly model the French market differently in that they
assume the dominant utility, EdF, does not pass-through its costs due to regulatory threats.
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patenting response to the introduction of the ETS than their French counterparts.
To operationalize these ideas, I next detail my estimation strategy.
3.4.1 Empirical Model
We can use the theoretical framework outlined earlier to define an estimation strategy
for studying the effects of the EU ETS on low-carbon patenting. In particular, the
knowledge production functions from (3.11), evaluated at equilibrium levels of output
and investment, provide the basis for estimation. In light of the discrete nature of patent
counts generated via those knowledge production functions, all models considered are
count models. All of the estimated models include both direct and indirect effects from
(3.3). The latter effect is identified through variation in the electricity price, knowledge
stock, and patenting over time, relying upon inclusion of other time-varying variables to
control for other factors which might include patenting output.
To make these count models operational, it is necessary to specify functional forms for
the knowledge production functions fR(·) and fU(·). I assume both take a Cobb-Douglas
form, as is common in many models of innovation (e.g. Griliches (1979); Popp (2002)).
Evaluating the knowledge production function at equilibrium levels of R&D as defined
by (3.14) yields
patsSit = α
0
iαct(r
S∗
it )
αSr (RS∗t )
αSS(R−S∗t )
αS−Sk
αSk
it νit, (3.17)
where νit ≥ 0 is a shock to patenting productivity. Recall that RS∗t captures R&D by
other firms within i’s sector, while R−S∗t captures R&D by firms outside i’s sector. The α
parameters capture various aspects of innovative productivity: α0i represents firm-specific
productivity, αct is a time-varying patenting productivity parameter that varies at the
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country level c,15 αSr is the productivity of own R&D, α
S
S is the productivity of within-
sector other R&D, and αS−S is the productivity of cross-sector other R&D. Thus, α
S
S and
αS−S capture spillovers within and across sectors. The superscripts on coefficients indicate
that the effects of determinants on patent output may vary with regulatory status.
This equation can be re-expressed in a form more familiar in count models with
exponential mean:
patsSit = α
0
iαctexp
(
αSr ln(r
S∗
it ) + α
S
Sln(R
S∗
t ) + α
S
−Sln(R
−S∗
t ) + α
S
k ln(kit)
)
νit. (3.18)
Unfortunately, since relevant R&D investments at the firm and industry level are not
observed, I cannot estimate this equation as part of a structural approach. Instead,
I employ a reduced-form approach by replacing the terms involving ln(rS∗it ), ln(R
S∗
t ),
and ln(R−S∗t ) with predicted determinants based on (3.14) and (3.16) and the analogous
condition for regulated firms. Those determinants include the price of regulated firm
output wR, other factor prices w, own knowledge ki, and knowledge stocks from other
firms, K. Further, to reflect the fact that equilibrium and R&D in the regulated sector
will differ once regulation is introduced, I allow R&D investment to depend upon a
treatment status dummy variable Tit, which takes the value one if a firm is in the regulated
sector and the policy is active, and zero otherwise (i.e. Tit = 1(Si = R & t ≥ t˜), where t˜
is the first year the policy is in effect).
Substituting these determinants yields the following reduced-form specification:
patsict = βiβctexp(β
S
RTit−1 + β
S
k ln(kit) + β
S
KS ln(K
S
t ) + β
S
K−S ln(K
−S
t )
+
∑
m∈M
βSmln(w
m
ct−1) + β
S
elecln(w
elec
ct−1))uit. (3.19)
15Note a firm may operate in several countries. For the purposes of analysis, a firm operating in
multiple countries is treated as multiple firms.
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Here, wmct−1 is the lagged price for factor m in country c (with the set of all factors included
denoted M). The factors I focus on for estimation are the prices of coal and natural gas.
Both are commonly used as inputs to production processes in conjunction with electricity,
and may be thought of more generally as capturing the effect of movements in other input
prices. Tit−1 is a (lagged) dummy variable taking the value 1 if firm i is regulated under
the ETS, and 0 if that firm is not regulated. I use one year lags of prices and regulatory
status to allow for prices to affect R&D with some delay (later I explore alternative lag
structures). KS and K−S reflect the overall knowledge stocks in the firm’s own sector
and the other sector.
Before this equation can be estimated, a few practical considerations must be dealt
with. First, knowledge stocks cannot be measured directly, and so I proxy for a firm’s
knowledge stock with that firm’s past patenting output. To account for firms with no
prior patenting history, I replace ln(kit) with a combination of a dummy variable indicat-
ing if the firm has not patented in the past, and the log of past patents if the firm has a
nonzero patent history (as in Aghion et al. (2012)). Second, because one of the variables
of interest, electricity price, is only observed at the country by year level, estimating βct
using a standard dummy variable approach would preclude identification of βSelec. Since
βSelec is a coefficient of interest, I instead proxy for βct with observed total patenting rates
Patsct at the country level across all technology types. Third, other government inter-
vention besides emissions regulation may affect the costs or benefits of R&D, such as
demand-side policies (e.g. feed-in-tariffs) or R&D subsidies via public-private partner-
ships. While the stylized model presented earlier omitted such complications for clarity,
I allow for them in the empirics with additional country-year controls Zct. Finally, I
assume that the industry knowledge stocks KSt and K
−S
t are truly public, such that they
can be considered a single public knowledge stock Kt. Making these substitutions yields
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the main model for estimation:
patsict = βiexp(βRTit−1+ Treatment effect
βk,01(kit = 0) + β
S
k,>01(kit > 0)ln(kit)+ Own knowledge effect
βKS ln(Kt)+ Knowledge spillover effect
βSelecln(w
elec
ct−1)+ Electricity price effect
βPatsln(Patsct)+∑
m∈M
βSmln(w
m
ct−1)+
βgZct)uit. (3.20)
Taking the expectation of equation (3.20) defines the conditional mean number of
patents for firm i, which forms the basis for count model estimation. In particular,
I estimate three quasi-poisson variants of this model via quasi-maximum likelihood,
relaxing the strong mean-variance equality assumption in poisson models to allow for
over-dispersion. The three variants differ in their approach to handling unobserved het-
erogeneity βi. The preferred model uses the pre-sample mean estimator introduced by
Blundell et al. (1995), which uses pre-sample information on patenting by firms in the
data set to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity. I also contrast this approach with a stan-
dard fixed effects poisson model (estimated via concentrated maximum likelihood) and
a simple pooled poisson estimator that ignores unobserved heterogeneity. The former
alternative will produce biased estimates in light of the dynamic nature of the model,
while the latter is likely to do the same on account of ignoring persistent firm-level het-
erogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998).
Note that this specification does not directly include the price of emissions permits τ .
The treatment dummy variable Tit−1 captures a discrete effect of regulation on regulated
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firms. I use that dummy variable rather than a price for direct comparison with existing
studies which use binary treatment status. Further, per the theoretical framework, any
indirect effects operate through both knowledge stocks and the electricity price, both of
which are included in the model. As a result, the evidence for indirect effects in this
model is itself partly indirect, requiring combination of the parameter estimates from
(3.20) and prior evidence of cost pass-through.
To provide a more direct test of the presence of indirect effects, I also estimate a
modified version of (3.20) that includes the permit price. Since one of the key hypothe-
sized channels for indirect effects is pass-through of the emissions price into the electricity
price, a natural step is to replace the electricity price with its determinants, including
the emissions price and the already included prices of coal and natural gas. The re-
sulting model provides a reduced form estimate of the impact of the emissions price on
low-carbon patenting. As discussed earlier, this effect is expected to be much stronger
for firms outside of France due to that country’s uniquely limited prospects for cost
pass-through.
The resulting model is
patsict = βiexp(βRTit−1+ Treatment effect
βk,01(kit = 0) + β
S
k,>01(kit > 0)ln(kit)+ Own knowledge effect
βK ln(Kt)+ Knowledge spillover effect
βScτ τt−1+ Emissions price effect
βPatsln(Patsct)+∑
m∈M
βmln(w
m
ct−1)+
βgZct)uit, (3.21)
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where the per-country coefficient βScτ captures the effect of interest. If the emissions price
has little influence on the retail electricity price (as in France) and there are no other
channels through which the ETS impacts low-carbon patenting by unregulated firms, βScτ
should be near zero. In other countries with greater prospects for cost pass-through, if the
increase in electricity price due to the permit price leads to more low-carbon patenting,
βScτ should be positive.
While the coefficient estimates from both (3.20) and (3.21) provide evidence as to
the presence or absence of indirect effects, they do not correspond directly to the direct
and indirect policy effects in (3.3) that are of most interest. With that in mind, I next
describe the two approaches I use to construct estimates of the direct and indirect policy
effects using estimated coefficients.
3.4.2 Constructing Estimated Direct and Indirect Policy Ef-
fects
To construct estimates of the direct and indirect effects of policy in (3.3), I employ
a simulation approach combining my fitted models with estimates of cost pass-through
rates from the literature. Because both (3.20) and (3.21) are dynamic specifications,
computing policy effects requires simulation using each fitted model rather than simply
interpreting coefficients. The estimate of βT , for example, provides insight into the sign
and significance of the direct effect of regulation on regulated firms, but the magnitude
of that effect depends on a combination of that coefficient and knowledge effects. In
particular, to construct estimates for both E[yis1] and E[yi01], it is necessary to compute
expected patent output for the first year in which regulation could have impacted patent
output, use those fitted outputs to update the knowledge stocks for the second year,
and so on. I next describe these simulations in more detail, beginning with computation
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of direct effects, then describing adaptations to compute indirect effects. The steps are
written with reference to (3.20), but I use the same procedure for (3.21) except where
noted.
Estimates of the direct effect
To estimate the direct effect of regulation on regulated firms (γRDirect), I perform two
related simulations. The first is designed to provide an estimate yˆiT1 of E[yiT1], while
the second provides an estimate yˆi01 of E[yi01].
The steps for producing yˆiT1 are as follows:
S1. For the first year of regulation, simulate patent output per firm using (3.20) and
estimated parameters.
S2. Update knowledge stocks for t+ 1 using the simulated patent output in year t.
S3. Repeat steps S1 and S2 for each year of regulation in sequence.
S4. Sum the patent output per firm from S1 across all years of regulation.
Denote the sum produced in S4 by yˆiT1. These steps compute predicted patent output
per firm, and sum over the years of regulation such that yˆiT1 represents an estimate of
total expected patent output under the actual policy and regulatory status of firms.
To compute yˆi01, I simulate a regulated firm’s i’s patent output if it were not regulated
by setting its regulatory status to unregulated and simulating in a similar fashion to
above. For this simulation, I hold estimated output by other firms j 6= i fixed at the
levels simulated during computation of yˆiT1. This reflects the fact that the direct effect
is intended to capture only the effect of a firm’s own regulatory status on its own patent
output. This process is then repeated for all regulated firms. In particular, I perform the
following steps to compute yˆi01:
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D1. Simulate patent output under observed regulation according to S1-S4 above.
D2. For firm i, set Tit = 0 for all t.
D3. For the first year of regulation, simulate patent output for firm i only using the
modified data and estimates from (3.20).
D4. Update firm i’s knowledge stock and total knowledge stocks for year t+ 1.
D5. Repeat steps D3 and D4 for each year of regulation in sequence.
D6. Sum the patent output computed in step D3 for each firm across all years of regu-
lation, and denote the sum by yˆi01.
D7. Repeat steps D2-D6 for each regulated firm i.
Once estimates of yˆis1 and yˆi01 have been computed according to the simulations
above, the estimate γˆRDirect of the direct effect γ
R
Direct is computed as:
γˆRDirect =
∑
i:Ti=1
(yˆiT1 − yˆi01). (3.22)
Estimates of the indirect effects
Estimation of the indirect effects of the ETS on patenting combines each fitted model
with existing estimates of cost pass-through rates from prior studies. Both of the indi-
rect effects in (3.3) contain the expected change in patenting when a given firm remains
unregulated but regulation is introduced for other firms. To construct an estimate yˆi00 of
the counterfactual patent output in which a firm is unregulated and no regulation exists
(E[yi00]), I use the estimated model to simulate patenting output when the electricity
price is modified according to previously estimated pass-through rates, the regulatory sta-
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tus of all firms is unregulated, and, for the alternative specification (3.21), the emissions
permit price is set to zero.
Letting PTRc denote the pass-through rate for carbon and electricity prices in the
EU ETS, the simulation of the counterfactual proceeds as follows:
I1 Set Tit = 0 for all i and all t
I2 Modify welect to be w
ALTelec
t = w
elec
t /(1 + PTRc) for all t.
I3 If the specification is (3.21), set τt = 0 for all t.
I4 Simulate patent output according to steps S1-S4 above using the modified data,
and denote the sum from S4 as yˆi00
The simulation procedure produces an estimate yˆi00 of E[yi00], the patent output of
firm i if no regulation existed. That estimate can be subtracted from estimates of yˆi10 and
yˆi00 computed in S1-S4 and D1-D7 to produce the desired estimates of indirect effects.
In particular:
γˆRindirect =
∑
i:Tit=1
(yˆi01 − yˆi00) , (3.23)
γˆUindirect =
∑
i:Tit=0
(yˆi01 − yˆi00) . (3.24)
On a final note, interpretation of the estimates γˆRindirect and γˆ
U
indirect requires some
care. As discussed above, βScτ in the alternative model (3.21) captures a joint effect of
simultaneous changes in the permit price and other determinants of the electricity price
such that the electricity price remains unchanged. Since other factor prices in the model
are likely to positively influence the electricity price, those factor prices would have to
simultaneously decline, meaning the change captured by βScτ involves a larger relative
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price increase for emissions than a standard ceteris paribus price increase. As a result, I
interpret estimates γˆRindirect and γˆ
U
indirect derived from that model as upper bounds. That
alternative model is quite useful in pinning down the role that cost pass-through plays
in innovation, but I focus my discussion of the estimated magnitude of indirect and total
effects on those derived from the main specification (3.20).
3.4.3 Data
In line with the specifications presented above, I construct a panel dataset of low-
carbon patenting in the EU at the firm level. The study period ranges from 1995 to
2010, covering activity both before the EU ETS (1995-2004) and during (2005-2010).
While patent data exist beyond 2010, I do not include those years in order to avoid
well-documented problems of truncation in patent counts (due to delays in processing of
patent applications). For the pre-sample mean estimator, I also use patent data going
back to 1985, allowing for a full decade of data to be used for that purpose.
The primary outcome of interest is low-carbon patenting activity at the European
Patent Office (EPO). I obtained patent records from the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT), with patents pertaining to reduction of carbon emissions identified
using the Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) categories associated with each patent.
As in Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2014), I consider any patent labeled with a CPC category
beginning with Y02 to be a low-carbon invention. Knowledge stocks based on these
patent counts are constructed using one, two, and three year lags of patent output.
Price and other control data come from several different sources. Emissions allowance
prices are from the European Energy Exchange (EEX), and represent the price (in e) of a
year-ahead future contract for a permit granting the right to emit one ton of CO2. Coal
prices come from the International Energy Agency (IEA)16 and represent the annual
16Table 4 of http://www.iea.org/media/training/presentations/statisticsmarch/CoalInformation.pdf
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average per-ton price of Colombian coal. Electricity and natural gas prices are from
Eurostat and represent within-year average prices for those commodities by country.
The natural gas prices used are those for mid-size industrial consumers.17 Controls for
other factors affecting the profitability of low-carbon R&D come from the IEA, and
include both installed renewable energy capacity (as a proxy for demand side-policies
such as feed-in tariffs) and public R&D investment in renewable energy (as a proxy for
supply-side interventions).
Regulatory status per firm is based on matching of patent data to the European
Union Transaction Log (EUTL) associated with the EU ETS. To match firms, I apply
the name harmonization process used in PATSTAT (Magerman et al., 2006) to account
operator names from the EUTL. Firms are then matched between datasets using the
harmonized name and country from both datasets.
Calculation of estimated effect sizes requires specification of a pass-through rate re-
lating the emissions permit price to the retail electricity price. Very few estimates of
the retail pass-through rates exist; most studies concern wholesale electricity prices due
to the frequency and availability of the data. In one of the only studies attempting
to quantify retail pass-through rates, Sijm et al. (2008) offer several such estimates for
Germany and the Netherlands (excluded here due to missing data), but none for France.
I use their estimates that are based on the assumption that the level of costs passed
through to the retail price is the same as the level passed through to the wholesale price.
To ensure my estimates are conservative, I use the lowest such estimate, which equates
to 4.8 e/MWh. Further, that pass-through level is also smaller than the average pass-
through level for Germany estimated via either of the other two approaches in Sijm et al.
(2008). For France, due to retail price regulation and in keeping with my desire to pro-
17Specifically, gas prices are from tables nrg pc 203 and nrg pc 203 h. Data up to 2007 are from
nrg pc 203 h, and data from 2008-2010 are from nrg pc 203. Prices are for band I3, which is for customers
using between 10,000 and 100,000 GJ.
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vide conservative estimates, I assume that while wholesale pass-through rate estimates
are positive, there will be no pass-through to retail prices (0%). Because no published
estimates exist for retail pass-through rates in other countries, I restrict effect size cal-
culations to Germany and France. That choice implicitly assumes the ETS has no effect
on low-carbon patenting in other countries, thereby ensuring that estimated effect sizes
remain conservative.
To motivate the empirical analysis, Table 3.1 provides brief summary statistics of
low-carbon, electricity related patent output broken out by country, ETS status, and
period (1995-2004 vs 2005-2010). A number of observations emerge from these summary
statistics. First, the average number of low-carbon patents per firm per year increases
during years in which the ETS is active. This is consistent with the idea of induced
innovation. Second, the increase in patenting among unregulated firms that occurs with
the introduction of the ETS is smallest in France (as a percent of pre-ETS patenting),
which is consistent with the hypothesis that indirect innovation effects will be weakest
in France. That pattern is more easily seen graphically; Figure 3.2 presents the low-
carbon patent output in the UK, Germany, and France, normalized to 2004 levels. The
increase in France is notably lower. However, attributing any of these observations to the
introduction of regulation is complicated by a number of factors. Both electricity and fuel
prices increase, and the patent rate for regulated firms differs from that for unregulated
firms even prior to the introduction of regulation. Thus, any estimation strategy must
account for both unobserved heterogeneity and the impact of factors other than the ETS
on low-carbon patenting. The preferred specification does both.
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3.5 Results and Discussion
3.5.1 Models with electricity price only
I first estimate (3.20) using the three estimation strategies outlined earlier, then
compute estimates of the direct, indirect, and total policy effects according to Sections
3.4.2 and 3.4.2. The results in Table 3.2 indicate that being subjected to ETS regulation
increases patent output, higher electricity prices lead to additional patents, and that
lagged own knowledge increases patent output. Evidence for strong cross-firm knowledge
spillovers in this context is mixed; patent stocks from the previous year have no significant
impact on current patenting, but longer lags exhibit significant effects of opposite signs.
I return to interpretation of these estimates in the discussion section below.
Estimates of the direct, indirect, and total policy effects computed according to Sec-
tions 3.4.2 and 3.4.2 are reported at the bottom of Table 3.2. For the preferred presam-
ple mean specification, the estimated direct effect of the ETS on patenting, captured by
γˆRDirect is 649 additional patents. The estimates of γˆ
R
Indirect and γˆ
U
Indirect are of greater
interest, as those indirect effects are the central focus of this paper. The estimated indi-
rect effect on regulated firms γˆRIndirect is 100 additional patents, while the indirect effect
on unregulated firms γˆUIndirect is 361 additional patents, for a total indirect effect of 461
patents. These results suggest that indirect effects are 71% the size of the estimated
direct effects, such that the total effect of regulation on innovation may be substantially
larger than frequently reported estimates of direct effects.
3.5.2 Models including emissions permit price
The results in the previous section provide a two-part argument that the EU ETS
has increased low-carbon patenting by unregulated firms: the ETS increased electricity
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price, and an increased electricity price leads to more low-carbon patenting. Estimates of
(3.21) should offer more direct evidence of such an effect, since the carbon price appears
directly in the model. Estimates of three variants of that model (pooled, fixed effects,
and presample mean) are reported in Table 3.3, with standard errors again adjusted for
over-dispersion.
The results in Table 3.3 suggest that again, own knowledge and ETS regulatory status
are important determinants of patent output. In addition, the estimates provide evidence
that the degree to which passed-through carbon costs contribute positively to patent
output varies by country. The estimates indicate no significant effect in France, but a
significant and positive effect in several other countries. This discrepancy in effects across
the two countries is consistent with the hypothesis that permit prices impact innovation
through cost pass-through, since the scope for pass-through is much higher in the more
liberalized retail markets outside of France. If permit prices were to affect innovation
through a channel other than the electricity price, we should still see an effect of the
permit price on patenting in France. If, instead, permit prices do not affect innovation
outside the regulated sector, we should see a zero effect across all countries. The fact
that we see no permit price effect in France but a positive effect elsewhere is consistent
with the hypothesis that indirectly induced innovation is mediated by cost pass-through.
3.5.3 Additional tests
While the main results presented above are consistent with the ETS having indirect
effects on low-carbon innovation, it is possible they reflect some other driver of innova-
tion. To address that possibility, I attempt to falsify the results through estimation of
variants of (3.20). First, since the stylized theoretical framework is based on unregulated
firms being users of the output produced by regulated firms (i.e. electricity), I estimate
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(3.20) on the subset of firms that are unregulated. Doing so yields the results in Table
3.4, which still suggests a positive and significant elasticity of patenting with respect
to electricity price; the primary results are not driven by behavior of regulated firms.
I also estimate a variant of (3.20) allowing βelec to vary by industrial sector. Lending
credibility to the specification, firms in electricity-dependent sectors, such as those de-
voted to the manufacture of chemicals, metals, electronic components, energy machinery,
and telecommunications exhibit strong, positive patenting responses to higher electricity
prices and pass-through.
Further exploration of the relation between electricity prices and low-carbon patent-
ing suggests that cost pass-through may impact innovation through multiple channels.
The preceding results are consistent with the theoretical setup in which firms innovate
to reduce their own production costs in response to a factor price increase. However,
suppliers of technology to downstream firms would view such cost increases as a mar-
ket opportunity for more electrically efficient machinery or distributed power generation.
Similarly, just as firms are exposed to higher electricity prices via pass-through, so too
are household users. To investigate whether pass-through stimulates innovation via these
alternate channels, I estimate variants of (3.20) that include foreign electricity prices and
domestic household electricity prices. The results in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that cost
pass-through could be affecting innovation by downstream, unregulated firms via all of
those mechanisms.
Third, I examine the sensitivity of the results to how both knowledge stocks and
expectations for future electricity prices are measured. In the primary specification,
knowledge stocks are based upon one, two, and three year lags of patent output, with
effects falling off quickly after the first lag. Estimation of a model that includes only that
first lag does not substantively change coefficient estimates (Table 3.7). Similarly, the
returns to innovation depend upon future electricity prices, and using only one-year lags
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of electricity prices as a proxy for expected future prices may be imperfect. As such, I
estimate an alternative specification including first, second, and third lags of electricity
prices. The results (Table 3.8) indicate that the effects of more than one year lags of
electricity prices fall off quickly, and the first lag retains its positive and significant impact
on patenting. Interestingly, the coefficient on the second lag of electricity price is negative
(though not significant), which could indicate that firms look at trends in prices when
forecasting future electricity costs. A higher second lag holding the first lag fixed would
indicate a declining electricity price trend and, if that trend were to continue, lower future
electricity costs and lower demand for innovation.
Finally, I also conduct a placebo test to examine whether patent outcomes that should
not respond to the electricity price in fact show no response. In particular, I examine
whether low-carbon patenting responds to future electricity price increases. As expected,
changes in electricity prices do not have a retroactive impact on patenting (Table 3.9).
3.5.4 Discussion
Several questions follow from the preceding empirical results, which suggest that un-
regulated, downstream firms responded to the introduction of the EU ETS by increasing
low-carbon patenting. First, why does such a response appear here but not in carefully
done studies such as that by Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2014)? Second, are the indirect
effects estimated here due to the hypothesized channel of cost pass-through and down-
stream firms innovating to reduce their own costs, or some other channel? Third, are
patents an appropriate measure of innovation?
114
Indirectly Induced Innovation: Consequences for Environmental Policy Analysis Chapter 3
Comparison with prior studies
The results here differ from prior studies for several reasons. First and foremost,
the current study emphasizes downstream spillovers, whereas prior studies either ignore
spillovers or focus onupstream spillovers involving suppliers of technology to regulated
firms. Downstream spillovers entail a different and much broader set of firms and a
larger set of technologies than the traditional focus on upstream spillovers. For example,
the vast majority of firms use electricity in their daily activities, yet most of them are
not regulated, not suitable matches for regulated firms, and not technology suppliers to
regulated firms. Thus any estimator focused on innovation that directly reduces emissions
is likely to miss any response by those electricity users. This suggests a broader definition
of low-carbon innovation to include technology related to efficient use of goods produced
by regulated firms (e.g. electrical efficiency). The concept of “embedded carbon” is
familiar in lifecycle analysis but it merits more careful consideration in studies of induced
innovation.
The estimates here also indicate a larger direct effect than that found in Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre (2014) in the ETS context, which demands explanation. That study uses
a matched difference in difference estimator, finding a treatment effect of 2 additional
patents per regulated firm. Applied to their matched sample, that corresponds to a direct
effect of 84 additional patents, and 188 additional patents for the full set of ETS firms
(including firms for which no suitable match was found). In contrast, the direct effect
estimated here for the full set of ETS firms is 649 additional patents.
The difference in the estimated direct effects here and in Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre
(2014) stems from differing assumptions about whether treatment effects are homogenous
or heterogeneous across firms. In Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2014), each firm subjected
to regulation is assumed to increase patenting by a fixed number of patents, with the
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caveat that patent output is censored at zero. In contrast, the dynamic count model
here assumes that treatment has a multiplicative effect, such that regulated firms in-
crease patenting by a fixed percentage rather than a fixed number of patents. The two
assumptions imply very different patenting responses to regulation for more innovative
firms, while they may have similar predictions for firms that produce no more than a few
patents. To illustrate the point, I use estimates in Table 3.2 to compute direct effects for
a set of firms with patent output comparable to the matched sample used in Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre (2014). Since their matched sample accounted for only 14.4% of patent-
ing by ETS firms during the 2005-2009 period but 61.6% of ETS firms, the matched
sample must consist of less innovative firms. This exercise yields a direct effect of 82
patents, which is in line with the matched sample effect from Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre
(2014). The primary difference between the direct effects estimated in the two stud-
ies then seems to be the different assumptions about how treatment impacts the more
innovative, unmatched firms.
Alternative channels
The question of whether the estimated effect of the ETS on low-carbon patenting
by unregulated firms is due to the modeled mechanism is more difficult to answer. The
empirical results are certainly consistent with unregulated firms responding to higher
electricity prices, and I have attempted to account for the influence of other drivers of
low carbon patenting (e.g. demand-side policies and public R&D investment) and con-
duct appropriate placebo and robustness checks.18 None of the results provide evidence
against the hypothesis that cost pass-through leads to increased low-carbon patenting by
18To the extent that public R&D is funded by revenue recycling from permit auctions, controlling for
public R&D may artificially remove some of the effect of the ETS on downstream innovation that occurs
via public-private R&D partnerships. I thank Dallas Burtraw for that observation. To the extent revenue
recycling provides a substantive component of R&D funding, the estimates presented here should then
be interpreted as lower bounds.
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downstream, unregulated firms.
However, in light of positive firm responses to both foreign industrial electricity prices
and domestic household electricity prices, cost pass-through may be influencing patenting
decisions of downstream, unregulated firms via multiple pathways. The theory presented
earlier suggests that firms facing higher electricity prices due to pass-through will view
investment in R&D as more profitable, and will alter R&D decisions accordingly. In a
similar fashion, both firms and households facing higher electricity prices due to pass-
through will view investment in electricity-saving technology provided by other firms as
more profitable than before. As such, some of the increase in low-carbon patenting by
unregulated firms may reflect increased patent output by technology suppliers reacting
to a market opportunity created by the electricity price increase rather than their own
cost increases. For example, downstream firms could be innovate to offer a differentiated,
more energy efficient good to consumers facing higher electricity prices (in the spirit of
Romer (1990)). Regardless, all of those mechanisms imply that pass-through of emissions
permit costs led to increased low-carbon patenting by unregulated firms. Disentangling
the different sub-mechanisms is an interesting avenue for further research.
Measuring innovation
This study and all others using patents as a measure of innovation are subject to the
caveats that come with such data. Other than the practical considerations (e.g. trunca-
tion due to delays in patent processing), two primary issues are worth addressing here.
First, not all innovations result in patents. As documented elsewhere (e.g. Hoffmann
(2007)), the EU ETS spurred many process changes that helped lower emissions with-
out the production of a patent. Similarly, some inventors of patentable innovations may
choose not to apply for protection, instead keeping the invention as a trade secret. As
such, the estimates presented here are likely to still underestimate the total impact of the
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ETS on innovation. Second, patent counts are a noisy measure of what is economically
relevant for the costs of regulation like the EUETS, which is the adoption of those new
technologies. Data do exist for some specific technologies (e.g. air conditioners – see
Newell et al. (1999)), but not across the full spectrum of technologies considered here.
Still, related pieces of evidence may shed some light on the topic. Patents filed just after
the introduction of the EU ETS had comparable family sizes to those filed just before,
providing no evidence that the additional induced patents were of any lower quality than
those filed before the introduction of the permit market. Since patent application is a
costly activity, we might interpret this as suggestive evidence that any induced innova-
tions are as likely to be brought to market as others.
3.6 Conclusions
Increasingly, a stated objective of environmental policy is to stimulate the develop-
ment of new technology that will make achievement of environmental goals less costly.
This is especially true for climate policy, for which the social costs of not achieving envi-
ronmental targets may be quite large. Traditional policy analysis seeks to quantify the
innovation effects of a particular environmental policy by estimating a treatment effect
on firms regulated under that policy. This paper has argued that the total effects of a
policy may diverge from the direct effects, using both a simple modeling framework and
an empirical application to the European Union Emissions Trading System. In that em-
pirical application, estimates suggest that the total effect of the EU ETS on low-carbon
patents is 71% larger than the direct effect that would be estimated via standard methods
based upon the treatment effects framework. The absolute size of the impact of the EU
ETS on low-carbon innovation remains small, but the relative size of the direct and total
policy effects suggests that for policies imposing higher costs on regulated firms, failure
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to account for indirectly induced innovation may have more important consequences.
Further, I argue the general mechanism for indirect effects is likely to apply to a
broad array of environmental policies. As seen in the simplified theoretical model, pass-
through of policy-imposed costs is likely to occur whenever regulated firms face little
unregulated competition in their output market(s). This can occur when all firms are
regulated, or when only some firms are regulated, but those firms possess market power.
The latter scenario is quite common in environmental policies. Firms with market power
are often included in environmental regulation: they are frequently large emitters, and
the concentration of emissions among a smaller number of firms may lower monitoring
costs for the regulator. As a result, the mechanisms presented here may be more broadly
applicable to a large number of environmental policies, though the strength of the indirect
policy effects on innovation will differ by policy, industry, and market conditions.
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Figure 3.1: Prices over time for year-ahead power futures and year-ahead emissions
permit futures. All prices are nominal and in EUR. Source: European Energy Ex-
change (EEX).
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Figure 3.2: Low-carbon patents by country per year in France, Germany, and UK,
normalized to 2004 levels for each country. Source: European Patent Office (EPO).
121
Indirectly Induced Innovation: Consequences for Environmental Policy Analysis Chapter 3
Figure 3.3: Number of low-carbon patents by country during 2000-2010 for the top
20 low-carbon patenting countries. Source: EPO.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics.
Total Pats Avg Pats Elec Price Gas Price Firms
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Belgium 129 309 0.1 0.39 91.62 119.8 5.62 9.32 133
Non-ETS 98 298 0.08 0.39 – – – – 128
ETS 31 11 0.62 0.37 – – – – 5
Germany 6056 10884 0.24 0.72 94.77 132.82 7.36 13.36 2518
Non-ETS 5016 8852 0.2 0.6 – – – – 2470
ETS 1040 2032 2.17 7.06 – – – – 48
Denmark 143 506 0.13 0.77 93.74 168.19 5.94 14.33 110
Non-ETS 119 468 0.11 0.74 – – – – 105
ETS 24 38 0.48 1.27 – – – – 5
Spain 101 493 0.04 0.33 74.31 107.53 4.57 8.36 252
Non-ETS 101 482 0.04 0.32 – – – – 250
ETS 0 11 0 0.92 – – – – 2
France 1323 1560 0.21 0.41 69.43 75.7 5.38 10.18 627
Non-ETS 1173 1341 0.19 0.37 – – – – 606
ETS 150 219 0.71 1.74 – – – – 21
Italy 607 727 0.09 0.19 107.25 152.28 5.66 9.54 642
Non-ETS 532 660 0.08 0.17 – – – – 629
ETS 75 67 0.58 0.86 – – – – 13
UK 348 702 0.07 0.24 69.87 108.18 4.53 9.48 482
Non-ETS 247 467 0.05 0.17 – – – – 468
ETS 101 235 0.72 2.8 – – – – 14
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Table 3.2: Main regression results: low-carbon patents as a function of predictors
including electricity price. Estimates of coefficients corresponding to other covariates,
including factor prices, presample mean, country effects, and total patent rate are
omitted for emphasis on the effects of interest. All standard errors are adjusted for
overdispersion by fitting a quasipoisson model.
Pooled FE Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.293. 0.041 -0.270
(0.169) (0.059) (0.167)
ln(Kt−1) 0.699** 0.456*** 0.708**
(0.243) (0.096) (0.240)
ln(Kt−2) -0.488** -0.273*** -0.479**
(0.170) (0.070) (0.168)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.226*** -0.529*** -1.221***
(0.032) (0.016) (0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.812*** -0.226*** -0.831***
(0.033) (0.015) (0.032)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.464*** -0.009 -0.515***
(0.032) (0.014) (0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.780*** 0.387*** 0.754***
(0.017) (0.005) (0.017)
ln(kit−1) 0.099*** 0.009 0.087***
(0.020) (0.007) (0.019)
ln(kit−2) 0.071*** -0.079*** 0.009
(0.017) (0.006) (0.018)
Log elec price ln(welect−1) 0.757*** 0.816*** 0.718***
(0.131) (0.024) (0.129)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.100** 0.004 0.138***
(0.034) (0.011) (0.034)
Policy effect estimates: # additional patents
Direct effect γˆRDirect 502 13 649
(340,683) (-44,122) (466,854)
Indirect effect (reg) γˆRIndirect 116 106 100
(107,122) (68,158) (93,106)
Indirect effect (unreg) γˆUIndirect 397 426 361
(379,422) (279,649) (349,370)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.3: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors including emissions
permit price. Direct and indirect effect size estimates omitted for brevity.
Pooled Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) 0.089 0.083
(0.124) (0.122)
ln(Kt−1) -0.032 0.011
(0.173) (0.170)
ln(Kt−2) 0.061 0.066
(0.126) (0.124)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.220*** -1.216***
(0.032) (0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.807*** -0.826***
(0.033) (0.032)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.463*** -0.514***
(0.033) (0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.780*** 0.754***
(0.017) (0.017)
ln(kit−1) 0.102*** 0.090***
(0.020) (0.019)
ln(kit−2) 0.072*** 0.012
(0.017) (0.018)
Permit price τt−1 0.005 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Permit price x Belgium τt−1 ∗ 1(Belgium) 0.021** 0.020**
(0.008) (0.008)
Permit price x Germany τt−1 ∗ 1(Germany) 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Permit price x Denmark τt−1 ∗ 1(Denmark) 0.030*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.007)
Permit price x Spain τt−1 ∗ 1(Spain) 0.024** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.007)
Permit price x Italy τt−1 ∗ 1(Italy) 0.011* 0.009.
(0.005) (0.005)
Permit price x UK τt−1 ∗ 1(UK) 0.036*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.005)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.089* 0.129***
(0.035) (0.034)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.4: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, with sample restricted
to unregulated firms. All estimates use presample mean estimator to account for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.093
(0.131)
ln(Kt−1) 0.300
(0.195)
ln(Kt−2) -0.190
(0.140)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.210***
(0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.841***
(0.032)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.500***
(0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.782***
(0.018)
ln(kit−1) 0.064**
(0.021)
ln(kit−2) 0.019
(0.019)
Log elec price ln(welecct−1) 0.574***
(0.126)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.5: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, including cross-coun-
try electricity price effects. All estimates use presample mean estimator to account
for unobserved heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.078
(0.124)
ln(Kt−1) 0.508**
(0.192)
ln(Kt−2) -0.440**
(0.142)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.218***
(0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.829***
(0.032)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.512***
(0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.755***
(0.017)
ln(kit−1) 0.087***
(0.019)
ln(kit−2) 0.011
(0.018)
Log own elec price ln(welecct−1) 0.625***
(0.121)
Log other elec price ln(welecc′t−1) 0.469**
(0.152)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.140***
(0.034)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.6: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, including household
electricity price effects. All estimates use presample mean estimator to account for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.054
(0.124)
ln(Kt−1) 0.318.
(0.186)
ln(Kt−2) -0.221
(0.136)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.227***
(0.032)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.839***
(0.033)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.505***
(0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.754***
(0.017)
ln(kit−1) 0.084***
(0.020)
ln(kit−2) 0.011
(0.018)
Log own elec price ln(welec,Industryct−1 ) 0.401*
(0.166)
Log household elec price ln(welec,Householdct−1 ) 0.469*
(0.213)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.138***
(0.034)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.7: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, including one year
lag of patent output as knowledge stock proxy. All estimates use presample mean
estimator to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.044
(0.058)
No own knowledge ln(Kt−1) -1.672***
(0.027)
Log own knowledge 1(kit = 0) 1.006***
(0.010)
Log elec price ln(kit) 0.552***
(0.113)
Regulatory status ln(welecct−1) 0.107**
(0.035)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.8: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, including multiple
lags of electricity price. All estimates use presample mean estimator to account for
unobserved heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.006
(0.128)
ln(Kt−1) 0.363.
(0.187)
ln(Kt−2) -0.324*
(0.139)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.222***
(0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -0.830***
(0.032)
1(kit−2 = 0) -0.514***
(0.032)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.754***
(0.017)
ln(kit−1) 0.088***
(0.019)
ln(kit−2) 0.009
(0.018)
Log own elec price ln(welecct−1) 0.816***
(0.184)
ln(welecct−2) -0.254
(0.203)
ln(welecct−3) 0.064
(0.146)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.138***
(0.034)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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Table 3.9: Regression results: low-carbon patents on predictors, including future elec-
tricity price. All estimates use presample mean estimator to account for unobserved
heterogeneity.
Presample
Log total knowledge ln(Kt) -0.177
(0.126)
ln(Kt−1) 0.170
(0.145)
No own knowledge 1(kit = 0) -1.372***
(0.031)
1(kit−1 = 0) -1.071***
(0.031)
Log own knowledge ln(kit) 0.751***
(0.018)
ln(kit−1) 0.134***
(0.018)
Log elec price ln(welecct−1) 0.594***
(0.135)
Log future elec price ln(welecct+1) -0.027
(0.135)
Regulatory status Tit−1 0.131***
(0.038)
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
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A.1 Appendix - Chapter 1
The following lemma will be useful in the proofs of multiple results and propositions:
Lemma 1 Let n∗(ω) be the largest integer nt satisfying
ln(nt) ≤ ω ln
(
1 +
1
ω +N − nt
)
.
Then n∗(ω) is non-decreasing in ω, i.e. n∗(ω2) ≥ n∗(ω1) for ω2 > ω1.
Proof: First, fix nt at the largest integer which satisfies the inequality, and consider
the partial derivative of the right hand side of the inequality with respect to ω:
∂
∂ω
ω ln
(
1 +
1
ω +N − nt
)
= ln
(
1 +
1
ω +N − nt
)
− ω
(ω +N − nt)(ω +N − nt + 1)
An established bound for the natural log is ln(1 +x) ≥ x
1+x
. Applying this to the partial
derivative yields:
∂
∂ω
ω ln
(
1 +
1
ω +N − nt
)
≥
1
ω+N−nt
1 + 1
ω+N−nt
− ω
(ω +N − nt)(ω +N − nt + 1) .
Algebra on the right side yields
∂
∂ω
ω ln
(
1 +
1
ω +N − nt
)
≥ 1
ω +N − nt + 1
(
1− ω
ω +N − nt
)
Both terms on the right hand side are positive, yielding ∂
∂ω
(
1 + 1
ω+N−nt
)ω
> 0. Thus,
if n∗(ω1) satisfies the inequality at ω1, it will satisfy the inequality at ω2 > ω1. Since
n∗(ω2) is the largest integer satisfying the inequality at ω2, n∗(ω2) can be no smaller than
n∗(ω1), i.e. n∗(ω2) ≥ n∗(ω1).
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Proof of Result 1
Proof: (i) Consider the stability condition (1.18). It can be shown that ln(1+x) ≤ x
(use the concavity of ln(·)). As a result, ln
(
1 + 1
δAL+N−nt+1
)
≤ 1
δAL+N−nt+1 . Use this
result to bound the right hand side of (1.18):
ln(nt) ≤ (1 + δAL) ln
(
1 +
1
δAL +N − nt + 1
)
≤ 1 + δAL
δAL +N − nt + 1
Since N ≥ nt, the rightmost fraction is necessarily less than or equal one. However,
since ln(nt) > 1 for nt ≥ 3, the stability condition is violated for nt ≥ 3. As a result,
n∗t ≤ 2.
(ii) Stability condition (1.18) can be rewritten as
nt ≤
(
1 +
1
1 + δAL +N − nt
)1+δAL
,
which is of the form of the inequality in Lemma 1, with ω = 1 + δAL. Note that
∂
∂bL
(1 + δAL) =
∂
∂bL
δ
1− δ(1− bL) = −
δ2
(1− δ(1− bL))2 < 0.
Applying Lemma 1, an increase in bL causes a decrease in ω, which can only destabilize
the coalition. As a result, n∗L is non-increasing in bL.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: The proof is analogous to that for Result 1, with AL replaced by A¯.
Consider the stability condition (1.28). Note that the term ln
(
1 + 1
δA¯+N−nt+1
)
is again
of the form ln(1 + x). It can be shown that ln(1 + x) ≤ x (use the concavity of ln(·)).
As a result, ln
(
1 + 1
δA¯+N−nt+1
)
≤ 1
δA¯+N−nt+1 . Use this result to bound the right hand
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side of (1.28):
ln(nt) ≤
(
1 + δA¯
)
ln
(
1 +
1
δA¯+N − nt + 1
)
≤ 1 + δA¯
δA¯+N − nt + 1
Since N ≥ nt, the rightmost fraction is necessarily less than or equal one. However,
since ln(nt) > 1 for nt ≥ 3, the stability condition is violated for nt ≥ 3. As a result,
n∗t ≤ 2.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: We show first that (i) an increase in ρ¯ cannot destabilize a stable coalition,
and then that (ii) there exist some increases in ρ¯ that cause the n∗H to increase.
(i) The stability condition (1.28) is again of the form in Lemma 1, with ω = 1 + δA¯. We
are interested in the sign of ∂ω
∂ρ¯
. Using the definitions of AH and AL, and A¯, we can write
A¯ as
A¯ =
1− δ(1− bL) + ρ¯
(
bH−bL
1−bH + δ(1− bL)
)
1− δ(1− ρ¯)(1− bH)
1− bH
1− δ(1− bL)
The sign of ∂ω
∂ρ¯
is the same as the sign of ∂A¯
∂ρ¯
. Since the second fraction in the expression
for A¯ is constant with respect to ρ¯, we consider only the partial of the first fraction.
Applying the quotient rule and rearranging the numerator, we are interested in the sign
of [
δ(1− bL) + bH−bL1−bH
]
[1− δ(1− bH)]− [δ(1− bH)] [1− δ(1− bL)]
(1− δ(1− ρ¯)(1− bH))2 .
The denominator is clearly positive, so we need only determine the sign of the nu-
merator. Since bH > bL, δ(1 − bL) > δ(1 − bH), and the first term is larger than the
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third. Similarly, bH > bL ⇒ 1− δ(1− bH) > 1− δ(1− bL), and the second term is larger
than the fourth. As a result, the entire expression is positive, and thus ∂ω
∂ρ¯
> 0. Applying
Lemma 1, this implies that an increase in ρ¯ cannot destabilize the coalition, and thus an
increase in ρ¯ will never decrease the stable coalition size.
(ii) To demonstrate that the introduction of exogenous threat can indeed make a coalition
of size 2 stable when it would not be in the absence of threat, consider the case where
N = 3, bH = 0.9, bL = 0.1, and δ = 0.95. At ρ¯ = 0, the coalition of size 2 is not internally
stable. When ρ¯ = 0.5, the coalition of size 2 is stable.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: Denote by n∗H , hjt, and hit the equilibria coalition size, harvest rate for a
non-member, and harvest rate for a member obtained under the threat of regime shift.
Clearly, the outcome of the no-shift case is given by n˜∗H = nH |ρ¯=0, h˜jt = hjt|ρ¯=0, and
h˜it = hit|ρ¯=0. In addition, as long as the second condition in (1.31) holds, we have
n˜∗H = 1, n
∗
H = 2, and N ≥ 3.
Using (1.24) and (1.25), we derive
hjt − h˜jt = g(St, H)(1 + δ(A˜H − A¯))
(δA˜H +N)[N − 1 + δA¯]
, (A.1)
hit − h˜it = g(St, H)(2−N + δ(A˜H − 2A¯))
(δA˜H +N)[N − 1 + δA¯]
, (A.2)
where A˜H = A¯H |ρ¯=0. Since A˜H , A¯ > 0, then (A.1) suggests that hjt > h˜jt if and only if
1 + δ(A˜H − A¯) > 0. It can be shown that 1 > δ(A˜H − A¯) if and only if ρ¯ < ρ¯R, where ρ¯R
is given in (1.32).
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, we have ∂A¯
∂ρ¯
> 0, which implies A¯ > A˜H =
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A¯|ρ¯=0. Using this result along with (A.2) and the fact that N ≥ 3, we get hit < h˜it.
Proof of Result 2
Proof: We are interested in the sign of ∂Ht(St,H)
∂ρ¯
= ∂
∂ρ¯
(
n∗Hh
∗
it + (N − n∗H)h∗jt
)
=
∂
∂ρ¯
(N − n∗H + 1) g(St,H)δA¯+N−n∗H+1 . Since g(St, H) is independent of ρ¯, we need only consider
the sign of ∂
∂ρ¯
N−n∗H+1
δA¯+N−n∗H+1
. By the quotient rule,
∂
∂ρ¯
N − n∗H + 1
δA¯+N − n∗H + 1
=
−∂n∗H
∂ρ¯
(
δA¯+N − n∗H + 1
)− (N − n∗H + 1)(δ ∂A¯∂ρ¯ − ∂n∗H∂ρ¯ )(
δA¯+N − n∗H + 1
)2
=− δ
∂n∗H
∂ρ¯
A¯+ (N − n∗H + 1) ∂A¯∂ρ¯(
δA¯+N − n∗H + 1
)2
By Result 1,
∂n∗H
∂ρ¯
≥ 0. Similarly, from the proof of Result 1, ∂A¯
∂ρ¯
> 0. Since all other
terms in the fraction are positive, the entire fraction is positive, and as such the right
hand side is negative, and thus ∂H
∂ρ¯
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: The stability condition in the doomsday scenario can be written as
n∗DDH ≤
(
1 +
1
1
1−δ(1−ρ¯)(1−bH) +N − n∗DDH
) 1
1−δ(1−ρ¯)(1−bH )
. (A.3)
This condition is again of the form used in Lemma 1, with ω = 1
1−δ(1−ρ¯)(1−bH) . In this
case, ω is clearly decreasing in ρ¯, and by Lemma 1, n∗DDH (ρ¯) is non-increasing in ρ¯.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Proof: (i) The second part of condition (1.35) corresponds directly to the stability
conditions for the doomsday and no-shift cases, and requires that the coalition of size two
is stable in the no-shift case and full non-cooperation prevails in the doomsday scenario.
(ii) Denote by h˜jt the harvest rate obtained under the no-shift case. Using (1.25) and
result (i), we derive
hjt − h˜jt = g(St, H)[−1 + δ(A˜H − A¯
DD)]
(δA¯+N)(δA˜H +N − 1)
.
It can be shown that −1+δ(A˜H− A¯DD) < 0 if and only if the first condition in (1.35)
holds. The result then follows.
Proof of Result 3
Proof: Total harvest prior to the occurrence of a doomsday event can be written
H∗H = (N − n∗H)h∗j + n∗Hh∗i =
(N − n∗H + 1) g(St, H)
δA¯+N − n∗H + 1
By Proposition 5, we know n∗H(0) > n
∗DD
H (ρ¯) for ρ¯ > 0. This reduction in coalition size
tends to increase total harvest. The other difference between the no-threat case and the
doomsday scenario is the change in A¯. In particular, we may compare A¯DD at ρ¯ and
ρ = 0. A¯DD can be written
A¯DD =(1− ρ¯) 1− bH
1− δ(1− ρ¯)(1− bH)
The right hand side is clearly decreasing in ρ¯, such that A¯DD(ρ¯) < A¯DD(0). Further, H∗H
is decreasing in A¯DD, so that an increase in ρ¯ (including from 0 to ρ¯ > 0) causes H∗H to
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increase.
Since both effects act in the same direction, total harvest is higher under the doomsday
scenario than the productivity shift scenario.
A.2 Appendix - Chapter 2
A.2.1 Representing Trip Limits in Spatial Effort Model
As explained in the text, the probability that a trip limit will constrain harvester
i’s effort in patch j depends: negatively on the actual catch limits that the regulation
imposes for each species; positively on i’s harvests of each species in other patches; and
positively on the density of each species in patch j. In turn, the density of each species in
patch j depends positively on the stock densities in the absence of fishing and negatively
on the effort other fishers apply there. Finally, the probability a trip limit will constrain
fishing effort must lie in the unit interval. The following function, Ψjt, has each of the
desired properties:
Ψjt = (1− IFQt)e−αqT¯jt , (A.4)
where
T¯jt = min
s
njtQ¯jst
CPUE0jst
. (A.5)
Q¯jet is the species s trip limit for each harvester, α > 0, q was defined earlier, njt is the
number of vessels with experience fishing in patch j, and IFQt is an indicator variable
taking the value 1 if the fishery is under IFQ management in period t. (Recall that trip
limits for most species were removed with the introduction of IFQs).
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To see the intuition for this proxy, consider a special case in which njt identical fishers
visit patch j in period t and these harvesters catch species s only in patch j. In this case
the trip limit prohibits the group’s aggregate catch of species s from exceeding njt Q¯jet.
Dividing this by catch per unit effort for species s on patch j translates the aggregate
catch limit into an aggregate effort limit that is linked to the trip limit for species s.
However, there are trip limits for several species and the individual must cease fishing if
any of these binds. Accordingly, the implied effort limit is the minimum of these species-
specific limits. The proxy function Ψjt in equation (A.4) scales this maximal effort limit
by the parameter α and maps it to the unit interval. If α < 1 the scaling spreads maximal
effort level across several cells, relaxing the assumption that all species with trip limits
are caught only in patch j.
The variable T¯jt is computed from (A.5) for each data point and the result is incor-
porated into (A.4), the proxy for the probability that a trip limit binds for patch j. The
estimating equation is expressed in terms of the probability that a trip limit does not
bind, (1−Ψjt). Inserting this into equation (2.5) yields
Tjt =
1
q
ln
(
(pt − ct)(1−Ψjt) · E
[
CPUE0jt
]
V Cjt + p¯it
)
+
1
q
jt. (A.6)
This is the equation actually estimated. The parameter α is estimated along with other
parameters in the model. The proxy is viewed less as a literal probability than as a
general indicator of the likely severity of trip limits for fishing decisions on each patch.
Equation (A.6) is estimating equation used to examine spatial avoidance of bycatch.
A.2.2 Estimation Strategy for Spatial Effort Model
We estimate a variant of equation (2.5) in the text, with trip limits incorporated as
given by equations (A.4), (A.5), and (A.6) above. As mentioned in the text, the outcome
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variable Tjt is necessarily non-negative, suggesting a censored data estimation approach
similar to Tobit. Let the first term on the right hand side of (A.6) be denoted T ∗jt. Then
the likelihood of Tjt is simply
L(Tjt) =
[
P (T ∗jt > 0)f(Tjt|T ∗jt > 0)
]1(Tjt>0) [P (T ∗jt ≤ 0]1(Tjt=0) , (A.7)
where 1(·) denotes an indicator function. As with a standard Tobit, the component
probabilities and densities in this likelihood are based on the normal distribution (recall
our assumption that the error term is normally distributed). The difference between
this and a standard Tobit is that the relevant normal distributions do not have means
that are a linear function of parameters. Instead, the means are a nonlinear function of
parameters as given by the first term in equation (A.6). Regardless, the sum across all
observations of the log of (A.7) can be maximized numerically as with a standard Tobit.
A.2.3 Corrections to Expected Catch Per Unit Effort for 2011,
2012
The baseline proxy we use for expected catch per unit effort in patch j in period
t is based on actual catch per unit effort in j during the same two-month season in
the prior two years. Our evidence on non-spatial adjustments indicates that fishers can
influence CPUE in response to IFQs. If fishers anticipate such changes in CPUE, then our
baseline proxy in 2011 and 2012 must be adjusted to better reflect fishers’ expectations.
In particular, we require a way to identify systematic changes in CPUE that fishers could
anticipate at the start of a period in 2011 and 2012 and update our CPUE proxy based on
those expected changes to CPUE. Based on equation (2.3), changes to expected CPUE
under IFQs come from changes to vulnerability f under a new fishing method akjt. We
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are interested in the effect of that change in vulnerability on the start-of-period CPUE for
each combination of species, patch, and period under IFQs. The ratio of start-of-period
CPUE for species s under IFQs to that under pre-IFQ management can be written
CPUE0ksjt
CPUE0k′sjt
=
qfs(akjt)X
0
jst
qfs(ak′jt)X0jst
=
fs(akjt)
fs(ak′jt)
(A.8)
where k represents the optimal fishing method under IFQs, and k′ represents the optimal
method prior to IFQs. If fishers anticipate these changes, then we may replace CPUEs
with their expectations and rearrange (A.8) to give
E[CPUE0ksjt] =
fs(akjt)
fs(ak′jt)
E[CPUE0k′sjt] (A.9)
Equation (A.9) forms the basis for our expected CPUE proxy adjustment in 2011 and
2012. The expectation on the right hand side is our baseline proxy that uses lagged
data. The ratio of vulnerabilities is a correction factor that we seek to estimate. To do
so, we regress actual CPUE under IFQs against our baseline proxy, doing so separately
for 2011 and 2012. The estimated coefficient on our proxy variable in that regression
represents the expected CPUE correction factor we seek. We multiply those coefficients
by our original proxy to get an updated proxy for expected CPUE for 2011 and 2012.
It is important to note that we only apply this updating process for coefficient es-
timates that are significant in the regression based on (A.9). Significant coefficients
represent systematic changes to CPUE, and we argue it is those changes to vulnerability
that fishers might have anticipated when making location decisions. Insignificant coeffi-
cients indicate that fishers could not reliably alter their CPUE of that species in response
to IFQs. Given that fishers could not actually achieve systematic CPUE changes, we have
no reason to believe that fishers would have expected to achieve CPUE changes. As such,
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for those species, we leave our baseline expected CPUE proxy untouched.
A.3 Appendix - Chapter 3
A.3.1 Deriving cost pass-through
Since wR is an endogenously determined price that depends upon regulated firm
output, the effect of τ on wR acts solely through output decisions of regulated firms.
Further, since wR = P (XR∗), we may write
∂wR
∂τ
=
∑
i:Si=R
∂wR
∂xR∗i
∂xR∗i
∂τ
= NRP ′(XR∗)
∂xR∗i
∂τ
. (A.10)
Next, we can derive an expression for
∂xR∗i
∂τ
through total differentiation of (3.8). Rear-
ranging the result of that differentiation yields ∂x
R∗
∂τ
, which can be substituted into (A.10)
to yield (3.10).
A.3.2 Signing cost pass-through
Differentiate (3.8) with respect to the output of some other firm j:
P ′′(XR∗)xR∗i + P
′(XR∗)
∂xR∗i
∂xRj
+ P ′(XR∗) = cxx(xR∗i , w)
∂xR∗i
∂xRj
+ τexx(x
R∗
i , k
R
i )
∂xR∗i
∂xRj
and solve for
∂xR∗i
∂xRj
:
∂xR∗i
∂xRj
= − P
′′(XR∗)xR∗i + P
′(XR∗)
P ′(XR∗)− cxx(xR∗i , w)− τexx(xR∗i , kRi )
Equilibrium stability requires the entire expression to be negative: reaction functions
should be downward sloping (see Seade (1980)). Since the denominator is negative under
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the maintained assumptions, stability requires P ′′(XR∗)xR∗i + P
′(XR∗) < 0.
Similarly, the firm’s second-order condition for output requires for a maximum that
P ′′(XR∗)xR∗i + 2P
′(XR∗)− cxx(xR∗i , w)− τexx(xR∗i , kRi ) < 0 (A.11)
Summing (N − 1) times the stability condition plus the second order condition yields
the denominator in (3.10). Since it is the sum of negative components, that denominator
is negative. As a result, cost pass-through is positive provided that the equilibrium is
stable. Note that the denominator captures the change in marginal profits that occur from
a simultaneous marginal increase in quantity by all firms. If marginal profits increased
in such a case at some equilibrium profile of quantity choices, the equilibrium could not
be stable.
A.3.3 Derivation of optimal R&D choices
Derivation of R&D incentives follows Leahy and Neary (1997). The first-order con-
dition for R&D by unregulated firm j is then
∂piU∗j
∂kUj
∂kUj
∂rUj
+
∑
l 6=j
∂piU∗j
∂xU∗l
∂xU∗l
∂rUj
= 1. (A.12)
Thus, the unregulated firm accounts for the direct effect of augmented knowledge on its
own profits, but must also account for the effect of its R&D on second period output
choices of other unregulated firms. Note, however, that this expression does not include
an effect of rUj on profits through output choices of regulated firms. In keeping with the
assumption that unregulated firms are price takers, unregulated firms assume that their
R&D will not impact output decisions of regulated firms (and hence the equilibrium price
wR).
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Appendix Chapter A
Note that by the envelope theorem,
∂piU∗j
∂kUj
= −wRDRk , and by the knowledge dynamics,
∂kUj
∂rUj
= fUr . In addition,
∂piU∗j
∂xU∗l
= P ′xU∗j . For a symmetric equilibrium, we may rewrite
(A.12) as
−wRDRk fUr + (NU − 1)P ′xU∗j2
∂xU∗l
∂rUj
= 1. (A.13)
To derive
∂xU∗l
∂rUj
, we start with the first order conditions defining xU∗l and x
U∗
j , and
consider a shock that affects output decisions of all unregulated firms and R&D of un-
regulated firm j. Totally differentiate both first order conditions(except hold rUl , l 6= j,
and wR constant), substitute for xU∗j from the differentiation of x
U∗
j into the result for
xU∗l , and rearrange. Letting pi
Uj
lj denote the second order partial derivative of profits by
firm j with respect to output of unregulated firms l and j, differentiation yields:
piUjjj dx
U
j + (N
U − 1)piUjlj dxUl +
∂piUjj
∂kUj
fUr dr
U
j =0,
piUlll dx
U
l + pi
Ul
jl dx
U
j + (N
U − 2)piUll′l dxUl′ +
∂piUll
∂kUj
fURUdr
U
j =0.
Assuming symmetry of the equilibrium prior to the shock (i.e. dxUl = dx
U
l′ , pi
Ul
l′l = pi
Ul
jl =
piUjlj , pi
Uj
jj = pi
Ul
ll , and
∂piUjj
∂kUj
= −wRDRk ), solving these two equations and rearranging yields:
dxUl
drUj
=
piUjjj
(
fURU −
piUjlj
piUjjj
fUr
)
wRDRk(
piUjjj − piUjlj
)(
piUjjj + (N
U − 1)piUjlj
) . (A.14)
Substituting (A.14) into (A.13) and factoring out −fUr wRDRk yields (3.14).
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